

モーリタニア

2023 年 3 月 9 日作成

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1. 一般情報

(1) 地理・人口

ア テキサス大学「[モーリタニア地図](#)」（1995 年）

イ 外務省「[モーリタニア基礎データ](#)」（2022 年 4 月 22 日）

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| 1 | 面積 | 103 万平方キロメートル（日本の約 2.7 倍） |
| 2 | 人口 | 465 万人（2020 年 世銀） |
| 3 | 首都 | ヌアクショット |
| 4 | 民族 | モール人、アフリカ系 |
| 5 | 言語 | アラビア語（公用語、国語）、プラール語、ソニンケ語、ウォロフ語（いずれも国語） なお、実務言語としてフランス語が広く使われている。 |

6 宗教 イスラム教 (国教)

ウ ●CIA「[ワールド・ファクトブック モーリタニア](#)」(2023年3月9日閲覧)**Ethnic groups**

Black Moors (Haratines - Arabic-speaking descendants of African origin who are or were enslaved by White Moors) 40%, White Moors (of Arab-Berber descent, known as Beydane) 30%, Sub-Saharan Mauritians (non-Arabic speaking, largely resident in or originating from the Senegal River Valley, including Halpulaar, Fulani, Soninke, Wolof, and Bambara ethnic groups) 30%

Languages

Arabic (official and national), Pular, Soninke, Wolof (all national languages), French; note - the spoken Arabic in Mauritania differs considerably from the Modern Standard Arabic used for official written purposes or in the media; the Mauritanian dialect, which incorporates many Berber words, is referred to as Hassaniya

(2) 内政

ア 外務省「[モーリタニア基礎データ](#)」(2022年4月22日)

5 内政

2005年8月の軍事クーデター後、19か月に亘る民政移管プロセスを経て、アブダライ政権が発足。しかし、2008年8月、同大統領が軍部により拘束されるクーデターが発生。アブデル・アジズ将軍が国家高等評議会議長に就任し、新たな大統領選挙の実施を表明。反クーデター派政党は当初同選挙へのボイコットを表明していたが、国際社会の仲介により、あらゆる政党が参加する大統領選挙が実施され、アブデル・アジズ大統領が選出された。2014年6月の大統領選挙においても平和裡かつ透明性のある選挙が実施され、同大統領が82%の得票率で再選された。2019年6月に大統領選挙が実施され、同年8月に、ガズワニ大統領が就任した。

イ ●Bertelsmann Stiftung「[BTI 国別報告 2022年 - モーリタニア](#)」(2022年2月23日)**Executive Summary**

…Following ex-President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz's decision not to seek a change in the constitution that would allow him to rule beyond his second term, he let his close friend and collaborator, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, run for the 2019 presidential election. Ghazouani's victory, with 52% of the votes, was a first in the country's history. At the same time, the fact that the new president is a retired general and close partner of the former president and has also held the most powerful positions in the security apparatus and played

a major role in the 2005 and 2008 coup d'états, shows that the military continues to maintain firm control within the country's authoritarian regime.

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2. 治安・人権状況

3. 関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い

(1) 政府に批判的な者／団体の取扱い

ア ● Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) [「BTI 国別報告 2022年 - モーリタニア」](#) (2022年)

1 | Stateness

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...Two bloggers were also arrested in March 2020 after they had discussed a major real estate development scandal involving then President Ould Abdel Aziz and a well-known religious figure, Sheikh al-Ridha, who had scammed numerous citizens in a Ponzi scheme. Their arrest indicated not only that it was risky to discuss alleged corrupt practices of the president, but also of powerful religious figures. The two bloggers were only released in June 2020. Relatedly, a 2017 law intended to fight discrimination contains an article that provides for a jail sentence of one to five years for anyone who “holds an inflammatory speech against the official religious rite of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.” In this context, another wave of arrests took place in February 2020, when 14 activists, including very well-known women involved in civil society organizations such as Mekfoula Mint Brahim, were arrested and accused of “contempt for the Muslim religion” and “terrorism.” These activists were calling for more secular laws and better respect for human rights.

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2 | Political Participation

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The right of association is protected by Article 11 of the 1991 constitution. Political parties of the opposition and NGOs are officially allowed to exist and operate without being repressed. Until 2020, however, the obligation for civil society organizations to obtain official recognition from the Ministry of Interior was a major legal obstacle. Many never secured this authorization, while others waited for years to receive it. This changed on 11 January 2021, when the National Assembly adopted a new “Law of the Freedom of Association,” which abolishes this obligation to obtain a formal authorization. Now, associations must simply notify the Interior Ministry of their creation and their statutes. They now also have the right to receive international funding, which was previously

prohibited. Even so, some international organizations such as Human Rights Watch noticed that the new law still contains major hurdles, including the obligation to define and limit themselves to a “main domain of intervention” and the obligation to refrain from political activities. It also provides for vague definitions of justifications that could lead to their disbandment (including the vague but powerful “undermine the existence of the state”).

Beyond these legal mechanisms, the reality is, and has been, more erratic. Challenges remain important, however, for ethnic minorities and Haratin, whose associations and activists are often harassed by state authorities and accused of “threatening national unity.” Leaders and activists of the IRA movement, an anti-slavery movement representing the Haratin, as well as the Black African Don’t Touch My Nationality (TPMN) movement, have been arrested on several occasions since the early 2010s. In February 2019, authorities finally released a Haratin activist who had been in jail for two years for having made a WhatsApp post calling Haratin to defend their rights and fight discrimination. In February 2020, fourteen activists were arrested when they were celebrating the creation of their new association, the Alliance for the Refoundation of the Mauritanian State (AREM). Nine of them were eventually released, but five remained in jail until their trial in October 2020. They were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms of six to eight months, as well as fines.

In early February 2019, authorities finally released a Haratin activist who had been in jail for two years for publishing a WhatsApp post calling for Haratin to defend their rights and fight discrimination. In March 2019, two bloggers were arrested and jailed after they shed light on a real estate scandal involving the then-President Ould Abdel Aziz and an influential religious leader. They were eventually released in early June 2019. Two journalists were also arrested in the aftermaths of the presidential election of June 2019 (Ahmed Ould Wedia and Camara Seydi Moussa). Then there is the case of the young blogger Mohamed Cheikh Ould M’khaitir. After being sentenced to death for apostasy in 2014, Mohamed Cheikh Ould M’khaitir was eventually set free by the Court of Appeals in 2017. However, he was actually being kept in a secret location by the government, officially to guarantee his own protection. In July 2019, he was freed, and subsequently went in exile in France. In January 2020, three bloggers and journalists (Mohamed Ali Ould Abdel Aziz, Abdou Ould Tajeddine and Cheikh Ould Mami) were arrested after they published a video that was critical of the president. Then, in October 2020, another blogger and journalist, Mohamed El Hacem Lebatt, was sentenced to one year in prison for defamation against the CEO of an important Nouakchott bank, after he had published an article discussing opaque transfers of money to former President Ould Abdel Aziz during the 2019 election. Similarly, in early 2021, a journalist and blogger, Mohamed Salem Kerboub, was arrested and jailed after a complaint was filed by the mayor of Nouadhibou and deputy to the National Assembly (for the ruling party UPR), who accused the journalist of slander after the latter had published an article on the mismanagement of COVID-19-related funds for the city’s impoverished citizens. In November 2020, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and close friend of former

President Ould Abdel Aziz sued a newspaper (Mourassiloun) after the latter had published a report on a meeting between him and the former president.

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イ ●国連人権理事会普遍的定期的報告作業部会 [「Compilation on Mauritania \[A/HRC/WG.6/37/MRT/2\]」](#) (2020 年 11 月 2 日)

30. The same Committee was concerned that non-governmental organizations and associations for the defence of human rights were required to obtain prior authorization and that some faced administrative obstacles in doing so, which forced them to operate underground. It recommended that Mauritania review the bill on associations with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It also recommended adopting a declaratory system for the registration of non-governmental organizations and associations for the defence of human rights, including those working to combat racial discrimination or slavery-like practices.³⁸

ウ ●IRBC [「Mauritania: The Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement \(IRA\), including its Canadian and US chapters, its founding, mission, structure, activities and documents issued to members; treatment of members by the authorities \(2018–November 2020\)」](#) (2020 年 11 月 30 日)

2. Treatment by Authorities

2.1 Non-recognition

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While unauthorized associations are often tolerated, their leadership, members and participants to their activities are exposed to substantial risks and administrative difficulties, including accessing donor funding or notifying authorities of planned public activities. Even when they are authorized, associations face impermissible restrictions, including the banning of planned activities, surveillance and arbitrary dissolutions. (Amnesty International 2018, 11)

However, media sources report that in September 2020, a bill to switch the registration of associations from an authorization-based system to a declaratory one was approved by the Council of Ministers and hailed by the president of the IRA (AMI 18 Sept. 2020) or by the IRA and various human rights organizations (RFI 18 Sept. 2020). Radio France internationale (RFI) explains that it will enable associations to [translation] "simply make a declaration rather than forcing them to obtain permission from authorities first" (RFI 18 Sept. 2020). Information on the adoption of this law could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.2 Accusations of Division

Sources report that the Mauritanian government accuses the IRA of [HRW English version] "undermin[ing] national unity" (HRW Feb. 2018, 6) or sowing "division" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 7) or "discord" (AA 1 Jan. 2019) in the nation (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 7; AA 1 Jan. 2019; HRW Feb. 2018, 6).

Sources indicate that a law criminalizing discrimination, adopted in January 2018, may be used against human rights defenders or anti-slavery activists in Mauritania (UNPO 16 Apr. 2020; Amnesty International 2018, 6, 7). According to Amnesty International, certain provisions of the law, such as Article 10, which "punishes anyone who 'promotes inflammatory speech that is contrary to the official doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania'" with prison sentences, "could be used against the activists who speak out about groups which perpetuate the practice of slavery in Mauritania" (Amnesty International 2018, 6-7).

UNPO reports the case of an IRA Mauritania leader who was detained by Mauritanian authorities in April 2020 for having criticized the Mauritanian government on social media, according to the IRA (UNPO 16 Apr. 2020).

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2.3 Repression

Sources report that the Mauritanian government has employed a [HRW English version] "repressive policy" towards Biram Dah Abeid and the IRA (HRW Feb. 2018, 6) or that the IRA and its leader have "been subject to repression" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 7). According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index 2020 (BTI 2020), "Haratin activists who become too vocal in the eyes of the government are repressed by security forces" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, 28).

Sources report that in February 2018, IRA protests lasting three days in Nouakchott were ["violently" ACLED 2 Mar. 2018] dispersed by police (ACLED 2 Mar. 2018; Jeune Afrique 21 Feb. 2018). According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Biram Dah Abeid's wife and other prominent leaders were injured during the events (ACLED 2 Mar. 2018). According to sources, on 8 October 2018 IRA activists who gathered in front of the National Assembly to protest the detention of their leader were attacked by police, and 9 to 12 of them, including Biram Dah Abeid's wife, had to be taken to the hospital (Front Line Defenders [2019]; Au secours des Haratines 10 Oct. 2018). On 29 October 2018, according to the Canadian security services company Garda World, security forces "violently dispersed" a protest in Nouakchott by IRA supporters to demand the release of Biram Dah Abeid (Garda World 2 Nov. 2018).

エ Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) [「BTI 国別報告 2020年 - モーリタニア」](#) (2020年)

2 | Political Participation

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Article 11 of the 1991 constitution protects the right of association. Like the majority of rights set out in the constitution, this protection was rarely observed up until the mid-2000s, following the ousting of Ould Taya. Most opposition political parties and NGOs are allowed to exist and operate without being repressed. Challenges remain, however, for Black African minorities and Haratin, whose associations and activists are regularly harassed by state authorities and accused of “threatening national unity.” In the past decade, there have been arrests of the leaders of the Initiative pour la résurgence du mouvement abolitionniste (IRA) movement, an anti-slavery movement representing the Haratin, as well as the leaders of Touche pas à ma nationalité (TPMN) and Kawtal ngam yellitaare, representing Black Africans. Just as he was about to start campaigning for the September 2018 legislative elections, IRA leader Biram Dah Abeid was arrested (August 2018). He was released five months later. His association is denied any official recognition and thus any activity they undertake can be deemed illegal and subjected to repression. TPMN activists were arrested in December 2017. In December 2017, five members of an association representing the widows and orphans of the Black African military personnel executed by the state in 1990 were arrested in Kaedi. Foreigners who come to Mauritania to report on these issues are often expelled, as seen in the expulsion of two French journalists in May 2017, accused of working for IRA and TPMN. Anti-slavery African-American activists were not allowed to enter the country in September 2017. Since the creation of the first Haratin movement, El Hor, in the 1970s and the large-scale repression of Black African activists in 1986, Haratin and Black African associations have always walked a fine line between official acceptability and repression

オ ●AI [「"A sword hanging over our heads": The repression of activists speaking out against discrimination and slavery in Mauritania \[AFR 38/7812/2018\]」](#) [ecoi.net](#)
(2018年3月22日)

3. RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: BANS, INTERFERENCE AND DISSOLUTIONS

The right to freedom of association is guaranteed under ICCPR Article 22, African Charter Article 10 and Article 10 of the Constitution of Mauritania. However, the Mauritanian authorities still use laws from the 1960s to routinely ban civil society organizations and social movements, interfere in their activities and dissolve them, particularly those campaigning to end slavery and discrimination.

3.1 BANNING OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Since 2014, Amnesty International has documented more than 43 associations working for the promotion and protection of human rights, including more than dozen INGOs, whose requests for authorizations have gone unanswered by the authorities, meaning that they can be considered unlawful, and their activities repressed.⁸⁵ This includes, for instance, the Collectif des Veuves de Mauritanie and Touche pas à ma nationalité, already highlighted in

section 2, and IRA, which will be covered in section 4.

This repressive practice stems from flaws in the 1964 law on associations and its amendments which fail to meet international standards. Most significantly, Article 3 of this law provides for an authorization regime, stating that: “Associations of people cannot be formed or undertake activities without a prior authorization delivered by the Minister of Interior.”⁸⁶ ...

注 85 These associations include: Assalamalekoum, Collectif des Veuves de Mauritanie, Initiative de Résurgence du Mouvement Abolitionniste, Kavana, Les Vigiles, Touche Pas à Ma Nationalité, Union des Jeunes Volontaires. Other organizations, including a dozen international nongovernmental organizations, requested not to be named for fear it should compromise their ability to get an authorization.

注 86 Law No. 64.098 of 9 June 1964 on associations and Law No. 73.007 of 23 January 1973 and Law No. 73.157 of 2 July 1973.

KAVANA: AWAITING AUTHORIZATION SINCE 2012, MEMBERS ARRESTED IN 2014, OFFICE CLOSED AND BURGLIED IN 2015

Kavana, meaning “Enough” in Arabic, is a youth association that empowers young people by exposing their difficulties, including unemployment and discrimination.⁹⁴

Kavana submitted its request for authorization to the Hakem of Arafat in February 2012. After being asked by a civil servant from the office of the Hakem to change the name as it was “too political”, they received no further response from the authorities, despite sending regular reminders and organizing protests in front of the Ministry of Interior.⁹⁵ Despite this, Kavana continued to operate openly, making appearances on TV shows and organizing press conferences. They opened a small office in Arafat, a neighbourhood of Nouakchott.

In August 2014, members of Kavana organized a peaceful protest in Nouadhibou to contest the fairness of the 2014 presidential election. The police arrested seven activists, as well as the President of Kavana, Yacoub Ahmed Lemrabet, as he visited the detainees at the police station. Six of them were released on the same day, but two men, including Lemrabet, were detained for eight days and charged with “disrupting public order”. They refused to sign a statement that Kavana would no longer organize protests.

They were released on bail, but the cases are ongoing and Yacoub Ahmed Lemrabet is regularly summoned by the police for questioning.

In April 2015, the Police Commissioner of Arafat told members of Kavana that they had to close their office as they were not an authorized association. They refused to heed to this order as they did not get an official notification that their request for authorization was rejected. They were burgled three weeks later, with all their computers stolen. They reported the burglary to the police, but there was no investigation and no one was held accountable.

With the lack of response from the police, leaders of Kavana felt it was unsafe to keep the office and decided to close it a few weeks later.

注 94 Interview with Yacoub Ahmed Lemrabet, President of Kavana, Nouakchott, June 2017.

注 95 Representatives of Kavana last went to the Ministry of Interior to enquire about the status of their request in March 2017.

(2) 2019 年大統領選挙

ア Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) [「BTI 国別報告 2022 年 - モーリタニア」](#) (2023 年 2 月)

In 2019, the country experienced a presidential election that was somewhat unprecedented. For the first time in its history, a change of succession from one head of state to another occurred through an election. After he had decided not to change the constitution and to step down after his second successive term, President Ould Abdel Aziz let his close friend and associate, General Ould Ghazouani, run on behalf of their party, Union for the Republic (UPR) in the June 22, 2019 presidential election. Ould Ghazouani obtained 52% of the votes; the turnout was estimated at 67%. The runner-up, Biram Dah Abeid, obtained 18.6% of the votes.

The election was not held in optimal conditions. No international observers were allowed except for the African Union's electoral monitoring mission. Ould Ghazouani declared himself the winner before the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) had published the official results. Opposition parties and protesters immediately criticized and condemned the results. In response, the government shut down the internet, police forces stormed opposition parties' headquarters and arrested several political actors, activists, and journalists, especially in connection with the Haratin candidate and the Black African candidate, Hamidou Baba Kane. Yet again, this raised important questions regarding the government's treatment of these two communities; dozens were arrested in the Senegal River Valley's main towns, where the majority of Black Africans live.

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4. ジェンダー、DV および子ども
5. LGBT
6. 汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護
7. 兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の）
8. 司法制度・刑事手続
9. 警察・治安部隊（刑務所等の状況含む）

10. 報道の自由
11. 宗教の自由
12. 国籍、民族および人種
13. 出入国および移動の自由
14. その他

略称

| | |
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| ACCORD | オーストラリア出身国・庇護研究ドキュメンテーションセンター |
| ACLED | 武力紛争位置・事件データプロジェクト |
| AI | アムネスティ・インターナショナル |
| ARC | 難民調査センター |
| BAMF | ドイツ連邦移民難民庁 |
| CGRS | ベルギー難民及び無国籍者庁 |
| CIA | 米国中央情報局 |
| CNDA | フランス庇護権裁判所 |
| CRS | 米国議会調査局 |
| DFAT | オーストラリア外務貿易省 |
| DIS | デンマーク移民庁 |
| DRC | デンマーク・レフュジー・カウンセル |
| EASO | 欧州難民支援機関 |
| FIS | フィンランド移民庁 |
| HRW | ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ |
| ICG | インターナショナル・クライシス・グループ |
| IDMC | 国内避難民監視センター |
| IRBC | カナダ移民難民局 |
| IRDC | アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター |
| ジェトロ | 日本貿易振興機構 |
| JICA | 国際協力機構 |
| Lifos | スウェーデン移民庁出身国情報データベース |
| Landinfo | ノルウェー政府出身国情報センター |
| MRGI | マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル |
| OECD | 経済協力開発機構 |
| OFPRA | フランス難民・無国籍庇護局 |
| OHCHR | 国連人権高等弁務官事務所 |
| OSAC | 米国海外安全保障評議会 |

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|--------|---------------------|
| RRTA | オーストラリア難民再審査審判所 |
| RSAA | ニュージーランド難民地位不服申立機関 |
| RSF | 国境なき記者団 |
| UKIAT | イギリス移民難民審判所 |
| UKUT | イギリス上級審判所 |
| UNHCR | 国連難民高等弁務官事務所 |
| USCIRF | 米国連邦政府国際宗教自由に関する委員会 |