

## タイ

2024 年 6 月 13 日ドラフト作成

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## 1. 一般情報

### (1) 人口・地理

#### ア 外務省「[タイ基礎データ](#)」(2024年5月27日)

4	民族	大多数がタイ族。その他 華人、マレー族等
5	言語	タイ語
6	宗教	仏教 94%、イスラム教 5%

### (2) 内政

#### ア 外務省「[タイ基礎データ](#)」(2024年5月27日)

#### 5 内政・社会状況

##### (1) タイの政治変遷

1932年の立憲革命から近年に至るタイの政治体制の変遷については、世界大戦や共産主義勢力の東南アジア地域での拡大といった国際情勢を反映して軍部中心の権威主義体制が長く続いた後、1980年代から1990年代にかけて民主化が進展し、冷戦終結による軍部の影響力が相対化する中で「1997年憲法」の下で急速に勢力を拡大したタクシン党首率いるタイ愛国党と、これに反発する勢力の政治的対立が深刻化してきた。

##### (2) 最近の内政動向

2023年3月20日の下院解散を受け、5月14日に下院総選挙が実施された。今次選挙では、全500議席（小選挙区400議席、比例代表100議席）が争われた。旧野党である「前進党」が大躍進し151議席を獲得し第一党、旧野党でタクシン元首相派の「貢献党」は141議席を獲得し第二党、選挙前の与党第一党で保守派の「国民国家の力党」は議席を減らし第四党（40議席）となり、プラユット前首相支持派の「団結国家建設党」は36議席で第五党となった。

同年7月13日に首班指名選挙が実施されたものの、唯一の首相候補である第一党のピター前進党党首の首相選出は否決された。首相選出には、上下両院750名（下院定数500名、上院定数250名）の過半数である376名以上の得票が必要であり、ピター党首が首相に選出されるには、2019年に軍政に任命された保守派の上院議員の票を一定数獲得することが不可欠であったが、不敬罪改正など革新的な政策を掲げる前進党のピター党首は上院議員から十分な票を得られなかった。7月19日に実施予定であった二回目の首班指名選挙は、ピター党首の首相候補への推薦が、国会議事手続規則にある「一事不再議の原則」に抵触するため推薦不可と判断され、投票は実施されなかった。

ピター党首の首相選出が困難となる中、貢献党は前進党との連立枠組みを解消し、前進党抜きの新たな連立枠組みとして、貢献党及び第三党の名誉党を中心とする旧与野党11党による新たな連立枠組みの結成を発表（右連立枠組みには親軍派の国民国家の力党や団結国家建設党も参加）。8月22日に実施された三回目の首班

指名選挙の結果、貢献党の首相候補であるセター氏（不動産開発大手元社長）が保守派の上院議員からの支持も得て首相に選出され、9月5日にセター新政権が発足した。

## イ ●DFAT「出身国情報報告 タイ（2023年12月18日版）」

### 政治システム

2.22 Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, with King Maha Vajiralongkorn as its Head of State. While the King has limited formal power, he is highly influential over Thai politics and the military (see Military). The National Assembly consists of an elected 500-member House of Representatives and an appointed 250 member Senate. All current senators were appointed by the last military junta; many are closely aligned with the military (see Recent History). The House of Representatives has a four-year term; the senate has a five year term.

2.23 At a sub-national level, Thailand is divided into 76 provinces and two special administrative areas (Bangkok and Pattaya). Provincial governors are appointed, while the governors of Bangkok and Pattaya are elected. Provinces are further subdivided into districts, led by centrally-appointed district chiefs. Local government sub-units include subdistricts, municipalities, and villages, in which citizens directly elect their leaders. The village headman or headwoman plays an important role in village life, including through organising collective action and mediating disputes.

## 2. 治安・人権状況

### (1) 一般的な状況

## ア ●DFAT「出身国情報報告 タイ（2023年12月18日版）」

### National Human Rights Institution

2.33 The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (NHRCT) was established in 2017. It is mandated to investigate violations, promote human rights, make recommendations to the government on the protection of human rights, and prepare human rights situation assessments. OHCHR currently rates the NHRCT as an ‘A’ status institution, meaning it is fully compliant with the Paris Principles governing national human rights institutions. It regained this status in 2022 after having been downgraded to ‘B’ status for several years for perceived shortcomings. Human rights organisations have criticised the NHRCT as lacking independence, as well as failing to hold state officials to account for human rights abuses.

### SECURITY SITUATION

2.34 The security situation in Thailand is generally stable, with two notable exceptions: an ongoing insurgency in the southern border provinces (SBPs) and periodic political

demonstrations which sometimes result in violence. Some border areas are dangerous due to armed conflict, landmines, violence associated with the drug trade and general lawlessness. Organised crime and corruption are significant problems. There is a large shadow economy, including trade in illicit drugs, human and wildlife trafficking, illegal logging, money laundering and counterfeiting.

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イ ●米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2023年-タイ](#)」(2024年4月22日)

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary arrest and detention; political interference in the judiciary; political prisoners; arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including arrests and prosecutions of those criticizing the government, censorship, and the use of lèse majesté and criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; serious government corruption; harassment of domestic human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence and sexual violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and significant restrictions on workers' freedom of association.

Authorities took some steps to investigate and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses. Official impunity, however, continued to be a problem.

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ウ ●HRW「[ワールドレポート 2024-タイ](#)」(2024年1月11日)

Thailand held a general election on May 14, 2023, under flawed and unfair constitutional and legal frameworks put in place by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) military junta. The reformist Move Forward Party (MFP) won the largest number of seats, but the military-appointed Senate led efforts that effectively blocked it from forming a government.

Srettha Thavisin of the runner-up Pheu Thai Party then formed a ruling coalition that included parties from the previous government of Prime Minister Gen. Prayut Chan-ocha. Even though the new government pledged to promote and protect human rights, impunity for abuses continued unabated. Authorities continued to restrict fundamental rights—particularly freedom of expression and peaceful assembly—and prosecuted human rights and democracy activists, community advocates, environmental defenders, and critics of the monarchy.

(2) 南部地域の状況

ア ●DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ \(2023 年 12 月 18 日版\)](#)」**People Associated with the Insurgency in the Southern Border Provinces**

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3.61 Insurgent attacks have targeted soldiers, police, state-sponsored militia, teachers, and monks. Security operations target insurgents and their suspected supporters. Civilians account for 70 per cent of all conflict-related deaths since January 2004. The SBPs are under martial law, and an emergency decree provides military and civilian authorities with significant powers, including to censor news and information, conduct warrantless searches, and hold detainees for 30 days without charge (see also Arbitrary Arrest and Detention). The decree also provides security forces with broad immunity from prosecution.

3.62 There are longstanding, credible reports of human rights abuses committed by security forces in the SBPs against suspected insurgents and ordinary civilians, including Arbitrary Arrest and Detention, Torture and Extra-Judicial Killings. People affected by state-perpetrated violence have limited recourse to justice, and human rights observers report that no member of the security forces has been successfully prosecuted for abuses committed in the SBPs. Insurgent groups have also been accused of human rights abuses against security forces and civilians.

3.63 In-country sources reported that the situation in the SBPs had improved significantly in recent years, and that abuses by security forces were much less common than in the past. They also reported that people involved in, or impacted by, the insurgency in the SBPs who needed to flee Thailand would most likely go to Malaysia rather than seek refuge in a third country.

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イ ●米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2023 年ータイ](#)」(2024 年 4 月 22 日)

Insurgents in the southernmost provinces committed human rights abuses and attacked government security forces and civilian targets; authorities investigated and prosecuted such actions.

ウ ●HRW「[ワールドレポート 2024ータイ](#)」(2024 年 1 月 11 日)**Violence and Abuses in the Southern Border Provinces**

The armed conflict in Thailand's Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla provinces, which has resulted in more than 7,000 deaths since January 2004, subsided in the first half of 2023 following an announcement by the Thai military and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) that both would seek to reduce violence during Ramadan. However, since August, insurgent attacks on military targets and civilians increased despite ongoing dialogue

between government representatives and the BRN.

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### 3. 関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い

#### (1) 一般的な状況

##### ア ●DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ（2023年12月18日版）](#)」

#### POLITICAL OPINION (ACTUAL OR IMPUTED)

3.14 Article 34 of the Constitution guarantees the right to express opinions, make speeches, write, print, publicise and express by other means, although allows for this right to be restricted by law for the purpose of maintaining state security, public safety, public order or good morals, or for protecting the health of the people. While Article 44 guarantees the right to assemble peacefully, it allows for this right to be restricted by law for the purpose of maintaining state security, public safety, public order or good morals, or for protecting the rights or liberties of other persons.

3.15 Despite these Constitutional guarantees, human rights activists have criticised the government for its frequent use of judicial harassment or ‘lawfare’ to silence critics, including under the following laws:

- Section 112 of the Criminal Code (Lèse-Majesté)
- Article 116 of the Criminal Code (‘the Sedition Law’)
- Sections 326 to 333 of the Criminal Code (criminal defamation)
- the Computer-Related Crime Act (2007; amended 2017)
- the Public Assembly Act (2015)
- the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation (2005)
- National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) decrees (2014-2019)

##### イ OFPRA「[タイ：2014年の軍事クーデター後の政治体制、抵抗勢力と反対派への弾圧](#)」（2021年6月24日）

**要旨：**2005年から2014年にかけて、タクシン・チナワットを支持する立法院多数派の政党が連続して再選されたため、伝統的なエリートたちから、タクシンは王政転覆を望んでおり、一族を違法に富ませ、以前は軽視されていた北部地域の有権者を優遇していると非難する激しい反応が起こった。これらのエリートは大衆運動を形成し、そのメンバーは王室の色である「黄色いシャツ」を着用している。2006年のクーデター後、タクシン支持者も「赤シャツ」を着用する大衆運動を組織した。この2つのグループは2014年の軍事クーデターまで衝突した。その後、軍政は新たな選挙後も権力を民間に譲ることなく維持し、憲法を書き換えて合法的に権力を維持した。2019年に立法院選挙が実施されるまで、テロ情勢の中で非常事

態を維持し、いかなる独立した政治活動も阻止した。選挙管理委員会の支援を受け、その政党は国会議員の過半数の議席を獲得し、すべての上院議員を指名した。そして2020年初頭、憲法裁判所は、すでにいくつかの親タクシン政党を禁止していたが、予想外の審理で、約80人の議員を擁し、軍部による政治機関への締め付けに非常に敵対的な言説を展開する新党を禁止した。この禁止令は若者の反乱を引き起こし、2020年夏には首都と非常に多くの地方で大規模なデモが発生した。2020年10月、君主をほのめかす言論が増えるにつれ、これらの抗議行動に対する弾圧が激化した。15年の禁固刑に処せられる不敬罪や扇動罪で起訴される事件が相次ぎ、この暴言に終止符を打とうとしているが、失敗に終わっている。100人近いタイの政治活動家が避難している近隣諸国では、失踪や殺人が君主制に最も批判的な活動家を襲っている。

※ 原文フランス語。訳文は、DeepL 翻訳に修正を加えた仮訳です。

(2) 国王又は王制を批判する者（又は政治的な動機から王制批判者と見なされる者）  
ア ●DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ（2023年12月18日版）](#)」

**Critics of the Monarchy**

3.19 Thailand's strict *lèse-majesté* law forbids all criticism of the monarchy. Under Section 112 of the Criminal Code, anyone who 'defames, insults, or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-apparent, or the Regent' faces 3-15 years in prison. An individual can be charged with multiple cases simultaneously, and sentences are cumulative, sometimes resulting in extremely long sentences. In 2021, a 65-year old public servant was sentenced to 43 years in jail for sharing audio clips deemed to insult the monarchy, while in 2017, a man was sentenced to 35 years in jail for social media posts that were deemed to insult the monarchy.

3.20 The law does not define what constitutes an insult to the monarchy, leaving courts to interpret a wide range of actions and statements as illegal. These have included: hanging banners, printing stickers, making statements online (including in private chatrooms), and liking or sharing social media posts, as well as appearing onstage with another person who criticised the monarchy, criticising royal pets, and writing about historical or fictional monarchs. In February 2022, two women were charged with *lèse-majesté* for conducting public polls on whether people felt bothered by royal motorcades. In March 2023, a man was sentenced to two years in prison for publishing a calendar featuring yellow ducks (a symbol of the 2020-21 protest movement) which authorities said mocked the King.

3.21 A total of 141 people were charged with *lèse-majesté* from 2006 to 2017, including Red Shirts and critics of the 2006 and 2014 coups. The youngest was aged 13 (see Children). Although prosecutions slowed after the death of King Bhumibol in 2016, they increased dramatically following the 2020-21 protests. Since then, more than 360 people have been charged with *lèse-majesté*, over twice the number charged during the entire

period 2006-2020. In-country sources reported in 2023 that the use of the *lèse-majesté* law was ‘the worst it has ever been’, and that new charges were being filed weekly or even daily.

3.22 Thai law permits citizens to file *lèse-majesté* complaints against each other. Ultra-royalist vigilante groups collect evidence and file charges against people under Section 112 and encourage others to do so.⋯

3.23 People accused of *lèse-majesté* are usually denied bail, access to legal aid, and banned from leaving the country. While some lawyers take on Section 112 cases pro bono, there are insufficient qualified lawyers for the number of cases.⋯

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### **Protesters**

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3.43 Starting in early 2020, student groups led a series of protests in response to the disqualification of progressive politician Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit and the dissolution of the Future Forward Party. The protester’s demands included reform of the constitution and education system, an end to conscription, and, most controversially, reform of the monarchy. At their height, these protests attracted tens of thousands of participants. While most were in Bangkok, protests also occurred throughout the country. The majority were non-violent, although some protesters threw Molotov cocktails, metal bars and other objects at police, and some burned vehicles and tires. Dozens of people were injured during the protests, including protesters, police, and journalists. In October 2020, a 14-year-old protester was shot dead near Din Daeng Police Station. A 28-year-old man was arrested for his killing; he reportedly had no connection to authorities.

3.44 On-and-off demonstrations persisted into 2021, with police using water cannons, tear gas, batons, and rubber bullets to disperse protesters, hundreds of whom were arrested on charges including sedition, *lèse-majesté*, and breaching COVID-19 restrictions. Many of these cases were ongoing at the time of publication. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch accused police of using excessive force during the protests and in some cases of torturing protesters in custody; authorities denied these accusations. DFAT is aware of prosecutions against street vendors, businesses and others who were perceived as supporting the protests, even when they were not directly involved. In November 2021, the Constitutional Court found three protest leaders had intended to ‘overthrow the monarchy’ and ordered protest groups ‘to cease further action in these matters’. By 2022, large-scale protests had mostly ceased.

3.45 Notwithstanding the issues described above, many people who attend protests do not suffer long term consequences for their participation. In-country sources told DFAT that young people who had participated in the 2020-2021 protests but subsequently

abandoned their activism had been able to graduate university and secure jobs, including in the civil service. Two protest leaders won seats in the May 2023 national elections, despite facing ongoing legal issues related to their protest activity.

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イ ●米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2023年-タイ](#)」(2024年4月22日)

**Political Prisoners and Detainees**

As of September, the NGO Thai Lawyers for Human Rights estimated there were at least 29 political prisoners, mostly for online political expression and for participating in the 2020-21 student-led protest movement. Authorities permitted human rights organizations to access political detainees, and there were no reports that political prisoners were treated differently than other prisoners.

Human rights groups claimed the convictions of several lèse majesté offenders were politically motivated. In September NGOs reported 257 persons were charged under lèse majesté laws, mostly for online political expression and participation in antigovernment protests.

**Political Parties and Political Participation:** …

On September 20, the Supreme Court banned Pannika Wanich, a member of the now dissolved Future Forward Party, from politics for life. Pannika was found guilty of making posts on social media in 2010 insulting the monarchy. On September 13, the Constitutional Court rejected a petition by a former minor government official seeking to dissolve the Move Forward Party on the grounds it advocated for the succession of the Deep South border provinces; other legal cases against Move Forward remained at various points in the drawn-out legal process.

ウ ●HRW「[ワールドレポート 2024-タイ](#)」(2024年1月11日)

**Freedoms of Expression and Peaceful Assembly**

As of September 2023, at least 1,928 people had been prosecuted since July 2020 for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful public assembly, according to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights. At least 286 of those charged were children.

Thai authorities continued to use Criminal Code article 112 on lèse-majesté, which includes punishments of up to 15 years in prison for each offense. In 2023, authorities prosecuted at least 258 people in relation to various activities undertaken at democracy protests or comments made on social media on lèse-majesté charges. Thai authorities used the vague, overbroad Computer-Related Crimes Act and Criminal Code article 116 on

sedition to prosecute democracy activists and dissidents.

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### (3) 野党の政治活動家等

ア ●DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ \(2023 年 12 月 18 日版\)](#)」

#### **Opposition Politicians**

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3.30 Before and after the 2019 election, the NCPO repeatedly filed charges including sedition and breaches of the Computer Crimes Act against opposition politicians. While most were eventually dropped, rights groups criticised their handling and lengthy delays in their finalisation.

3.31 Since direct military rule ended in 2019, the military-backed government has frequently used criminal defamation suits and accusations of lèse-majesté to silence opposition politicians. In 2021, Future Forward Party leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit was charged with lèse-majesté after accusing the government of mishandling the COVID-19 vaccine rollout, and unfairly favouring a vaccine supplier owned by King Vajiralongkorn. The Criminal Court later ordered his posts removed. In February 2023, Move Forward MP Rangsiman Rome was sued for criminal defamation after he said an arrest warrant had been improperly revoked for a senator wanted on drug charges. As at the time of publication the case had yet to be finalised.

3.32 On several occasions, the Election Commission and the Constitutional Court have dissolved political parties that opposed the interests of military-backed governments. Less than a month before the 2019 election, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Thaksin-aligned Thai Raksa Chart party and banned its executives from politics for 10 years. The Election Commission had earlier found Thai Raksa Chart had violated election laws by nominating Princess Ubolratana, the elder sister of King Vajiralongkorn, as its prime ministerial candidate. Almost 300 Thai Raksa Chart candidates were disqualified from contesting the election as a result.

3.33 In February 2020, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Future Forward Party and banned its executives from politics for 10 years, after finding Thanathorn and his party had breached campaign funding rules. In March 2023, a former advisor to the military-backed government filed a petition with the Election Commission to have the Pheu Thai party dissolved, saying they had violated election law by allowing banned former politicians to canvass for them ahead of the May 2023 election. The Election Commission declined to act, and Pheu Thai was able to contest the election.

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### **People Associated with the Red Shirt Movement**

3.36 Initially formed as the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), the Red Shirt movement rose to prominence in 2009. It opposed the military-backed governments of Surayud Chulanont and Abhisit Vejjajiva and sought the return from exile of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. It also took up issues of economic and political inequality. At its height, the Red Shirt movement had millions of supporters. The majority were from Thailand's rural north and northeast, although it also included some progressive urbanites, academics, and left-wing activists. Most Red Shirts were non-violent, but a small number engaged in or supported violence against political opponents, civilians, and authorities.

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3.38 After the 2014 coup, many Red Shirts were detained and subjected to “attitude adjustment” sessions, where security forces pressured them to end their political activities (see Arbitrary Arrest and Detention). Amnesty International recorded many human rights abuses during this period, including arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and torture. Red Shirt leaders were jailed on charges including defamation, incitement, and lèse-majesté. Grassroots supporters were harassed, intimidated and in some cases detained. Afterwards, some Red Shirt leaders withdrew from politics, while others switched allegiance to military-backed parties.

3.39 While significant numbers of Thais still identify as Red Shirts, the movement is now much less prominent than in the past. Red Shirts played a limited role in the 2019 election, 2020-21 protests, and the 2023 election. Most in-country sources said that authorities no longer harassed or monitored Red Shirt supporters, especially if they were no longer politically active. Although DFAT is aware of isolated reports of active Red Shirt supporters being harassed or monitored by local authorities, DFAT is not aware of specific cases, and has no evidence to suggest such treatment is centrally directed or widespread.

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### **Arbitrary Arrest and Detention**

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4.17 Following the 2014 coup (see Recent History), the NCPO summoned, arrested and detained approximately 2,000 people under HNCPO order 3/2015 (see Political opinion, actual or perceived). Those detained included politicians, activists, journalists, and others accused of supporting the deposed government, offending the monarchy, or being involved in anti-coup activities. Prior to releasing detainees, military authorities often required them to sign documents affirming they were treated well, would refrain from political activity, and would seek authorisation prior to travel outside the local area.

4.18 After the 2014 coup, authorities summoned at least 929 people to participate in

‘attitude adjustment’ sessions. Those subjected to such sessions were detained incommunicado in military camps, with some held longer than the allowable seven-day limit. Although attitude adjustment generally did not involve physical mistreatment, authorities subjected detainees to psychological pressure, including being blindfolded and driven to undisclosed locations, subjected to lengthy interrogations and intimidatory talks from military officials, held in solitary confinement, and denied access to family members or legal counsel. DFAT is not aware of cases of people being subjected to attitude adjustment after 2019.

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イ ●米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2023 年－タイ](#)」(2024 年 4 月 22 日)

**Political Parties and Political Participation:** Critics complained that the army’s International Security Operations Command, political opponents, and private citizens used legal action to harass and impede liberal opposition parties and officials. A conservative party associated with the outgoing military-dominated government brought several legal challenges against the Move Forward Party and its then leader Pita Limjaroenrat. In September Pita was suspended from parliament (and resigned as party leader) after being accused of breaching laws governing the business dealings of political office candidates by owning shares in a defunct media company.

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According to an NGO, ahead of the May election, opposition members were discredited through state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, while prodemocracy activists faced arrest, surveillance, and extralegal harassment in retaliation for their online content. The group also alleged that authorities blocked websites and removed content under claims that it violated provisions of the restrictive Computer-Related Crimes Act. There was no follow up on this case after the May election.

ウ ●HRW「[ワールドレポート 2024－タイ](#)」(2024 年 1 月 11 日)

**General Election, Attacks on Move Forward Party, and New Government**

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In July, the Constitutional Court suspended MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat from parliamentary duties pending a ruling on allegations that he violated electoral rules for holding shares in the iTV media company, even though the company has not broadcast for 15 years and was removed from listing on the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 2014.

In September, the Supreme Court banned former Future Forward Party (predecessor party of the MFP) spokesperson and former MP Pannika Wanich from running for political office or holding any political post for the rest of her life because she posted a photo online when

she was a college student that the court found disrespectful to the monarchy.

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#### (4) 人権活動家等

ア ●DFAT [「出身国情報報告 タイ \(2023年12月18日版\)」](#)

##### **Civil Society, Human Rights Defenders and Whistleblowers**

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3.48 While many CSOs operate without interference, activists who work on ‘sensitive’ issues, including civil and political rights, the insurgency in the SBPs, and the rights of stateless people, have been subjected to harassment and violence by the state and business interests. Labour, environment, and land issues are also highly sensitive, and companies frequently sue activists who campaign on these issues. For instance, Thammakaset poultry farms, which has been accused of labour abuses, has filed at least 39 civil and criminal defamation cases against 23 human rights defenders, journalists, and former employees since 2016. In country sources told DFAT that while most such cases were eventually dismissed, they caused serious inconvenience and financial hardship, and had a chilling effect on activism.

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3.50 At least 62 community-based rights defenders and lawyers have been killed in Thailand since 2003 in relation to their work. In March 2017, soldiers shot and killed Chaiyaphum Pasae, a prominent ethnic minority activist, at a military checkpoint in Chiang Mai Province. The soldiers reported he attacked them with a grenade; eyewitnesses say he was unarmed and was shot after trying to flee a beating. In May 2023, Bounsuan Kitiyano, a Lao political activist and long-time resident of Thailand, was shot dead while riding his motorcycle in Ubon Ratchathani. Bounsuan had organised human rights workshops and protests in front of the Lao Embassy in Bangkok. No one has been arrested for his murder.

3.51 Thailand has no dedicated legal protections for whistleblowers. People who draw attention to corruption or criminal activity, including civil servants, experience threats, discrimination, and violence from the people they expose and their networks. In 2017, Police Major-General Paween Pongsirin fled Thailand after receiving threats in relation to his investigation of high-ranking military involvement in human trafficking. In 2020, Army Sergeant Narongchai Intharakawi received death threats and faced a disciplinary hearing after he filed complaints about corruption in the Army Ordnance Materiel Rebuild Center where he worked. After Narongchai fled his barracks and went public with his claims, the Army sought to court martial him for going AWOL (absent without leave).

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イ ●米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2023 年－タイ](#)」(2024 年 4 月 22 日)

**Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:** Following a 2022 investigation that revealed human rights defenders and prodemocracy activists were targeted by Pegasus commercial spyware, more than 40 human rights defenders reported notifications from Facebook early in the year suggesting they change their passwords due to recent suspicious activity originating in state-sponsored accounts and targeting their accounts. According to an NGO, many human rights defenders reported digital harassment directly weakened their collective action by generating public misperception of their work.

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ウ ●HRW「[ワールドレポート 2024－タイ](#)」(2024 年 1 月 11 日)**Attacks on Human Rights Defenders**

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Officials regularly intimidated and threatened democracy activists and human rights defenders in Bangkok and other provinces to stop them from organizing or participating in protests, especially during the visits by cabinet ministers or members of the royal family.

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4. ジェンダー、DV および子ども
5. LGBT
6. 汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護
  - (1) 人身取引の被害者

ア ●DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ \(2023 年 12 月 18 日版\)](#)」**People Trafficking**

2.39 Thailand is a destination, source, and transit country for human trafficking of both Thai nationals and foreigners. Women, children, LGBTQIA+ people, ethnic minorities and stateless people are particularly vulnerable. Women and children are trafficked into sex work in brothels, massage parlours, bars, karaoke lounges, hotels, and private residences. Labour traffickers exploit migrant workers in commercial fishing, the poultry industry, manufacturing, construction, agriculture, domestic work and begging. An emerging trend is the trafficking of Thai nationals and others into Myanmar and Cambodia where they are forced to work in illegal call centres or participate in online scams.

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3.115 Loan sharking operators include criminal gangs, wealthy individuals, and corrupt

officials. Some employ former police officers – known as ‘black helmets’ – as enforcers. Enforcers use a variety of methods to coerce borrowers into repaying their debts, including verbal harassment and threats of legal action, as well as vandalism, such as supergluing the locks on a property so the victim can’t access it. They may also use doxxing or post notices around a person’s workplace or home that they are a ‘bad person’ who doesn’t pay their debts. At the higher end, enforcers seize assets such as TVs and rice cookers, burn down victims’ homes or businesses, make violent threats (including sexual threats) against victims, family members and guarantors, and carry out physical attacks. DFAT is aware of cases where victims were severely beaten or forced into drug trafficking or sex work to repay their debts. Suicide rates among victims are high.

3.116 Thailand criminalises loansharking under Civil Code 156, which limits the maximum interest chargeable on loans to 15 per cent, and Civil Code 2560, which makes loansharking a criminal offence, punishable by two years in prison. Loansharking victims can access support through agencies including the police, the Ministry of Interior and the Prime Minister’s Office. Victims can also contact the Center for Countering Abuse by Loan Sharks on a 24/7 hotline. Police investigate loansharking claims and loan sharks are regularly arrested and imprisoned: for instance, more than 100 people were arrested on suspicion of loansharking in the first half of 2022.

3.117 Despite these protections, in-country sources reported that victims were often unaware of how to seek help, authorities were under-resourced to combat loansharking, and their efforts were often poorly coordinated. Corruption is a serious obstacle and local officials are often involved in loan sharking or turn a blind eye to it. It can be difficult or impossible for victims to access state protection where the alleged loan shark is a high-ranking official, military or police officer, or local powerbroker.

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## (2) 闇金の被害者

ア ●DFAT [「出身国情報報告 タイ \(2023 年 12 月 18 日版\)」](#)

### **Victims of loan sharks**

3.112 Loan sharking is a serious and widespread problem in Thailand, where it accounts for an estimated 20 per cent of total lending. At least half of those who owe money to loan sharks also have debts with formal lenders. In many cases, victims owe money to multiple lenders and borrow from one lender to pay off another. Victims range from factory workers and day labourers to small-scale farmers, economic migrants, and operators of SMEs. Loans range from as little as THB 3,000 (AUD 120) to THB 1 million (AUD 40,000) or more.

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## 7. 兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の）

### ア FIS「[タイ：兵役忌避、徴兵期間 \(Thaimaa / Asepalveluksen välttely, syyteoikeuden vanhentuminen\)](#)」（2022年6月7日）<EUAA COI Portal>

タイでは良心的兵役拒否は一般的であり、良心的兵役拒否の結果、毎年3万人ものタイ人男性が法的措置に直面しているという情報もある。兵役に関する法律（B.E.2497）第45条は、徴兵忌避に対して最高3年の禁錮刑を規定している。

タイ刑法（B.E. 2499）は、民事・刑事裁判所の管轄に属する犯罪の時効期間を定めている。例えば、刑法第95条に基づき、法律が1年以上7年以下の量刑を規定する犯罪の公訴時効期間は10年である。…

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しかし、タイ戒厳令（B.E.2457）の下では、軍務に関する法律（B.E.2497）に基づく犯罪は軍事裁判所の管轄下にある。入手可能な情報源からは、軍事裁判所においてどのような犯罪の期限や公訴時効が適用されるのか、またどのような期限やその条件がタイ刑法に規定されているものと同等なのかについての情報は得られない。

タイの英字ニュース誌『The Nation』の2015年の記事によると、第26軍団のトップであるデクウドム・ニチャラット〔Dech-udom Nicharat〕少将は、3年の実刑判決を受ける可能性のある徴兵忌避をしないよう、声明で若者らに警告していた。少将の声明によれば、この犯罪は10年で失効する。

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一般に、タイの旅券当局は、犯罪で告発された者の旅券の発給を拒否したり、取り消したりする可能性があるが、メディアによって報道されたケースは、通常、注目される政治犯罪や重大犯罪で告発された亡命者が対象である。

※ 原文フィンランド語。訳文は、DeepL 翻訳に修正を加えた仮訳です。

## 8. 司法制度・刑事手続

### ア ○DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ（2023年12月18日版）](#)」

## 9. 警察・治安部隊（刑務所等の状況含む）

### (1) 警察

#### ア ●DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ（2023年12月18日版）](#)」

#### Police

5.5 The Royal Thai Police (RTP) is the national police force of Thailand. It is governed by a Director-General who reports to the Office of the Prime Minister. The RTP employs an estimated 220,000 officers.

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5.7 In October 2018, a new 1,600-strong police unit was created called the Ratchawallop Police Retainers, King's Guards 904. This unit provides security to the royal family, carries out the king's 'royal wishes', and collects information on 'individuals and groups whose behaviours pose a threat to national security and the monarchy'. See Critics of the monarchy.

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5.10 There are credible, well-documented reports of human rights abuses by Thai police, including torture and mistreatment, arbitrary detention and extra-judicial killings. People can file complaints of police abuse with the superior of the accused police officer, with the Office of the Inspector General, or with the Police Commissioner General. The NHRCT, the Lawyers' Council of Thailand, the Office of the National Anticorruption Commission, the Supreme Court of Justice, the MOJ, the Office of the Prime Minister, and the Office of the Ombudsman also accept complaints of police abuse and corruption. Complaints about police abuse rarely result in punishment. Investigations are often superficial, and complainants are sometimes countersued for defamation by police (see Political Opinion, Actual or Imputed).

## TORTURE

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4.10 Despite legal protections, there have been credible reports of torture in Thailand, including by military and police. Victims include protesters, suspected criminals, and suspected insurgents. Methods include beatings, burns, electric shocks and suffocation. Police are reported to abuse and torture suspects in custody, including to extract confessions. The widely-reported 'Joe Ferrari' case in 2021 involved police torturing a suspect by suffocating him with plastic bags to extort money (see Deaths in custody).

4.11 Security forces have been known to use torture to extract intelligence from people associated with the insurgency in the SBPs, although in-country sources reported this was much less common than in the past. Amnesty International's 2016 report 'Make Him Speak by Tomorrow' detailed multiple cases of torture against protesters and other detainees by security forces following the 2014 coup. There are credible reports that some protesters who were detained during the 2020-21 protests were tortured in custody by police, including beatings, death threats and burning with cigarettes.

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## (2) 特別捜査局

ア ●DFAT [「出身国情報報告 タイ \(2023年12月18日版\)」](#)

**Department of Special Investigation (DSI)**

5.11 Formed in 2002, the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) is a 1,600-strong investigative unit that sits within the Ministry of Justice and operates independently of the RTP. The DSI has a statutory remit to investigate serious crimes in the public interest, including complex criminal cases, those affecting national security, those involving organised crime, and those potentially implicating high-ranking government officials or police officers. It is empowered to instigate its own enquiries.

5.12 Although the DSI is reportedly a well-funded and highly capable organisation, DSI officers are occasionally accused of corruption and misconduct. In January 2023, the head of the DSI was removed from his post, after reportedly failing to act against five DSI officers accused of accepting THB 9.5 million (AUD 400,000) in bribes to release 11 suspected Chinese gangsters operating from the former Nauru Consul General's residence.

**(3) 刑務所等**

ア ●DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ \(2023年12月18日版\)](#)」

**Critics of the Monarchy**

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3.26 A royal prison is reportedly maintained inside Dhaveevatthana Palace in Bangkok for 'insiders' who displease the monarch. There are multiple credible reports of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in this prison, such as beatings, being forced to roll in excrement, and being forced to do excessive heavy labour. In 2015, three former palace insiders died in custody after being arrested for embezzling funds from 'Bike for Dad', a royal charity project. The exact circumstances of their deaths remain unclear.

**Detention and Prison**

5.17 In its 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, the US State Department described conditions in Thai prisons as 'poor'. In-country sources reported they were nevertheless significantly better than they were in the past. Overcrowding is a major problem and toilet facilities are basic. Food and water are reportedly sufficient in quantity and quality. Prisoners have access to free medical care, medication, vaccination, and dental care. Conditions in Bangkok prisons are generally better than provincial prisons. In-country sources reported that violence within prisons was uncommon and guard-on-prisoner violence extremely rare. However, violence against detainees in police custody is reportedly common (see Police, Torture, Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).

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## 10. 報道の自由

### ア ●DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ \(2023年12月18日版\)](#)」

#### Media and Journalists

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3.54 After the 2014 coup (see Recent History), the NCPO issued orders prohibiting media outlets and individuals from distributing information regarded as “malice,” “false information,” or with an “aim to discredit” the junta. According to the International Council of Jurists (ICJ), between 2014 and 2018 the NCPO summoned 35 journalists for attitude adjustment and prosecuted 14 for political crimes. It also suspended the licenses of media outlets on 52 occasions.

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3.56 The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) reported that Thai journalists are often threatened with legal action when they report on topics that touch on the interests of business or political elites, including corruption, labour issues, and environmental abuses. The ICJ recorded at least 15 cases of journalists being “prosecuted merely for reporting on issues of public interest” between 2001 and 2023. Most were sued under criminal defamation laws. In 2019, Voice TV reporter Suchanee Rungmuanporn was sentenced to two years in prison after she reported on labour exploitation by a Thai chicken farming factory (the case was later dropped). In 2023, a Thai mining company sued GreenNews editor Pratch Rujivanarom for defamation after he reported on a Myanmar court verdict that found the company had contributed to a dam collapse. If convicted, he faced up to two years in prison. Where cases involve online speech, plaintiffs often intentionally file criminal defamation suits in distant, conflict-affected provinces such as Narathiwat to inconvenience and deter the person they are suing.

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## 11. 宗教の自由

### (1) イスラム教徒

#### ア ●DFAT「[出身国情報報告 タイ \(2023年12月18日版\)](#)」

3.10 Anti-Islamic sentiment exists in Thailand, although overt discrimination is relatively rare. Although Muslim identity is one of a range of factors in the insurgency in the SBPs, experts generally categorise it as a primarily ethnonationalist conflict rather than a religious one. In May 2018, a primary school in Pattani banned Muslim students from wearing the hijab and reportedly punished breaches with the loss of behavioural conduct points. The policy was later reversed by the local Administrative Court. In September 2017, security officials in Songkhla arrested Aphichat Promjan, a prominent Buddhist monk who had urged the government to burn down mosques in retaliation for attacks on

Buddhist monks in the SBPs. He was later defrocked.

3.11 Buddhists in some parts of the country have opposed the construction of mosques in majority Buddhist communities. In 2021, a Buddhist group tried unsuccessfully to prevent the construction of a mosque in Nakhon Ratchasima Province. In 2017, villagers in Khon Kaen voted against the registration of a Muslim prayer house that had been set up in a private home. Also in 2017, Buddhists in Bueng Kan Province opposed the construction of a mosque in their community, citing fears of Islamic extremism. Organisations such as the Buddhism Protection Center of Thailand have reportedly circulated anti-Islamic material.

3.12 Thai law outlines the administrative structure of Muslim communities in the SBPs. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) allows Muslim residents of the SBPs to access sharia as a special legal process, outside the national civil code, in relation to personal status matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Provincial courts apply this law, and a sharia expert advises the judge. Committee members in the SBPs act as advisers to government officials in dealing with the area's ethno-nationalist and religious tensions. See People Associated with the Insurgency in the SBPs.

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## 12. 国籍、民族および人種

## 13. 出入国および移動の自由

## 14. その他

### 略称

ACCORD	オーストリア出身国・庇護研究ドキュメンテーションセンター
ACLED	武力紛争位置・事件データプロジェクト
AI	アムネスティ・インターナショナル
ARC	難民調査センター
BAMF	ドイツ連邦移民難民庁
CEDOCA	ベルギー難民及び無国籍者庁出身国情報部門
CIA	米国中央情報局
CNDA	フランス庇護権裁判所
CRS	米国議会調査局
DFAT	オーストラリア外務貿易省
DIS	デンマーク移民庁
DRC	デンマーク・レフュジー・カウンセラー
EASO	欧州難民支援機関

FIS	フィンランド移民庁
HRW	ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ
ICG	インターナショナル・クライシス・グループ
IDMC	国内避難民監視センター
IRBC	カナダ移民難民局
IRDC	アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター
ジェトロ	日本貿易振興機構
JICA	国際協力機構
Lifos	スウェーデン移民庁出身国情報データベース
Landinfo	ノルウェー政府出身国情報センター
MRGI	マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル
OECD	経済協力開発機構
OFPRA	フランス難民・無国籍庇護局
OHCHR	国連人権高等弁務官事務所
OSAC	米国海外安全保障評議会
RRTA	オーストラリア難民再審査審判所
RSAA	ニュージーランド難民地位不服申立機関
RSF	国境なき記者団
UKIAT	イギリス移民難民審判所
UKUT	イギリス上級審判所
UNHCR	国連難民高等弁務官事務所
USCIRF	米国連邦政府国際宗教自由に関する委員会