

## コートジボワール

2022 年 9 月 15 日ドラフト作成

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### 1. 一般情報

#### (1) 地理・人口

## ア 外務省「コートジボワール基礎データ」(2022年4月25日)

### 4 民族

60以上の民族から構成され、東南部を中心とするアカン系（バウレ、アニ等）、西南部を中心とするクル系（ベテ、ゲレ、ティダ等）、北東部を中心とするボルタ系（セヌフォ、クランゴ、ロビ等）、北西部を中心とするマンデ系（マレンケ、ダン等）に大別される。

### 5 言語

フランス語（公用語）、各民族語

### 6 宗教

キリスト教 39.1%、イスラム教 33.7%、伝統宗教 4.4%、その他の宗教 0.6%、無宗教 22.2%

## イ ●ACCORD「COI集—コートジボワール」ecoi (2021年9月)

### 1.2 Demographics

According to several sources five main ethnic groups exist in Côte d'Ivoire: the Akan or Kwa, the Krou (Kru), the Mandé du Sud (Southern Manding), the Mandé du Nord (Northern Manding) and the Gur (Voltaic, voltaïque) (INS, September 2017, p. 9; see also MRG, last update January 2018; CIA, last update 20 August 2021; ASSN, February 2017, p. 1). However, while the country has five main ethnic groups there are more than 60 groups in the country altogether (MRG, last update, January 2018; see also GROWup, 2017, p. 1; Encyclopaedia Britannica, last updated 9 September 2020). Minority Rights Group International (MRG), a London-based international NGO advocating for disadvantaged minorities and indigenous peoples names the Baoulé (also spelled Baule), an Akan subgroup, as “the largest single ethnic group, constituting about 15-20 per cent of the population” and states that the Akanspeakers make up 28.8 percent of the population (MRG, last update January 2018). The EPR Atlas of the Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform (GROWup) by the ETH Zurich names the Abron, the Agni, and the Lagoon peoples as other Akan subgroups, “which are relevant above all in their distinction to the Baule”, therefore, this source handles them as a separate “ethnic cluster”. Of all the existing ethnic groups the Baoulé appear to be “the most important group in political terms” since the “country’s ‘founding father’, Félix HouphouëtBoigny, hails from this group which has long dominated Côte d'Ivoire’s political and social life”. His successor Henri Konan Bédié also belongs to the Baoulé (GROWup, 2017, pp. 1-3). According to MRG “a small proportion of the population is non-African, which includes French, Lebanese, Vietnamese, Spanish, US and Canadian residents” (MRG, last update January 2018).

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According to GROWup, the northwestern Mandé, such as the Malinké and Dioula groups and the northeastern Voltaic, such as the Senoufo, Lobi, Kulango groups “are combined into

one single ethnic category of ‘northerners’, due to their common Muslim faith and because they have come to be seen this way by the groups from the southern half of the country”. They are commonly referred to as “Dioula”. It is important to note though that the southern Mandé peoples, such as the Yacouba and the Gouro, differ culturally from the “northerners” (GROWup, 2017, p. 1). Freedom House notes that a “north-south, Muslim-Christian schism has been a salient feature of Ivorian life for decades and was exacerbated by the 2002–11 crisis.” It has since however receded (Freedom House, 4 March 2020, section B4). In contrast, the ACSS in October 2020 notes that “continued polarization between the mostly Muslim north and the largely Christian south continues to be at the heart of the rising tensions” (ACSS, 20 October 2020). ASSN further states that the accession of Alassane Ouattara to power in 2011 was widely perceived, by both opponents and supporters of the regime, as a takeover of the state apparatus by the “Dioula” in the broadest sense of the term (ASSN, February 2017, p. 5). The reason behind this being Ouattara’s own northern identity (GROWup, 2017, p. 3), since he is said to be of northern Mandé or, more precisely, Malinké origin (Le temps, 4 August 2020; see also Le Point, 6 June 2018; Afrique Contemporaine, 2003).

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## (2) 略史・内政

### ア 外務省「[コートジボワール基礎データ](#)」(2022 年 4 月 25 日)

1960 年 11 月 初代大統領にウフェ・ボワニ選出 (1990 年 10 月再選)  
 1993 年 12 月 ウフェ・ボワニ大統領逝去  
 1994 年 2 月 コナン・ベディエ (暫定) 大統領就任、翌年 10 月大統領に正式就任  
 1999 年 12 月 ゲイ元参謀総長が全権を掌握 (翌 1 月、ゲイ元参謀総長を首班とする暫定政府設置)。ベディエ大統領は国外へ。  
 2000 年 10 月 ゲイ元参謀総長失脚。大統領選挙の結果、バグボ大統領就任  
 2001 年 10～12 月 国民和解フォーラム開催  
 2002 年 9 月 一部兵士による騒擾事件が発生し、北部及び西部掌握  
 2003 年 1 月 マルクシ合意 (和平合意) 成立  
 2003 年 3 月 国民和解政府樹立  
 2004 年 4 月 国連コートジボワール活動 (UNOCI) 派遣開始  
 2007 年 3 月 ワガドゥグ合意成立、翌 4 月ソロ内閣成立  
 2010 年 10 月 大統領選挙を実施。第 2 回投票 (11 月) 後、独立選挙委員会はウワタラ氏 (野党 RDR 党党首) の当選を発表したが、憲法院はバグボ氏 (前大統領) の当選を発表。国際社会は一致してウワタラ氏への支持を表明。

2010 年 12 月	ウワタラ大統領及びバグボ氏ともに大統領就任宣誓式を実施。
2011 年 5 月	憲法院はウワタラ大統領の当選を宣言。ウワタラ大統領は改めて宣誓式及び就任式を実施。
2011 年 6 月	第 4 次ソロ内閣成立
2011 年 12 月	国民議会選挙実施
2012 年 3 月	アウス内閣成立
2012 年 11 月	ダンカン内閣成立
2015 年 10 月	大統領選挙（ウワタラ大統領再選，同年 11 月より 2 期目）
2016 年 1 月	第 2 次ダンカン内閣成立
2016 年 11 月	第三共和国憲法制定
2017 年 1 月	ゴン＝クリバリ内閣成立
2017 年 6 月	国連コートジボワール活動（UNOCI）活動期限満了に伴い撤退
2020 年 8 月	バカヨコ内閣成立（ゴン・クリバリ首相逝去に伴う組閣）
2020 年 10 月	大統領選挙(11 月、ウワタラ大統領再選)
2021 年 3 月	国民議会選挙実施
2021 年 4 月	アシ内閣成立

### 3 議会

上院（99 議席、任期 5 年）

国民議会（255 議席、任期 5 年）

### 4 政党

与党：ウフェ派連合（RHDP）

野党：コートジボワール民主党（PDCI）、イボワール人民戦線（FPI）、共和国のための自由と民主主義（LIDER）等

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### 6 内政状況

1960 年の独立後、ウフェ・ボワニ初代大統領の下 30 年以上にわたる安定した政権運営と年平均 8%の経済成長を達成し、その発展は「象牙の奇跡」と形容された。また、クーデターのない高い政治的安定性から、西アフリカ地域での指導的役割を担った。

しかし、1993 年のウフェ・ボワニ大統領逝去後、90 年代後半から社会が不安定化。99 年のクーデター翌年にバグボ大統領が就任すると、2002 年には政府軍と反政府勢力との対立が発生、反政府勢力が同国の北部・西部を支配下に置き、事実上国が二分される状態となった。

2007 年 3 月、バグボ大統領（当時）とソロ「新勢力」事務局長（当時：現国民議会議長）の間で和平プロセス合意（ワガドゥグ合意）が成立し、ソロ事務局長が首相に就任、同年 4 月に新内閣が発足し、国を二分する状態は解消された。

2010 年 10 月には 10 年ぶりとなる大統領選挙が実施され、第 2 回投票の結果、国際社会がウワタラ氏の当選を支持したものの、バグボ前大統領は権力移譲を拒否。約 5 か月にわたる混乱後、2011 年 4 月、軍がバグボ氏を拘束し、事態は収束した。

2011 年 5 月に改めて就任したウワタラ大統領は、安全対策、復興及び国民和解を 3 本柱とする国家復興政策に取り組み、2011 年 12 月には、11 年ぶりとなる国民議会選挙が実施された。

2015 年 10 月には、大統領選挙が平和裡に実施され、国民和解と経済復興の実績を訴えたウワタラ大統領が約 84% の得票率で再選を果たした。ウワタラ政権は二期目の重点政策として、国民和解の推進や、経済成長の恩恵の国民への均てん、貧困削減、若者の雇用促進及び女性の処遇改善等に取り組んでいる。

2016 年 11 月、国民投票を経て、副大統領職の創設や上院の設置を定めた新憲法が公布された。

2020 年 8 月、クリバリ首相の急逝を受け、ウワタラ大統領は同年 10 月の大統領選挙への立候補を正式に表明。同年 10 月に大統領選挙が実施され、翌 11 月、ウワタラ大統領が再選した。2021 年 3 月には国民議会選挙が実施され、与党が過半数を維持。同年 4 月、アシ内閣が成立した。

2022 年 4 月、2020 年 7 月以来空席だった副大統領のポストに、ティエモコ・メリエ・コネ氏（前西アフリカ諸国中央銀行総裁）が任命された。同月の内閣改造では、アシ首相他主要閣僚が再任。

## イ ACCORD [「COI集—コートジボワール」](#) ecoi (2021 年 9 月)

### 2 現在の政治状況

85 人以上の死者を出した 2020 年 10 月の激動の大統領選挙を経て、コートジボワールは政治的安定を取り戻しつつあるようだ。2021 年 3 月 6 日、投票権を持つ約 750 万人のイボワール人が、新しい国民議会を選出を呼びかけられた。ドイツの政治財団 Konrad Adenauer Stiftung の報告書によると、市民社会の監視団らはこの選挙を包括的であると認定し、平和的なプロセスが優勢であることを強調した。アラサン・ワタラ大統領の与党 RHDP（民主主義と平和のためのウフェ主義者連合／Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix）[注 1] は、255 議席中 137 議席の過半数を獲得して議会選挙を制した。野党は、ベディエ元大統領の PDCI [コートジボワール民主党]、バグボ元大統領の EDS（民主主義と主権のための連携／Ensemble pour la démocratie et la souveraineté）、FPI [イボワール人民戦線] が合計 91 議席を獲得している。EDS は、当時不在だったバグボの支持者らが政治プラットフォームとして 2017 年 4 月に立ち上げた政党である。同プラットフォームの目的は、すべての政治犯の釈放を得ることであったが、2020 年の大統領選挙

を視野に入れた位置づけでもあった（2017年8月21日付け *jeune afrique* ; 2017年8月21日付け *rfi*）。亡命中のギョーム・ソロ元首相を中心とする GPS 同盟はこの選挙に参加しなかった。26人の無所属候補が国会に選出された（2021年3月11日付け KAS・1頁）。

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ウ 佐藤章「[コートジボワールは安定したのか](#)」『アフリカレポート』日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所（2015年）

…2010年11月末にようやく大統領選挙の決選投票が実施されたものの、敗北を認めない現職の L・バゴ（Laurent Gbagbo）と、当選を国際的に承認された挑戦者の A・D・ワタラ（Alassane Dramane Ouattara）がともに政府を樹立して対峙する状況に陥った。両者の対立は2011年3月末に軍事衝突へと発展したが、最終的にはワタラ側が勝利し、2011年5月にワタラ政権が正式に発足した。

エ 佐藤章「[コートジボワール新憲法の意義をめぐって](#)」『アフリカレポート』日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所（2018年）

…初代大統領の F・ウフェ＝ボワニ（Félix Houphouët-Boigny、以下ウフェ）というカリスマ的な指導者のもとで、ウフェが率いるコートジボワール民主党（Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire: PDCI）が国民議会の全議席を独占する体制が、独立から1990年まで、じつに30年にわたって続いた。

複数政党制にのっとった選挙は、1990年に初めて実施され、野党の国民議会議員も誕生したが、PDCI が圧倒的優位を占める体制は1999年末まで続いた。…

(1) 内戦

ア 記事「[コートジボワール前大統領に予想外の無罪判決 ICC、能力に疑念](#)」AFP（2019年1月17日）

国際刑事裁判所（ICC）は15日、2010年のコートジボワール大統領選後に発生した一連の衝突で人道に対する罪に問われていた同国前大統領ローラン・バゴ（Laurent Gbagbo）被告（73）に無罪を言い渡し、同被告の即時釈放を命じた。…

コートジボワールでは2010年の大統領選でバゴ被告が敗北を認めなかったことから、数か月にわたる騒乱が発生し、約3000人が死亡した。人道に対する罪に問われたバゴ被告は、ICCで裁判にかけられた初の国家元首となっていた。

イ 記事「[コートジボワール、排外主義と内戦の末](#)」video 朝日新聞グローブ（2017年8月17日）

99年12月、ロベール・ゲイ元軍参謀長がクーデターを執行し、事態の打開を図

ったが、国民の反発で国外逃亡を余儀なくされ、「イボワリテ民族主義」に固執する排外的な「イボワール人民党」のローラン・バボ（バグボ）が政権の座に就いた。

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02 年 9 月に始まった南北内戦は、翌年の和平合意で形式的には終結したが、バボ政権は和平合意を履行せず、混乱は長期化した。結局、紆余曲折の末にバボ大統領が 11 年 4 月に身柄を拘束され、南北に分断されていたコートジボワールはようやく再統一された。…

ウ 佐藤章「[コートジボワールは安定したのか](#)」『アフリカレポート』日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所（2015 年）

2000 年 10 月の民政移管選挙により、野党の草分け的存在であるイボワール人民戦線（Front populaire ivoirien: FPI）のバボが大統領に当選したが、2002 年 9 月には、軍事政権期に軍を離脱したエリート精鋭兵らが組織した反乱軍——コートジボワール愛国運動（Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire: MPCCI）——の挙兵により内戦が勃発した。…

## 2. 人権状況

ア ●米国国務省「[国別人権状況報告 2021 年 - コートジボワール](#)」（2022 年 4 月 12 日）

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings by government or on behalf of government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detentions; political prisoners or detainees; politically motivated reprisals against individuals in another country; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; serious restrictions on free expression and media, including violence or threats of violence against journalists and the existence of criminal libel laws; serious government corruption; lack of investigation and accountability for gender-based violence, including but not limited to domestic and/or intimate partner violence, female genital mutilation and other harmful practices; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons.

## 3. 関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い

### (1) 主な政党

#### ① 民族と政党

ア ●ACCORD「[COI集—コートジボワール](#)」ecoi（2021 年 9 月）

### 1.2 Demographics

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The main political parties are all identified with their ethnic base: the Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire-Rassemblement démocratique africain (Democratic Party of Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally – PDCI-RDA) is identified with the Akan, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (Ivorian Popular Front – FPI) with the Krou, referred to as the people of the West (ASSN, February 2017, p. 5). The Rassemblement des Républicains (Rally of the Republicans – RDR), which had been formed by dissidents of the PDCI in 1994 in support of Ouattara, was considered to be the party of the Dioula and Muslims. Due to Ouattara's northern identity and the “aggressive ethno-nationalist course” of the PDCI, the RDR became “the political home of the northerners” (GROWup, 2017, p. 3).

...

### 3.2 Violence after the October 2020 presidential elections

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The New Humanitarian (TNH), an independent news agency focusing on crises and advocating for improving humanitarian response, cites Drissa Traoré, an Ivoirien lawyer and secretary general of the Paris-based International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), according to whom “political parties have the bulk of their supporters coming from the same ethnic groups as the leaders [...]. When these parties are opposed, the situation exacerbates community tensions” (TNH, 28 October 2020). Similarly, the French independent online journal Mediapart in an October 2020 article cites Arthur Banga, an expert in security issues in Côte d'Ivoire. According to Banga the political sphere is tied to the community sphere: “If you take an ethnic group, you will have 70 % adhering to the same religion and supporting the same political party.” The article goes on to provide an overview of political figures the different ethnic groups support. The Baoulé, historically present in the centre and east of the country are traditionally close to the PDCI, the party led by Henri Konan Bédié. In the west, the Bété population tends to favour Laurent Gbagbo. In the Senoufo region of Ferkessédougou, near the Burkinabé border, there is a general preference for Guillaume Soro, while the Agni territories in the centre show more support for Pascal Affi N'Guessan. The Malinke or Dioula often favour president Alassane Ouattara and the RHDP. According to Banga, this is only a small part of the picture, however. Specific political movements are also attributed to the Adioukrous, Gouros, Dan, Guérés, Abrons, Koulangos etc. (Mediapart, 27 October 2020). TNH further cites a political analyst, Sylvain N'Guessan, who noted, with regard to inter-communal violence around the presidential elections, that “long-standing ethnic and social divisions in Côte d'Ivoire have not been adequately addressed”. According to the article, there was a feeling among many Ivoiriens supporting Gbagbo in the west of the country that they were excluded from government jobs and “an associated system of patronage that they say benefits northern ethnic groups”. Tensions between communities remain due to the lack of “lasting solutions to the Ivoirien socio-political crisis” (TNH, 28 October 2020).



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## ② RDR (共和主義者連合/Rassemblement des républicains)

ア ●EASO [「EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Côte d'Ivoire: Country Focus」](#) (2019 年 6 月)

## 3.2.1.3 Rassemblement des Républicains [Rally of the Republicans] (RDR)

The RDR was founded in 1994 by Djéni Kobina as a central, democratic liberalist party, splitting from the PDCI.<sup>244</sup> It is a founding member of the African Liberal Network<sup>245</sup> and it joined the Liberal International at the Dakar Congress in 2003.<sup>246</sup>

The party is based on the political ideas of Ouattara, as reported on its official website.<sup>247</sup> The core idea of RDR is that the three key areas of development for Côte d'Ivoire are: '... good economic policy, a conducive legal and political environment, and attention to equitable social development. Finally, the RDR believes in the growth of a free society based on personal liberty, personal responsibility and social justice'.<sup>248</sup> However, an internal report by EU ambassadors, cited in AFP on 2 August 2018, reportedly criticises the government for gradually restricting the freedom of expression and for not listening to internal and external criticism, while social protest is increasing. At the political level, the creation of a unified party is considered a way to ensure reelection and marginalising opposition movements.<sup>249</sup>

The party and its leader are supporters of the economic liberalism and the withdrawal of the social state. Actually this approach has caused a strong perception of inequalities in the Ivorian society: the majority of the population, indeed, feels that there is a bias, mostly ethnic-based, in the access to opportunities and advantages of the economic growth.<sup>250</sup> Moreover, the government, facing this situation, shows a progressive closure to external or internal criticism.<sup>251</sup>

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※脚注の詳細は原文をご覧ください。

イ 佐藤章 [「コートジボワールは安定したのか」](#) 『アフリカレポート』日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所 (2015 年)

…内戦勃発前の 2000 年 12 月に実施された国民議会選挙で、ソロはワタラが率いる政党「共和連合」(Rassemblement des républicains: RDR) の候補者として立候補したが落選し、その後は RDR での活動を行っていない。内戦勃発後には、RDR を含む主要野党 4 党と反乱軍 3 派は和平推進派の連合を形成し、またソロとワタラは歴代政権による北部人差別に反対する立場を共有していた。…

ウ ○イタリア内務省 [「政治情勢と RDR 党 \(共和派連合\) の概要 \(Panoramica della](#)

[situazione politica e Partito RDR \(Rassemblement des Républicains\)](#) | via  
EUAA (2022 年 5 月 30 日)

③ PDCI (コートジボワール民主党 / Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire)

ア ●EASO [「EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Côte d'Ivoire: Country Focus」](#) (2019 年 6 月)

**3.2.1.2 Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire – Rassemblement démocratique africain [Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire – African democratic rally] (PDCI - RDA)**

The PDCI - RDA was founded by Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1946. 223 It was the sole party until 1990.224...

The last years of PDCI's supremacy in the Ivorian political landscape were characterised by the introduction of the concept of Ivoirité which stressed the ethnic balance of the country and led to a deterioration of the attitude towards migrant workers.227 This concept had the political function of excluding Ouattara from running for president in 1995 and triggered the conflict regarding which ethnic group is more Ivorian.228

...

The PDCI structure comprises: • the presidency made up by le Président, les Vice-présidents, le Comité des Sages [Committee of Wise Men] and le Secrétariat Exécutif [Executive secretary]; • le Bureau politique [Political bureau], les Secrétaires Généraux de Section [General secretaries of sections]; and • two Organisations Spécialisées [Special organisations]: l'Union des Femmes du PDCI [Women League of PDCI], (UFDCI) and la Jeunesse du PDCI [Youth League of PDCI] (JPDCI).238

After years of rivalries with Ouattara's RDR, the PDCI joined the coalition RHDP in 2005. the coalition was in opposition of former President Laurent Gbagbo in the 2006 election (which was postponed to 2010, see Section 2.5). In 2010, Bédié's party supported the election of Alassane Ouattara as president and with the 'Appel de Daoukro' in 2014 renewed his support to his ally in the 2015 presidential election.229

During Ouattara's second mandate, new tensions arose between RDR and PDCI regarding the alternation in candidacy and the unified party process which was initially endorsed by the PDCI. Tensions reached high levels as exemplified by Bédié's official communication of 13 July 2018 in which he forbade PDCI's leaders and militants to participate in the General Assembly of the Parti unifié [Unified Party].230

On 9 August 2018, Bédié announced the PDCI's withdrawal from the project of a unified party.231 The breakup was primarily due to the non-respect of the previously agreed alternation in the candidacy. Indeed Bédié does not exclude the possibility to be the candidate of PDCI in the 2020 election.232 Moreover the unification, from Bédié's perspective, is not needed in a situation in which there is not a strong opposition in the representative institutions of Cote d'Ivoire, due to the boycott by FPI.233

Following the withdrawal of the PDCI from the unified party process, Daniel Kablan Duncan, VicePresident of Côte d’Ivoire and former Vice-President of PDCI, created, with the other PDCI members of the government, a movement called PDCI - Renaissance, that supports the unification in RHDP.<sup>234</sup> This split was strongly condemned by Bédié and he dismissed high-ranking PDCI members who supported Duncan’s movement such as Ahoua N’Doli Théophile and Achi Patrick.<sup>235</sup> Therefore several PDCI members joined the PDCI - Renaissance.<sup>236</sup>

...

## (2) 野党支持者に対する当局の取扱い

ア ●米国国務省「[国別人権状況報告 2021 年 - コートジボワール](#)」(2022 年 4 月 12 日)

### **Political Prisoners and Detainees**

The government denied there were political prisoners, although it arrested multiple members of opposition parties at the end of 2019 and during 2020 on various criminal charges. Many of these persons were either released or prosecuted during the year. The government also released numerous persons arrested for crimes allegedly committed during the 2020 presidential electoral period. In December 2020 and in January, the government provisionally released several members of the opposition charged with sedition and terrorism in connection with their November 2020 professed establishment of a National Transitional Council (see section 3, Recent Elections). In January the government also released five members of Guillaume Soro’s political movement arrested in August 2020 in connection with protests against President Ouattara’s candidacy for a third term.

In May the public prosecutor announced that judges responsible for investigating persons detained for alleged crimes, some involving violence, committed during the presidential electoral period had ordered the provisional release of 100 of these detainees. Included in this group was Pulcherie Edith Gbalet, a civil society organization leader, and three of her colleagues, provisionally released in April. In August 2020, Gbalet and the three colleagues were arrested and charged with inciting riots in connection with their calls for demonstrations against President Ouattara’s candidacy, as well as with disturbing public order, calling for insurrection, violence and assault, and destruction of public and private property. The government cited the accused’s social media posts calling for protests, but no further evidence, to substantiate the charges. After her release, the government informed Gbalet that she would be tried, but as of October no trial date had been set. The government did not pursue charges against her three colleagues.

In early August President Ouattara announced in a televised speech the provisional release of an additional 69 persons detained for crimes allegedly committed during the presidential electoral period. He also announced the pardon of nine persons convicted of crimes committed during this period. As of late August, 37 individuals accused of

committing crimes during the presidential electoral period remained in pretrial detention.

...

イ ●EASO [「EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Côte d'Ivoire: Country Focus」](#) (2019 年 6 月)

**3.2.4 Situation of Gbagbo supporters**

**Political prisoners of the post-electoral crisis**

...

On 31 December 2015, Ouattara announced a presidential pardon to release or reduce the sentences of 3 100 detainees, including political personalities from the FPI, even though he rejected the definition of ‘political prisoners’.<sup>380</sup>

...

In January 2016, there were reportedly 311 political prisoners, most of them without conviction. On 15 January 2016, 85 of them received pardon.<sup>382</sup> In March 2016, an FPI report noted that 241 militants of the FPI (192 civilians and 49 militaries) were still in prison.<sup>383</sup>

Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that 200 Gbagbo-supporters, arrested in 2011, were still in prison in 2017 awaiting trial.<sup>384</sup> In April 2018, the AFFDO-CI declared that, 7 years after the end of the postelectoral crisis, 120 out of 300 people were convicted while 120 were in pre-trial detention<sup>385</sup>, although the maximum term of pre-trial detention in Côte d’Ivoire is 18 months.<sup>386</sup>

The condition of detention of Gbagbo-supporters was defined as inhuman by the President of the Association des femmes et familles de détenus d’opinion (AFFDO-CI), Désirée Douati, who pointed out that political prisoners are deprived of the right to medical assistance.<sup>387</sup> In June 2017, two detainees died in Maison d’arrêt et de correction d’Abidjan (MACA).<sup>388</sup>

**Government response to opposition activities**

...

※脚注の詳細は原文をご覧ください。

(3) 2020 年大統領選に係る政治暴力

ア ●ACCORD [「COI集—コートジボワール」](#) ecoi (2021 年 9 月)

**3.2 Violence after the October 2020 presidential elections**

With reference to Côte d’Ivoire’s National Human Rights Council, Human Rights Watch (HRW) states that 55 people were killed and 282 injured between 31 October and 10 November and, referring to numbers provided by the Ivorian government, that 20 people

were killed on election day, while additional 31 people were killed in the days after the election. 13 of these deaths were documented by HRW, 2 of which occurred during violence between government and opposition supporters on election day and 9 during clashes in the days to follow (HRW, 2 December 2020).

...

AFP notes that “the weeks before the election saw clashes, mainly between local ethnic groups close to the opposition and Dioula communities” (AFP, 2 November 2020) who are regarded as close to president Ouattara due to his northern Muslim origin (AFP, 28 October 2020). A few days before election day, AFP notes that “deadly clashes have broken out in four towns in the southeast, Daoukro, Divo, Bongouanou and Dabou, leaving around 30 dead” (AFP, 28 October 2020).

On election day, 31 October 2020, intercommunal violence between opposition supporters from the Gouro ethnic group and pro-government youth, largely Malinké, in the town of Oumé were reported; one person was killed and dozens injured (HRW, 2 December 2020). HRW further mentions clashes between Baoulé and Dioula ethnic groups on 31 October and 1 November 2020 in the town of Toumodi, where young men armed with machetes, clubs, and hunting rifles attacked Toumodikro, a predominately Baoulé neighborhood, and set homes and shops on fire. A family of four were burned alive in their home and dozens of residences were reported to having been burned during the violence. It was also reported that Baoulé youth torched garages belonging to Dioula (HRW, 2 December 2020; see also RFI, 5 November 2020).

...

#### 4. ジェンダー、DV および子ども

##### (1) 人身取引の被害者

ア ●米国国務省「[人身取引年次報告 2022 年 - コートジボワール](#)」ecoi (2022 年 7 月 29 日)

##### **Protection**

...

The government did not have standardized procedures to proactively identify trafficking victims and refer them to care; however, the UCT, Brigade Mondaine, and SDLTEDJ each had operational victim referral procedures. The government developed an NRM, in collaboration with an international organization, which remained pending final approval at the end of the reporting period. Despite the lack of a formal NRM, in practice, officials referred adult trafficking victims to NGOs or host families and child victims to NGO and government-run shelters or foster families when necessary. Officials could also refer trafficking victims to government-run centers for victims of abuse for psychological care and NGOs for shelter and services. The government provided food, medical care, and

psycho-social support to victims. The government, in partnership with an NGO, operated three shelters for child labor and child trafficking victims, including a new shelter opened during the reporting period. There was no government-run shelter that could accommodate adult victims. Government ministries lacked coordination, which in some cases hindered the provision of services. The Ministry of Women, Children, and Families (MWCF) provided some in-kind support to NGOs caring for victims, including food, hygiene products, and other supplies, but did not report providing any direct financial support. Observers reported government support for victim protection and services remained inadequate, and in many cases, NGOs funded and provided the majority of trafficking victim care. Observers also noted social workers lacked the resources and personnel to effectively care for and monitor the reintegration of victims. The lack of services, especially for adults, and lack of reintegration assistance rendered many victims vulnerable to re-victimization. ...

Access to victim services was not dependent on cooperation with law enforcement proceedings. Ivoirian law required the government to provide protection and assistance to victims who participated in investigations or trials against alleged traffickers, but the government did not report providing this assistance to any victims. The law also called for creation of a national office for the protection of witnesses and victims; however, the office was not yet operational. Observers reported the government did not provide or refer trafficking victims to legal aid, which hindered victims' ability to press charges against their alleged traffickers and, for foreign victims, to address immigration issues. Trafficking victims could file civil suits, but none reportedly did so, and many victims were not aware of this option. Ivoirian law allowed victims to obtain restitution, and in one case, the court ordered a convicted trafficker to pay 10 million FCFA (\$17,190) in restitution. Due to the lack of standardized victim identification procedures, some victims may have remained unidentified within the law enforcement system. International organizations reported border agents sometimes denied entry to foreign nationals, including potential victims, without screening for human trafficking. Law enforcement officials reportedly only screened individuals in commercial sex for trafficking when detaining or arresting them.

イ ●EASO [「EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Côte d'Ivoire: Country Focus」](#) (2019年6月)

5.4.1 Trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation Many women from five countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria) or more distant countries are victims of sexual exploitation in cities along the trade corridor from Abidjan to Lagos or at the borders.<sup>865</sup> Some Ivorian women and girls are exploited in sex trafficking. Nigerian traffickers also exploit Nigerian women and girls in sex trafficking in Côte d'Ivoire. The Government did not show attempts to reduce the demand for commercial sex.<sup>866</sup>

※脚注の詳細は原文をご覧ください。

## (2) FGM

- ア ○Asylos [「クエリー回答 \[AFR2022-03\] コートジボワール：女性器切除と家庭内暴力 \(Côte d'Ivoire : Excision et violences conjugales\)」](#) (2022 年 2 月 21 日)
- イ ○ACCORD [「COI 集—コートジボワール」](#) eoi (2021 年 9 月)
- ウ ●EASO [「EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Côte d'Ivoire: Country Focus」](#) (2019 年 6 月)

**Legal provisions**

...

The 5th article of the Constitution forbids ‘les mutilations génitales féminines’ (FGM).<sup>825</sup> In 1998, Côte d’Ivoire adopted a national law (98/757, 23.12.1998) prohibiting and punishing FGM/C. Article 2 of the Law stipulates that whoever commits a female genital mutilation is liable to imprisonment from 1 to 5 years and a fine from CFA 360 000 to 2 000 000 ( about EUR 550 and 3 060). The penalty is from 5 to 20 years if the victim dies of related consequences.<sup>826</sup> In 2000, the Ivorian State created a National Committee within the Ministry of Family and Social Affairs in order to fight violence against women and children. The Committee implemented an Action Plan for Women 2003-2007 to protect women and children from violence.<sup>827</sup>

In 2013, the Government launched the Tolérance zéro aux MGF campaign, and initiated actions aimed at reinforcing the application of Law No 98-757 of 23 December 1998 on FGM, in support of legal professionals and prefectural authorities work.<sup>828</sup>

The 2011-2012 Enquête Démographique et de Santé et à Indicateurs Multiples indicates that 38 % of the women aged 15-49 declared to have been excised and 11 % of girls aged 0-14. Nearly all women, 97 % of the daughters and 95 % of the mothers, were excised by a traditional (nearly all female) practitioner. The most prevalent form of FGM/C in the country is ‘flesh removed’.<sup>829</sup> As of 2016, according to MICS, 36.7 % of the women aged 15-49 years had undergone some kind of FGM/C in Côte d’Ivoire; 10.9 % of the girls aged 0-14 years had been subjected to FGM/C.<sup>830</sup>

The percentage of women who underwent FGM/C is higher in the north-west, north and west regions. It is more widespread in rural rather than in urban areas. Prevalence is higher among Muslim population and among poorest and less educated people. The Northern Mandé ethnic group shows the highest percentage of excised women (60.7 %), followed by the Gur (59.1 %), the Southern Mandé (43 %), the Krou (14.1 %), while the Akan has the lowest one (2.7 %). Non-Ivorian ethnic groups have 58 % of excised women, other Ivorian groups 53 %.<sup>831</sup>

...



**Enforcement of the law**

In 2012, for the first time a conviction was issued on FGM; nine women in Katiola were sentenced to one year in prison and to a fine of CFA 50 000 [about EUR 75] for the excision of about thirty girls; four of them were convicted for FGM/C and four for complicity. In the past, according to a representative of the UNFPA, there were cases of arrests of women who performed excisions, but these cases never resulted in judgments and convictions.<sup>840</sup>

Some other cases of conviction and fines for performing excision were reported, for example in 2013 in the western region of Tonkpi.<sup>841</sup>

In 2015, the mother of an excised girl was convicted in Katiola to one year in prison and a fine of CFA 360 000 [approximately EUR 550] for ‘complicity in excision’ and so was a relative who had accompanied her to an ‘exciseuse’. The prosecutor Hamed Diomandé stated that it was the second time they had condemned exciseuses, but the phenomenon was persistent.<sup>842</sup>

...

※ 脚注の詳細は原文をご覧ください。

**(3) 非嫡出子**

ア ○ FIS [「コートジボワール：非嫡出子 \(Norsunluurannikko / Avioliiton ulkopuolella syntyneen lapsen asema\)」](#) via EUAA (2022 年 8 月 16 日)

イ ○ OFPRA [「コートジボワール：婚外子 \(Côte d'Ivoire : Enfants nés en dehors du mariage\)」](#) (2021 年 11 月 19 日)

**5. LGBT**

ア ○ OFPRA [「コートジボワール：性的及びジェンダー・マイノリティの状況 \(Côte d'Ivoire : Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre\)」](#) (2021 年 10 月 20 日)

イ ○ EASO [「EASO Country of Origin Information Report. Côte d'Ivoire: Country Focus」](#) (2019 年 6 月)

6. 汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護 ※未調査

7. 兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の） ※未調査

8. 司法制度・刑事手続 ※未調査



## 9. 警察・治安部隊（刑務所等の状況含む）

### (1) コートジボワール共和国軍（FRCI）

ア 佐藤章「[コートジボワールは安定したのか](#)」『アフリカレポート』日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所（2015 年）

…軍の厚遇は、ウフェ＝ボワニ（Félix Houphouët-Boigny）初代大統領（在職 1960～1993 年）が主導するコートジボワール民主党（Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire: PDCI）の一党支配体制を支える重要な手段だった。…

…2011 年 4 月上旬に、…FRCI がバボとその幹部らを拘束した。その後 FRCI によりバボ側の武装勢力（FDS 離脱者、民兵、リベリア人傭兵など）の掃討作戦が行われ、5 月末頃までに全土での支配権がほぼ確立された。これにともない、元来の正規軍である FDS は、FRCI の司令権下に置かれることとなった。

## 10. 報道の自由

ア ●記事「[RSF calls for release of six journalists held for “false information”](#)」RSF via [ecoi.net](#)（2017 年 2 月 14 日）

…six mostly very senior journalists have been detained since 12 February for reporting that bonuses were paid to members of the army’s special forces who staged a mutiny in the southeastern town of Adiaké.

…

They are all charged with “publishing false news” and “inciting army personnel to insubordination and rebellion” in articles published on 10 and 11 February about payment of bonuses to the Adiaké-based special forces who staged a mutiny for more pay on 7-8 February. The government issued a statement denying the reports.

…If convicted on these charges, they face the possibility of jail terms of one to five years and fines of 300,000 to 3 million CFA francs.

## 11. 宗教の自由 ※未調査

## 12. 国籍、民族および人種

### (1) 北部人

ア ●ACCORD「[COI 集—コートジボワール](#)」ecoi（2021 年 9 月）

#### 3 Inter-communal violence

…

The HRW report further describes that “several politicians employed the rhetoric of

‘Ivoirité,’ or ‘Ivorianness’ – an ultranationalist discourse focusing on Ivorian identity” aimed at making Ouattara’s run for presidency in 1995 and 2000 impossible (HRW, 10 October 2013, p. 15). Henri Konan Bédié, the president at that time, developed the concept of “Ivoirité” (“Ivorianness”), “together with a close circle of university intellectuals”. This concept “established new, ‘scientific’ criteria for citizenship based on an Akan – or more specifically, a Baule – cultural identity” (GROWup, 2017, p. 3). But besides being about politics and nationality, this discourse marginalized immigrants and northern Ivorians and also “related to land issues, challenging non-Ivorians’ ability to have significant property rights” (HRW, 10 October 2013, p. 15). As described in an academic paper by Drissa Kone, property ownership and land rights are “vital to the livelihood of most West Africans”. Since the dispossessed were mainly Muslim, this discrimination could easily be presented as “a strategy against the so-called ‘Dioula’ northerners, who also happened to constitute the bulk of Ouattara’s supporters” (Kone, September 2020, p. 224). As a result of the fact that the boundaries between “original” northern Ivorians and second- or third-generation immigrants from northern countries and more recent immigrants were blurred, “northerners had increasingly become equated with foreigners. Being ‘Dioula’, Muslim, and RDR partisan became completely intermixed in the perception of other Ivoirians”, which eventually led to exclusion of millions of Ivoirians from the north “from the ‘national community’ and from citizenship” (GrowUp, 2017, p. 4) as well as to the civil war that divided the country into a northern and a southern part (France 24, 28 October 2010).

...

イ 佐藤章「[コートジボワール新憲法の意義をめぐって](#)」『アフリカレポート』日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所（2018年）

…第3 憲法では、これらの条件がほとんど削除され、さらに「イボワール人性」に関する箇所でも、「父と母」ではなく「父もしくは母」に緩和され、本人に関しても「生まれながらの」という条件が削除された。条件が少なくなることで、その条件の証明や認定をめぐる政治的な駆け引きを発生させる可能性を低める効果が期待できる。この点で、第3 憲法の被選挙権規定は、特定政治家の排除の象徴というこれまでの性格を、かなりの程度、克服したものと言えるだろう。

もちろん、「父もしくは母」に緩和されたとはいえ、親世代について、植民地に遡り「生まれながらのコートジボワール人」であることを求める点は、証明の根拠となる民籍登記（出生証明書の届出）が必ずしも広く実施されてこなかったことを考えると、技術的な問題を残すものであることはたしかである。また、ワタラが経験したように、民籍登記の真正性に疑義が呈されるという事態は、新しい規定でも完全に排除されているとはいえない。

ウ 佐藤章「[コートジボワールは安定したのか](#)」『アフリカレポート』日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所（2015年）

(脚注 4) コートジボワールでは 1990 年代なかばから、「イボワール人性」(ivoirité) という概念を唱える政治扇動が歴代政権によって盛んになされ、北部出身者が「生粋のイボワール人」ではないと決めつけられ、暴力や差別の対象となってきた。この扇動は北部出身者であるワタラへの政治的圧力の性格も持つ。ソロも北部出身者であり、自らが反乱軍に加わった理由が北部人差別をやめさせることにあると述べている [Soro 2005]。

## (2) 国籍

ア Mirna Adjami [「Statelessness and Nationality in Côte d'Ivoire - A Study for UNHCR」](#) refworld (2016 年 12 月)

### 3.1.1. Nationality by origin

...

The Ivorian legislators privileged the automatic attribution of Ivorian “nationality by origin,” in the 1961 Nationality Code’s Title II encompassing Articles 6-9, which was available for three categories of individuals. Article 6 conferred Ivorian nationality by origin for the first group as follows:

Is Ivorian, any individual born in Côte d’Ivoire except if both of his or her parents are foreigners.

...

### 3.2.7. Dual nationality

### 3.2.8. Loss and renunciation of nationality

The Ivorian Nationality Code distinguishes between the loss/renunciation (Title IV, Chapter 1 entitled “perte”) 94 and deprivation (Title IV, Chapter 2, entitled “déchéance”) of nationality with the difference between these categories in the consequences. In general, the Code foresees loss/renunciation in instances where an Ivorian acquires another nationality. Given that such loss can occur automatically, however, loss resembles deprivation in several instances. Nevertheless, for individuals who have lost Ivorian nationality pursuant to the instances set forth in Title IV, Chapter 1, the Nationality Code allows such individuals to apply to reacquire Ivorian nationality pursuant to Articles 34-38. By contrast those individuals who are deprived of their nationality pursuant to Article 54 are not eligible to apply to reacquire Ivorian nationality unless the conditions for the deprivation of nationality in Article 54 are legally expunged. The rules contained in both chapters pertaining to loss, renunciation, and deprivation are problematic with respect to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness on a number of procedural due process points, as well as for the lack of safeguards against statelessness, and should be revised to bring the Nationality Code

into conformity with its treaty obligations.

The Ivorian Nationality Code foresees five scenarios for the loss or renunciation of Ivorian nationality. The first two circumstances in Articles 48 and 49 are discussed above.<sup>95</sup>

With respect to loss, Article 51 allows an Ivorian woman marrying a foreigner to conserve her Ivorian nationality unless she makes an oath that she wishes to renounce her Ivorian nationality prior to a civil marriage ceremony. This provision establishes strict formal conditions a woman must follow to submit an oath of renunciation. It also contains a safeguard against statelessness, in that an oath of renunciation of Ivorian nationality is only valid when a woman proves she acquires or can acquire the nationality of her husband according to the nationality laws of his country. This provision respects the free will of an Ivorian woman to choose whether to retain or renounce her Ivorian nationality upon marriage to a foreigner, but perpetuates gender inequality in offering the option to renounce Ivorian nationality through declaration only to Ivorian women, and not to Ivorian men, marrying foreigners.

...

There are two additional grounds for loss of Ivorian nationality. Article 52 provides for the automatic loss by decree of Ivorian nationality for Ivorian nationals who comport themselves as nationals of a foreign country.<sup>96</sup> Article 53 foresees loss of Ivorian nationality if someone continues to occupy a post in the public service or army of a foreign State, in spite of an injunction made by the Ivorian government to resign from this post, unless the concerned individual proves the impossibility of resigning from this post. The loss becomes effective after six months from the injunction through the adoption of a decree declaring automatic loss of Ivorian nationality for the person concerned. Although the Nationality Code classifies Articles 52 and 53 as instances of loss of nationality, they technically represent instances of deprivation of nationality in that they occur at the discretion of the government and with no safeguards against statelessness.

### **3.2.9. Deprivation of nationality**

Anyone who acquires nationality by any mode (as opposed to Ivorians by origin) can be deprived of their Ivorian nationality pursuant to Article 54 for any of the following four reasons: (1) if the person is convicted of any crime or infraction against the internal or external security of the State; (2) if the person is convicted of any act qualified as a crime or infraction against institutions; (3) if the person engages in any acts, to the benefit of a foreign State, that are incompatible with being Ivorian and prejudicial to the interests of Côte d'Ivoire; and (4) if the person is convicted in Côte d'Ivoire or abroad of an act qualified as a crime by Ivorian law and that would result in a sentence of at least five years' imprisonment. Deprivation of nationality, however, can only occur if the proscribed acts happen within 10 years of the time an individual acquires Ivorian nationality and within two years of the commission of the proscribed offense (Article 55).

Deprivation of nationality can also be extended to the relevant person's spouse and minor

children on the condition that these family members are of foreign nationality and continue to retain their foreign nationality after having acquired Ivorian nationality (Article 56).

### 13. 出入国および移動の自由

#### (1) 難民の自発的帰還

- ア UNHCR [「COTE D'IVOIRE : SITUATION DU RAPATRIEMENT VOLONTAIRE」](#) ecoi (2022 年 8 月 12 日)
- イ UNHCR [「COTE D'IVOIRE : SITUATION DU RAPATRIEMENT VOLONTAIRE」](#) ecoi (2022 年 7 月 29 日)

### 14. その他

#### (1) 障がい者

- ア ○Asylos [「クエリー回答 \[AFR2022-01\] コートジボワール：コミュニケーション障害のある障がい者の状況 \(Côte d'Ivoire : Situation des personnes en situation de handicap avec des troubles de la communication\)」](#) (2022 年 3 月 21 日)

#### 略称

ACCORD	オーストリア出身国・庇護研究ドキュメンテーションセンター
ACLED	武力紛争位置・事件データプロジェクト
AI	アムネスティ・インターナショナル
ARC	難民調査センター
BAMF	ドイツ連邦移民難民庁
CGRS	ベルギー難民及び無国籍者庁
CIA	米国中央情報局
CNDA	フランス庇護権裁判所
CRS	米国議会調査局
DFAT	オーストラリア外務貿易省
DIS	デンマーク移民庁
DRC	デンマーク・レフュジー・カウンセル
EASO	欧州難民支援機関
FIS	フィンランド移民庁
HRW	ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ

ICG	インターナショナル・クライシス・グループ
IDMC	国内避難民監視センター
IRBC	カナダ移民難民局
IRDC	アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター
ジェトロ	日本貿易振興機構
JICA	国際協力機構
Lifos	スウェーデン移民庁出身国情報データベース
Landinfo	ノルウェー政府出身国情報センター
MRGI	マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル
OECD	経済協力開発機構
OFPRA	フランス難民・無国籍庇護局
OHCHR	国連人権高等弁務官事務所
OSAC	米国海外安全保障評議会
RRTA	オーストラリア難民再審査審判所
RSAA	ニュージーランド難民地位不服申立機関
RSF	国境なき記者団
UKIAT	イギリス移民難民審判所
UKUT	イギリス上級審判所
UNHCR	国連難民高等弁務官事務所
USCIRF	米国連邦政府国際宗教自由に関する委員会