

スーダン

2021年3月15日ドラフト作成

2022年2月21日更新

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1. 一般情報

(1) 人口・地理

ア 外務省「[スーダン共和国基礎データ](#)」(2020年11月30日)

- | | | |
|---|-------|--|
| 1 | 面積 | 188万平方キロメートル（日本の約5倍） |
| 2 | 人口 | 4,281万人（2019年、世銀） |
| 3 | 首都 | ハルツーム |
| 4 | 人種・民族 | 主としてアラブ人、ヌビア人、ヌバ人、フル人、ベジャ人等（200以上の部族が混在） |
| 5 | 言語 | アラビア語（公用語）、英語も通用、その他 部族語多数 |
| 6 | 宗教 | イスラム教、キリスト教、伝統宗教 |

イ 英国内務省「[出身国情報報告：スーダン](#)」(2010年4月16日)

民族と言語

1.09 米国内務省の2009年2月25日発表の Report on Human Rights Practices

2008, Sudan（人権に関するレポート2008：スーダン）（USSD レポート2008）は次のように述べている。「スーダンの住民には、無数の言語や方言を話すアラブ系およびアフリカ系の500以上の種族が入り混じっている。」[3a](セクション5)EIU カントリープロフィール：スーダンには次のようになっている。

「スーダンには大きな民族多様性...言語多様性がある。アラブ系が人口のおよそ40%で、それに次ぐのはブラックアフリカのディンカ12%、ベジャ7%である。」[114c](ハイライト)

- 1.10 同じソースによれば、アラビア語を話すのが人口の60%を占めるが、南部では英語も広く話されている。115の部族語があるとみられており、そのうち10万人以上の人話す言語は27ある。[114c](基本データ)2010年1月15日にアクセスした Europa World Online サイトの日付なしの記事には次のように記されている。「アラビア語が公用語であるが、その他の言語も話されており、英語も広く理解されている。」[1b](カントリープロフィール：位置、気候、言語、宗教、国旗、首都)Ethnologue ウェブサイトにはスーダンの言語マップが載せられている。また、スーダンの言語リストも参照。

宗教

- 1.11 イスラム教はスーダンの国教であるが、イスラム教徒は人口の60%前後である。(EIUのカントリープロフィール2009) [114c](ハイライト)北部スーダンの人々はほとんどイスラム教徒であるが、南部スーダンでは多くの人々がアミニズム信仰者かキリスト教徒である。(2010年2月22日にアクセスした Europa World Online サイト) [1b](カントリープロフィール：位置、気候、言語、宗教、国旗、首都)(p1)

1.12 米国国務省の2009年2月26日発表の人権に関するレポート2008：スーダンは次のごとく記している。

「人口の70%がイスラム教と推定される。北部ではイスラム教が支配的である。殆どのイスラム教徒はスンニ派であるが、特にスフィ教団では信仰するスンニの教えごとにはっきりグループが分かれている。

「土着信仰（アミニズム）は地方部に広まっており、人口の25%がその信仰者とみなされる。アミニズム信仰者の一部にはキリスト教の洗礼を受けた者もいるが、自分がキリスト教徒なのかアミニズム信仰とキリスト教の合体したものの信仰者なのか自覚できていない。

「キリスト教は第3の宗教グループであり、伝統的に南部とヌバ山地帯に広がっている。ハルツームにはキリスト教徒が多い。これは、長く続いた内戦の間に地方からの人口流入があった事もその原因の一つであろう。スーダンのローマカソリック教会と監督教会の洗礼を受けた信者は夫々600万人および500万人と言われるが、定期的に教会に行く人達の数をはるかに少ない。」 [3h]

(2) 内政

① 2021年10月25日の軍事クーデター以降の情報

ア ●BAMF [「Briefing Notes」](#) (2021年11月15日)

Military coup

General Abdelfattah Al-Burhan, commander in chief of the Sudanese armed forces and former chairman of the transitional government's Sovereign Council, announced on 11.11.21 that the Sovereign Council is to be reinstated in its previous form, after being deposed and dissolved together with the transitional government following the military coup of 25.10.21 (cf. BN of 08.11.21). He added that the composition of the council would be largely retained. Al-Burhan himself will continue to be chairman. He aims to replace only the civilian members of the council, with one exception. In the face of this arbitrary appointment of council members, Al-Burhan is being accused of breaching the original agreement, according to which the Sovereign Council was to comprise five civilians elected by civilian actors, five representatives of the military and one member chosen by common accord between civilian actors and military representatives.

Repeated calls for demonstrations led to renewed protests in various towns and cities in the country on 13.11.21. According to reports in the media, tens of thousands of people took part in these demonstrations. Security forces used live ammunition against the demonstrators, particularly in the capital, Khartoum, and in the neighbouring city of Omdurman. Tear gas was also deployed to drive the demonstrators apart. Military forces and paramilitary units reportedly blocked key roads and bridges in the capital to hinder the demonstrations. The internet continues to be blocked. According to the central committee

of Sudanese doctors, which is close to the protest movement, seven people were killed and more than 200 injured during the protests. Among the injured, more than 100 allegedly sustained bullet wounds. The police deny that live ammunition was deployed and, according to media reports, have stated that 39 police personnel were seriously wounded, while the police themselves applied only minimal force. Police stations were allegedly also attacked by demonstrators. Further protests are apparently planned for 17.11.21. On the day after the protests, the Al-Jazeera news network reported that the head of its office in Sudan had been arrested and taken into custody by security forces. There has been no reporting on the reasons for this arrest. International demonstrations of solidarity with the civilian protests took place in Paris, Berlin and Washington, DC, for example.

There are also reports of a further deterioration of the security situation in the Darfur region. Various incidents are said to have occurred last week, claiming a total of four lives.

イ ● ACLED [「Appetite for Destruction: The Military Counter-Revolution in Sudan」](#)
(2021年10月29日)

The military coup d'état in Sudan on 25 October 2021 sent shockwaves across the region and through diplomatic circuits. Following the arrest of the civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and several prominent senior officials from the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), demonstrators took to the streets across Khartoum. They were confronted by soldiers from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitaries in the capital, with reports emerging of Central Reserve Police paramilitaries also being deployed (Human Rights Watch, 29 October 2021). Over 10 people have reportedly been killed by state forces thus far and over 160 wounded (Radio Dabanga, 29 October 2021; UN OCHA, 28 October 2021), with at least some victims uninvolved in the demonstrations (Eye Radio, 27 October 2021). Demonstrations have since spread across much of Sudan.

The ringleader of the coup — Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan — is the military head of the Sovereign Council, and the commander-in-chief of SAF. On 25 October, he announced that a state of emergency was in effect, and that civilian political institutions established under the Constitutional Declaration of August 2019 would be dissolved. Bodies tasked with investigating the massacre of 3 June 2019 (discussed below) and with dismantling the 'deep state' of ex-President Omar al Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) were also dissolved (Al Jazeera, 25 October 2021), perhaps tipping the hand of the generals who organized the coup in the process.

By 26 October, amid widespread condemnation at home and abroad, Burhan re-emphasized that the seizure of power would only last until elections in mid-2023, and that Prime Minister Hamdok would be released from custody later that day. While Hamdok and his wife were released that evening, further arrests of civilian politicians and trade unionists were reported (AP, 27 October 2021). On 27 October, Sudan's membership of the African Union was suspended for the second time since the removal of Bashir in April 2019 (Al

Jazeera, 27 October 2021).

The fierce resistance to the coup — and the failure of the coup leaders to forge links with any ideological or politically viable constituency (Berridge, 2021) — suggests that the coup leaders will have to hurriedly cut deals with FFC elites who are prepared to do business with the military, or attempt to ride out the storm of protests coming their way. There is a palpable risk that the political bargain which has stitched together Sudan in the aftermath of Bashir will disintegrate. The prospect of serious violence against demonstrators in urban areas is increasing, while a reorganization or unravelling of alliances between military, paramilitary, and rebel elites threatens to plunge peripheral regions of Sudan into renewed war.

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ウ ●記事「[Analysis: Sudan's military rulers draw on Bashir-era veterans to tighten grip](#)」Reuters (2021年11月11日)

Summary

- Military has appointed senior bureaucrats since takeover
- Civilian critics say Bashir-era are returning
- Army said it stepped in to prevent instability

CAIRO, Nov 11 (Reuters) - Sudan's military rulers have been drawing on veteran ex-officials of toppled leader Omar al-Bashir for key posts in the state bureaucracy, in what critics see as a sign that they are seeking to cement control after seizing power in a coup.

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Nevertheless, publicly announced appointments of former senior Bashir-era officials since the coup include justice ministry undersecretary Huweda Al Kareem, foreign ministry undersecretary Ali Sadeq, and education ministry undersecretary Mahmoud Al Hourri.

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Officials have also been replaced in senior positions in state banks, media, and the regional government in Khartoum State and other states.

By giving jobs to former appointees of Bashir, an autocrat and military man associated by many Sudanese with years of isolation and U.S. sanctions, Burhan may only stiffen popular opposition to the takeover and narrow the space for compromise, critics say.

At the same time, public servants appointed under the civilian Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition that was sharing power with the military before the coup are being dismissed or reassigned, government employees and political groups say. Many Sudanese saw the appointment of non-political technocrats as one of the few tangible gains of the transition.

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② 2021年10月25日の軍事クーデター前の情報

ア 外務省「スーダン共和国基礎データ」(2020年11月30日)

5 内政

バシール准将(当時)は1989年、クーデタにより政権を獲得し、1993年10月に大統領に就任。以来、政権を維持。2005年1月の包括的和平合意(CPA)により南北内戦が終結した後、同合意に基づいた国民統一政府が発足し、バシール大統領(当時。以下同じ。)が統一政府大統領に就任。同年7月には暫定国家憲法が批准された。

暫定憲法に基づき実施された2010年4月の総選挙(24年ぶりの複数政党参加による総選挙)では、バシール大統領が再選。

2014年1月、バシール大統領は、国内和解等を目的として「国民対話メカニズム」を開始したが、反政府勢力や強硬派野党との協議が進捗しないまま、2015年4月に総選挙が実施され、バシール大統領が再選。国民対話は同年10月から1年間実施された後、2016年10月に国民文書を採択。同文書に基づき、首相職が創設され、2017年3月にサーレハ第一副大統領が首相に就任、国民文書に署名した野党も加わる形で新内閣が発足。2018年9月、内閣改造・省庁統廃合が行われ、ムウタズ・ムーサ水資源・灌漑・電力相が首相に就任。

国内では、西部のダルフル地方で2003年頃から、南部2州(南コルドファン州・青ナイル州)では2011年から紛争が続いてきたが、現在は、政府側とほとんどの反政府勢力がそれぞれ一方的敵対行為停止を継続中であり、現地の治安は改善傾向。これを踏まえ、現地の国連・AU合同ミッション(UNAMID)が活動を縮小しつつある。

スーダン国内では、経済情勢の悪化とインフレの昂進が契機となり、2018年12月以降、全国各地で政府に対する抗議デモが増加。2019年3月、バシール大統領は非常事態宣言を発出し、治安機関を使ってデモ運動を抑制しようと努力したが、問題の解決には繋がらなかった。その後も、国民の不満はデモの拡大という形で膨張を続け、同年4月、バシール大統領は国軍によって解任された。国軍は、新たに暫定軍事評議会(TMC)を設立すると、TMCが2年にわたりスーダンを暫定支配することを発表した。その一方で、TMCに対し、早期の民政移管を求める反政府デモが国内各地で継続的に行われた。同年6月、政府治安機関が反政府デモ隊に対して発砲する事件が発生し、100名以上犠牲になると、事態を重く見たAUはスーダンのAUメンバー資格を停止する処分を決定した。

TMCと「自由と変化宣言」勢力(DFC)は、AUとIGAD(エチオピア)の仲介の下、将来の民政移管を念頭に置きつつ、暫定的な統治機構の設立に関する交渉を継続した。その後TMCとDFCは、同年8月17日、暫定的な統治機構の設立に関する文書(「政治合意」と「憲法宣言」文書)に正式署名した(3年3か月の暫定期間の開始。)。その後アブダッラー・ハムドゥークが新首相に任命され、同年9月5日に同首相を首班とする新暫定政府が設立された。翌6日AU平和安全保障理事

会はスーダンの AU メンバー資格停止措置の解除を決定した。新暫定政府の優先課題は、(1) 反政府勢力との停戦と和平の達成、と (2) 経済再建のための経済・財政政策の実施。

…

イ ●英国内務省「[国別政策情報ノート スーダン:ヌバ、1.0 版](#)」(2020年12月)

6. Political context

6.1 Events in 2020

6.1.1 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) paper of 9 November 2020 noted:

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‘The decision comes amidst a political transition following the April 2019 military ouster of Sudan’s longruling leader, Omar al Bashir, who took power in a 1989 coup. Removal from the SST list has been a top priority for Sudan’s new prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, who has described Bashir’s Islamist regime as “one of the most brutal and repressive regimes in human history” in a 2019 U.N. address. “The Sudanese people have never sponsored, nor were supportive of terrorism,” he asserted, “those were the acts of the former regime which has been continuously resisted by the Sudanese people until its final ouster,” referencing nationwide protests that spurred Bashir’s overthrow. Hamdok’s government has sought to end Sudan’s international isolation and internal conflicts, pursuing peace with insurgents and reforms to improve human rights and religious freedom. The transition is fragile; the government, formed out of a power-sharing arrangement between a disparate civilian coalition and security chiefs, faces mounting public frustration over an economic crisis inherited from the former regime. A new peace deal with insurgents may change the country’s political dynamics, but whether it will empower civilians or security actors is subject to debate.’¹

6.1.2 The United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, published on 17 September 2020, reported:

…Its achievements included amendments to the penal code, which will improve the protection of fundamental rights, the appointment of interim civilian governors in all 18 states and reaching a comprehensive peace agreement with some armed groups in Darfur and the Two Areas…

‘On 29 August, a peace agreement was reached between the transitional Government, the SRF alliance and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Minni Minawi faction, concluding nearly a year of negotiations mediated by the Government of South Sudan. Signatories

under the SRF umbrella included the Justice and Equality 20-12062 3/16 Movement (JEM), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Transitional Council and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Malik Agar faction. The agreement includes a number of protocols and covers key issues related to security arrangements and the integration of combatants into the Sudanese army, land ownership, transitional justice, power-sharing and the return of displaced persons. The SLA-Abdul Wahid al-Nur faction did not participate in the Juba-based negotiations and has rejected the agreement.

'On 3 September, the transitional Government and SPLM-N Abdelaziz AlHilu faction signed a joint agreement on, inter alia, principles for maintaining the cessation of hostilities throughout the peace process until security arrangements were agreed. In the agreement, the parties also affirmed that the future constitution should be based on the principle of separation of religion and State, in the absence of which the right to self-determination in the Two Areas must be respected. Mr. Al-Hilu himself has made it clear he remains committed to the Juba process as set out in the agreement on negotiation issues of 18 October 2019.'²

6.1.3 The BBC reported in September 2020:

'Sudan's peace agreement signed last week finally promises to end the devastating wars in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile that have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, but as Alex de Waal and Edward Thomas explain, it comes with a huge price tag.

...

2. 一般的な治安状況と人権状況

(1) 2021年10月25日の軍事クーデター以降の情報

ア ●UNOCHA [「Sudan: Conflict in West Darfur - Flash Update No 1 \(27 January 2022\) \[EN/AR\]」](#) reliefweb (2022年1月27日)

Highlights

- Conflict displaces 11,100 people in Ag Geneina locality.
- Eight people were reportedly killed in Adikong village following armed group attacks.
- UNHCR verifying reports of about 4,500 people crossing into Chad.
- More displacement in Kereneik locality.

...

イ ●UNOCHA [「SUDAN: Situation Report」](#) (2021年12月23日)

Highlight

- The situation in parts of Darfur and Kordofan regions remains volatile, with an increase

in violence since October.

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ウ ●ACLED [「Appetite for Destruction: The Military Counter-Revolution in Sudan」](#)
(2021年10月29日)

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※前掲

(2) 2021年10月25日の軍事クーデター前の情報

① 首都ハルツーム等

ア 外務省海外安全ホームページ [「スーダンの危険情報【危険レベル継続】\(内容の更新\)」](#) (2021年6月1日)

1 概況

(1) 2019年4月11日、バシール大統領(当時)を含む政府要人の身柄が拘束され、新たに設置された暫定軍事評議会(TMC)がスーダンを暫定統治し、平和的な権力の委譲に向けた機運の醸成に努める旨の声明を発表しました。これに対し、民政移管を求める「自由と変化宣言」署名派(DFC)が即時の政権移譲を求め、スーダン全土でのデモ行進や首都ハルツームの軍総司令部前で座り込みを行うなど、TMCに対する抗議活動を継続的に実施しました。6月3日、TMCが治安上の理由として、軍総司令部前で座り込みを行っていた抗議者を強制排除したことにより、多数の死傷者が発生しました。これに対し、DFCはゼネストや不服従運動に訴えるなど、抗議活動を継続しました。

その後、アフリカ連合(AU)やエチオピアの仲介のもと、TMCとDFCにより民政移管に関する協議が続けられた結果、8月17日、軍民双方が参加する暫定的な統治機構の設立に関する合意文書への署名が行われ、国内の緊張状態は相当程度緩和されました。

一方、旧バシール政権を支持する勢力、暫定政府への参加を拒んでいる政党・

市民社会勢力や同機構へ参加後に脱退した政党・市民社会勢力なども存在しており、更には継続する厳しい経済状況や慢性的な燃料・小麦・医薬品等の生活必需品の不足への不満などから抗議活動の発生等、引き続き情勢を注視する必要があります。

…

(4) ハルツーム州（首都ハルツームを含む。）、北コルドファン州、紅海州（ポートスーダン及びエリトリアとの国境地帯を除く。）、カッサラ州（エリトリアとの国境地帯を除く。）、ガダーレフ州、北部州（リビアとの国境地帯を除く。）、ナイル州、ゲジーラ州、センナール州（南スーダンとの国境地帯を除く。）並びに白ナイル州（南スーダンとの国境地帯を除く。）

レベル2：不要不急の渡航は止めてください。（継続）

ア 2018年末頃から物価高騰や燃料不足等に対する不満を背景に発生した抗議活動は、政治体制そのものに対する抗議活動へと発展し、全国に拡大しました。2019年4月11日、バシール大統領（当時）を含む政府要人の身柄が拘束され、スーダンを暫定的に統治する機構としてTMCが設置されましたが、民政移管を求めるDFCがスーダン全土でのデモ行進やハルツーム市内の軍総司令部周辺での座り込みを行うなど、TMCに対する抗議活動を行いました。

イ TMCとDFCの協議は、このような抗議活動が行われている最中にも進められていましたが、2019年6月3日、TMCが治安上の理由として、軍総司令部前で座り込みを行っていた抗議者を強制排除したことにより、大量の死傷者が発生しました。

ウ 同衝突によりTMCとDFCの協議は停滞しましたが、AUやエチオピアの仲介により2019年7月5日、両者はバシール政権崩壊後の移行期間の統治構造に関する合意に至りました。これは、「政治合意」（主権評議会、内閣、立法評議会の構成等を定めたもの）と「憲法宣言」（「政治合意」で合意された各機関の権限等の詳細を定めたもの）として具体化され、8月17日に正式署名がなされました。

エ 同合意により、軍・民間の権力分掌に基づく民政移管に向けた移行統治が開始され、バシール政権崩壊直後のような軍・民間の実行力を伴う衝突は収束し、国内の緊張状態は相当程度緩和されました。

一方、旧バシール政権を支持する勢力、暫定政府への参加を拒む政党・市民社会勢力や参加後に脱退した政党・市民社会勢力なども存在しており、更には継続する厳しい経済状況や慢性的な燃料・小麦・医薬品等の生活必需品の不足への不満などから抗議活動の発生等、引き続き情勢を注視する必要があります。

オ ガダーレフ州では、2020年11月にエチオピア・ティグライ州で発生した軍事衝突による影響を受け、6万人以上のエチオピア難民がスーダンに流入したほか、同州とエチオピアとの国境付近では国境問題をめぐりスーダン国軍とエチオピア軍部隊との間で武力衝突が散発的に発生・継続しています。今後、不測の

事態が発生する可能性もありますので、引き続き情勢を注視する必要があります。
 つきましては、これら地域への不要不急の渡航は止めてください。

イ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - スーダン」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Sudan's first year of a three-year transition to democratic rule following the dramatic ouster of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, was marked by a failing economy, political tensions and continuing popular protests for justice and reforms. These challenges were compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Reforms

Authorities repealed an abusive public order law, outlawed female genital mutilation, removed the death penalty and lashing as punishments for consensual same-sex conduct and many other offenses, and abolished apostasy as a crime. However, many of the other reforms envisioned in the 2019 Constitutional Charter were not implemented.

...

② ダルフール地方

ア 外務省海外安全ホームページ [「スーダンの危険情報【危険レベル継続】\(内容の更新\)」](#) (2021年6月1日)

1 概況
 ...

(2) 西部のダルフール地方には、数百もの異なる部族が存在しており、土地や牧畜牛、金の採掘権等に絡む部族間抗争が各地で発生しており、これまでに多数の犠牲者が発生しています。2007年末から UNAMID が展開していましたが、2020年12月、同地域における平和維持活動が終了し、2021年1月には、西・南ダルフール州において約 250 名の死者を伴う部族間衝突が発生するなど、死傷者を伴う部族間衝突が散発的に発生しており、情勢は不安定です。

2 地域別情勢

(1) ダルフール地方5州 (東ダルフール州, 西ダルフール州, 南ダルフール州, 北ダルフール州及び中央ダルフール州)
 レベル3 : 渡航は止めてください。(渡航中止勧告) (継続)

ア 中央ダルフール州等に位置するジャバル・マッラ地域には、「ジュバ和平合意」に参加していない反政府武装勢力が存在しており、これら武装勢力と政府軍と

の間で散発的に武力衝突が発生しています。また、部族間の衝突も依然発生しており、多くの国内避難民も新たに発生するなど情勢は不安定です。

イ 長らく続いた紛争によってダルフルの経済が疲弊し、小型武器が蔓延した結果、一般犯罪や武装集団による犯罪行為が頻発しています。現在、政府による武器回収キャンペーンが実施されていますが、依然として犯罪はダルフルの治安における主要な脅威となっています。

つきましては、どのような目的であれ同地域への渡航は止めてください。また、既に滞在中の場合には、今後の更なる情勢の変化を踏まえ、追加的な危険レベルの引上げの可能性もありますので、情勢の推移によっては国外に退避することも検討してください。

イ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - スーダン」](#) (2021年1月13日)

In Darfur and eastern Sudan, inter-communal violence surged. The United Nations/African Union Darfur peacekeeping mission (UNAMID) continued to draw down, while a new nationwide political mission began to deploy.

Conflict in Darfur and Eastern Sudan

...

In Al Geneina, West Darfur, fighting between Arab and Masalit communities flared in December 2019, six months after UNAMID forces had withdrawn from their base there. Armed militia groups, including members of the RSF, attacked a camp for displaced people and killed dozens of people, including children, raped women, and girls, destroyed schools, and burned homes, causing tens of thousands to flee.

On July 25, armed Arab militia attacked the town of Misteri, West Darfur. The attackers targeted ethnic Masalit, according to media. The UN said at least 60 were killed in the attack.

③ 東部地方

ア 外務省海外安全ホームページ [「スーダンの危険情報【危険レベル継続】\(内容の更新\)」](#) (2021年6月1日)

2 地域別情勢

...

(3) 紅海州 (ポートスーダン), エリトリアとの国境地帯 (紅海州, カッサラ州), リビアとの国境地帯 (北部州)

レベル3 : 渡航は止めてください。(渡航中止勧告) (継続)

ア 紅海州の都市ポートスーダンにおいて、2019年8月21日から24日までの間

にベニアミル族とヌバ族が衝突し、家屋や店舗が燃やされるなどにより多数の死傷者が発生しました。その後、2020年8月には暫定文民州知事の出身部族等がきっかけとなり、紅海州及びカッサラ州において部族間衝突が発生し、更には「ジュバ和平合意」をめぐり、部族間の衝突が発生するなど、突発的に部族間の衝突が発生する可能性があることから、引き続き注意が必要です。

イ エリトリアの国内情勢を受け、国境を越えてスーダンへ難民が流入しているとの報道があります。また、同国境付近は密輸が横行し、部族間の衝突も見られるなど治安状況が不安定になっているとの情報もあります。

ウ 現在、隣国のリビア全土に「レベル4：退避勧告」の危険情報が発出されており、北部州のリビアとの国境地帯の治安が不安視されるほか、リビアからの武器や武装勢力の流入も懸念されます。2018年4月には、北部州において治安当局が大量の銃と弾薬を密輸業者から押収した際、銃撃戦が発生したと報じられています。

つきましては、紅海州及びカッサラ州におけるエリトリアとの国境付近並びに北部州におけるリビアとの国境付近は、どのような理由であれ渡航は止めてください。また、既に滞在中の場合には、今後の更なる情勢の変化を踏まえ、追加的な危険レベルの引上げの可能性もありますので、情勢の推移によっては国外に退避することも検討してください。

イ ●英国内務省「[国別政策情報ノート スーダン：ヌバ、1.0版](#)」（2020年12月）

8. Security and humanitarian situation in South Kordofan

…

8.1.5 The United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, published on 17 September 2020, reported:

‘… In Western Kordofan, clashes between members of the Misseriya and Nuba communities occurred in June in Lagawa, reportedly leading to several deaths. Following the violence, representatives of both communities signed a cessation of hostilities agreement… In Eastern Sudan, intercommunal clashes between members of the Bani Amir and Nuba communities as well as between the Bani Amir and Hadanduwah resulted in more than 30 people being killed and over 100 injured. On 13 July, Bani Amir and Nuba communities signed an agreement in the presence of Sovereign Council, FFC and state government representatives.

‘Following the finalization of the transitional Government’s civilian protection strategy, the Prime Minister announced the formation of a joint army and police force to be deployed in areas of increased volatility. The decision was backed by the Security and Defence Council. Meanwhile, security forces have been deployed and the transitional

Government has intervened in response to protection-related incidents throughout the country... In Kassala, a reconciliation agreement between the Bani Amir and Nuba communities was renewed to forestall intercommunal conflict...’10

ウ ●HRW「[ワールドレポート 2021 - スーダン](#)」(2021年1月13日)

Conflict in Darfur and Eastern Sudan
 ...
 In eastern Sudan, at least 25 were killed after violent clashes between the Beni Amer and Nuba ethnic groups in Port Sudan. Scores were also killed after violent clashes in the city of Kassala in August, between tribal groups of Hadendawa and Beni Amer.

④ 南部地方

ア 外務省海外安全ホームページ「[スーダンの危険情報【危険レベル継続】\(内容の更新\)](#)」(2021年6月1日)

1 概況
 ...
 (3) また、スーダンと南スーダンとの関係は改善傾向にあるものの、治安措置やアビエ地域の帰属等、依然として多くの問題を抱えています。

2 地域別情勢
 ...
 (2) 南コルドファン州、西コルドファン州(アビエ地域を含む。)、青ナイル州、南スーダンとの国境地帯(白ナイル州、センナール州)
 レベル3: 渡航は止めてください。(渡航中止勧告)(継続)
 ア スーダン南部地域においても、政府による武器回収キャンペーンが実施されていますが、依然として政府の統治が及んでいない反政府勢力支配地域が存在します。元来南スーダン系住民が多数居住している地域であり、未だ武力衝突等の可能性も排除できません。
 イ 2020年10月に暫定政府とSRFとの間でジュバ和平合意が成立したことにより、両者の間で武力衝突発生の可能性は低下しましたが、依然として同和平合意に参加していない武装勢力が存在しており、これら勢力は、暫定政府との間で敵対行為停止の合意を結んでいます。小規模な衝突は散発的に発生しており情勢は不安定です。さらには、ダルフル地域同様、死傷者を伴う部族間衝突も発生しています。また、同地域では、南スーダンの治安情勢悪化を受けて、南スーダンからの避難民が多数流入しています。
 ウ アビエ地域はスーダンと南スーダンとの間の係争地であり、両国が締結した

アビエ地域行政治安暫定措置に基づいて非武装地帯とされており、国連平和維持部隊「国連アビエ暫定治安部隊 (UNISFA)」が同地域の治安維持を担っています。比較的平穏は保たれていますが、主に政治プロセスの停滞のため、情勢は不安定な状態にあります。

つきましては、どのような目的であれ同地域への渡航は止めてください。また、既に滞在中の場合には、今後の更なる情勢の変化を踏まえ、追加的な危険レベルの引上げの可能性もありますので、情勢の推移によっては国外に退避することも検討してください。

イ ●英国内務省「[国別政策情報ノート スーダン：ヌバ、1.0版](#)」(2020年12月)

8. Security and humanitarian situation in South Kordofan

...

8.1.2 The Armed Conflict and Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), ‘a disaggregated data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping project’⁴, shows various data in the South Kordofan region between 5 December 2019 and 5 December 2020. The dashboard shows 116 reported fatalities and 50 total events in the South Kordofan region, those being 12 battles, 1 riot and 37 violent events against civilians⁵.

...

8.1.5 The United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, published on 17 September 2020, reported:

‘During the reporting period [from 3 June to 8 September 2020], the security situation was marked by increased intercommunal tensions including in the east, west and south of the country...In Western Kordofan, clashes between members of the Misseriya and Nuba communities occurred in June in Lagawa, reportedly leading to several deaths. Following the violence, representatives of both communities signed a cessation of hostilities agreement...’

8.1.8 The July 2020 United Nations General Assembly Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan observed:

‘The Independent Expert received information that a tribal armed conflict erupted in the city of Kadugli in South Kordofan on 11 May between the Nuba (Angolo) and the DarNaela Arab tribe that allegedly resulted in the killing of more than 60 people, including 15 soldiers from the Rapid Support Forces, and 19 injured. Sources suggest that the death of 15 soldiers were allegedly the result of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces who intervened, each aligning itself with one of the tribal groups across ethnicity lines. Another tribal clash reportedly took place in El

Fagara, Lagawa, in South Kordofan on 6 June between the Nuba and Misseriya tribes; several people were allegedly killed or injured. No response was taken by security forces, sources alleged.

‘Civilians continue to face the burden of conflicts in the Blue Nile. Many people were displaced and lost their land, which was their main source of income. Even today, humanitarian organizations struggle to get access and provide aid to most people in the regions. Reportedly, some internally displaced persons have returned to their homes voluntarily, despite the lack of basic services including water, electricity, adequate housing, health facilities and education. Reportedly, some returnees found that their lands had been sold by the ousted Government to large-scale farmers who have power and wealth, leaving the small-scale farmers empty-handed. Such violations of economic and social rights form a real threat to the protection of civilians and to any future peace agreement in the region.’ 14

...

3. 関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い

(1) 2021年10月25日の軍事クーデターへの反対運動の状況

ア ●BAMF [「Briefing Notes」](#) (2021年11月22日)

軍事クーデター

21年11月13日のデモ（BN v. 15.11.21 参照）の後、多数の恣意的な逮捕と拘留が報告された。国内外のメディア関係者は報道を妨害され、場合によっては攻撃されたり、投獄されたり、あるいは関係者が報道した国から追放されたりしました。

17.11.21には、軍事クーデターに反対するデモや抗議活動が再び行われた。デモの対象となったのは、カースム、オムドゥルマン、バーリの3つの町。15人が死亡、100人以上が負傷しました。これは、21年10月25日のクーデター以来、1日の死傷者数としては最も多いものでした。警察は、催涙ガスや実弾を使って、デモ参加者を再び取り締まりました。抗議活動は18.11.21の夜まで続けました。さらに報道によれば、治安部隊はOmdurmanとBahriの複数の病院を封鎖し、時には催涙ガスを使って病院内を捜索しようとしていました。

アルジャジーラの支局長が21年11月14日にスーダンの治安部隊に逮捕・拘留された後（BN v. 15.11.21 参照）、21年11月16日に再び釈放されました。報道によると、この間、インターネットや携帯電話網へのアクセスも解除されています。今回のリリースに向けて、すでに実施されたブロッキングを非難し、ブロック解除を求める判決が出ていたが、これまでは無視されていた。さらに報道によると、軍とアブドゥラ・ハムドクは11月21日に合意に達し、ハムドクは自宅軟禁を解除して首相に復帰することになった。彼は、テクノクラートからなる独立した内閣を組むことになっていた。さらに、すべての政治犯や投獄された政治家を釈放し、過

去の抗議活動における事件や暴力の発生、死亡者を調査し、責任者を裁判にかけることになっています。したがって、新内閣は次の選挙までの暫定的なものであり、ハムドクが自由に組むことができる。軍部とハムドク首相の合意の前後には、デモや抗議活動が行われ、その際にも2人が殺害され、警察署に放火されたこともあった。催涙弾が何度も使用され、アパートや家、モスクの捜索も行われました。様々な野党やグループが、この協定や軍との協力関係を強く否定しています。彼らは、クーデターの責任者を裁くこと、純然たる市民政府を樹立することを要求し、さらなる抗議活動を発表しました。

※訳文は、DeepL.com（無料版）の翻訳を修正したものです。

イ ●HRW [「Sudan: Security Forces Use Lethal Force on Protesters」](#) (2021年11月23日)

Security forces have repeatedly used excessive force, including lethal force, against demonstrators in and around Khartoum, Human Rights said today. Sixteen people were shot dead on November 17, 2021, alone, including a woman and a child, the deadliest response to date. Protesters again took to the streets on November 21, despite the announcement that the prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, had been released and had signed a deal with the military.

...

Since the October 25 military coup, groups have organized multiple large-scale demonstrations during which security forces have repeatedly used lethal force. While the prime minister was signing the deal with the military leadership, security forces used teargas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition to disperse protesters outside. Human Rights Watch spoke to 10 protesters and 3 doctors, and reviewed 7 video clips posted online. The Sudanese Archive, an independent rights organization that archives, verifies, and investigates open-source documentation in Sudan, verified the videos.

On November 18 the police denied that their forces had used live ammunition. Human Rights Watch examined reports filed by families of the killed at police stations for eight protesters killed on November 17, citing live ammunition injuries as the cause of death. Lt. General al-Burhan, the military chief, denied in a televised interview on November 7 that the army was involved in previous killings. However, evidence obtained by Human Rights Watch, including witness accounts, forensic reports, and video footage, point to the use of live ammunition by security forces in SAF, RSF, CRP, and regular police uniforms.

...

ウ ●記事 [「Sudan sources: 11 demonstrators dead, protests grow」](#) Radio Dabanga (2021年10月29日)

Civil disobedience actions and road blocks in protest against the military coup on October

25 continued for the fourth day yesterday. Reportedly 11 protesters were killed and 150 others were injured since Monday. Most of the bridges in Khartoum reopened. Flights to and from Khartoum International Airport were not resumed, while the internet in the country remained inaccessible....

エ ●記事「[S Sudanese student among people killed in Khartoum protests](#)」Eye Radio
(2021年10月27日)

On Monday, the military in the neighboring Sudan dissolved the civilian government and arrested leaders, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.

This reportedly prompted those opposed to the military takeover to take to the streets where gunfire and injuries were reported.

Media reports suggest that at least 10 people were reported killed and dozens injured, many of them as a result of soldiers opening fire on protesters.

...

(2) 暫定政権下での反対運動の状況

① 暫定政府に反政府活動

ア 外務省海外安全ホームページ「[スーダンの危険情報【危険レベル継続】\(内容の更新\)](#)」(2021年6月1日)

2 地域別情勢

...

(4) ハルツーム州(首都ハルツームを含む。)、北コルドファン州、紅海州(ポートスーダン及びエリトリアとの国境地帯を除く。)、カッサラ州(エリトリアとの国境地帯を除く。)、ガダーレフ州、北部州(リビアとの国境地帯を除く。)、ナイル州、ゲジーラ州、センナール州(南スーダンとの国境地帯を除く。))並びに白ナイル州(南スーダンとの国境地帯を除く。)

レベル2: 不要不急の渡航は止めてください。(継続)

ア 2018年末頃から物価高騰や燃料不足等に対する不満を背景に発生した抗議活動は、政治体制そのものに対する抗議活動へと発展し、全国に拡大しました。2019年4月11日、バシール大統領(当時)を含む政府要人の身柄が拘束され、スーダンを暫定的に統治する機構としてTMCが設置されましたが、民政移管を求めるDFCがスーダン全土でのデモ行進やハルツーム市内の軍総司令部周辺での座り込みを行うなど、TMCに対する抗議活動を行いました。

イ TMCとDFCの協議は、このような抗議活動が行われている最中にも進められていましたが、2019年6月3日、TMCが治安上の理由として、軍総司令部前で座り込みを行っていた抗議者を強制排除したことにより、大量の死傷者が発生しました。

ウ 同衝突により TMC と DFC の協議は停滞しましたが、AU やエチオピアの仲介により 2019 年 7 月 5 日、両者はバシール政権崩壊後の移行期間の統治構造に関する合意に至りました。これは、「政治合意」（主権評議会、内閣、立法評議会の構成等を定めたもの）と「憲法宣言」（「政治合意」で合意された各機関の権限等の詳細を定めたもの）として具体化され、8 月 17 日に正式署名がなされました。

エ 同合意により、軍・民間の権力分掌に基づく民政移管に向けた移行統治が開始され、バシール政権崩壊直後のような軍・民間の実行力を伴う衝突は収束し、国内の緊張状態は相当程度緩和されました。

一方、旧バシール政権を支持する勢力、暫定政府への参加を拒む政党・市民社会勢力や参加後に脱退した政党・市民社会勢力なども存在しており、更には継続する厳しい経済状況や慢性的な燃料・小麦・医薬品等の生活必需品の不足への不満などから抗議活動の発生等、引き続き情勢を注視する必要があります。

...

イ ●EASO [「COI クエリー回答 スーダン：反政府活動家の暫定政府による取扱い」](#) (2020 年 5 月 19 日)

Background

... the news of the replacement of president al-Bashir by General Ahmed Ibn Auf, former Defense Minister and head of military intelligence under al-Bashir's rule - who had been accused of supporting militias and perpetrating atrocities in Sudan's Darfur region -, originated protests. Activists continued to demand democracy and civilians to take over: 'a civilian is needed, not one of these army officers [...] we want a real democracy, with real freedom and human rights [and a] civilian-led transition.'⁸

Another major event during Sudan's pro-democracy movement was a crackdown on 3 June 2019, during which the security apparatus reportedly killed dozens of protestors 'and some had their bodies thrown into the River Nile';⁹ a report by Freedom House mentions 127 fatalities as a result of the 3 June 2019 crackdown on protestors. ¹⁰

...

The Transitional Government / Sovereignty Council¹⁶

2019

Sources mainly reported human rights violations against members of the opposition during president Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir's rule until August 2019, while no information was found regarding the treatment of political activists since the instalment of the Sovereignty Council.

In general, according to Amnesty International, the previous year '[2019] was marked by

[...] excessive use of force and unlawful killings by Sudanese security forces against peaceful protesters [as] security forces used live ammunition against demonstrators.’¹⁷ However, no explicit reference is made regarding the treatment of activists by the Transitional Government.¹⁸

Human Rights Watch does not mention any violations against protesters after the transition government came into force.¹⁹ Furthermore, the same sources does (also) not report on any repression against members of the opposition of the Transitional Government.²⁰ In line with previous sources consulted, Amnesty International does (also) not report on any mistreatment of members of the opposition by the Transitional Government. ²¹ USDOS does not report on repression of political activists by the current government either.²²

Asylum Research Consultancy (ARC), reporting on in their query response explicitly writes about students, political activists, human rights activists and journalists, however, they are mainly reporting on incidents that occurred before August 2019.²³

2020

...

During 2020, several demonstrations took place, and some protests turned violent. On 20 February 2020, 53 people were injured, including ‘many women and children’, in anti-government protests in Sudan’s capital. ²⁵ Police and protestors clashed as thousands of protesters gathered asking for a restructuring the Sudanese army, as well as the return of dismissed officers, which, according to the protestors were ‘punished for showing solidarity with the anti-Bashir protests.’ ²⁶ The government had previously released a list of dismissed officers.²⁷

...

During protests on 12 April 2020, albeit lockdown restrictions, the police did not disperse the demonstration. However, an emergency decree was issued by the prime minister to sanction people not overserving the coronavirus lockdown measures.³⁰

ウ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2022 - スーダン」](#) (2022年1月13日)

Ongoing Crackdowns on Protesters

Groups organized protests in Khartoum and other towns against the poor economic situation and delayed reforms. On June 30, police used tear gas to disperse protests against economic reforms that led to high prices.

On May 11, 2021, Sudan armed forces used excessive and lethal force against peaceful protesters gathered in Khartoum leading to 2 deaths. The protests were to commemorate the victims of the deadly crackdown against the June 3 sit-in in Khartoum in 2019. After the reported arrest of 99 army soldiers, at least 7 of whom were charged, the army handed over

investigation findings to the then attorney-general. If any further steps have been taken, they have not been made public.

...

エ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - スーダン」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Crackdowns on Protesters

...

In Khartoum, on June 30, the one-year anniversary of a major protest following al-Bashir’s ouster, police responded with violence, killing one protester and injuring several. On August 17, on the anniversary of the power-sharing deal, police used tear gas and whips against protesters gathered in front of the prime minister’s office, arresting and injuring many.

...A protester was also killed by security forces in Khartoum on October 21.

Freedom of Expression and Assembly

In September, 11 artists were sentenced to two months in prison for being a “public nuisance” and “disturbing public peace,” in part because of pro-democracy chants they shouted while in the police station.

《参考》●英国内務省 [「国別政策情報ノート スーダン：ヌバ、1.0版」](#) (2020年12月)

2.4.2 In the country guidance case of KAM (Nuba – return) Sudan CG [2020] UKUT 00269 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal (UT) held that:

...

- c) ‘Prior to the political developments in 2019, individuals who were at risk on return (whether at the airport or in Greater Khartoum) were those who were perceived by the Sudanese authorities to be a sufficiently serious threat to the Sudanese Government to warrant targeting.
- d) ‘The assessment of that risk required an evaluation of what was likely to be known to the authorities and a holistic assessment of the individual’s circumstances including any previous political activity in Sudan or abroad and any past history of detention in Sudan. Factors include whether the individual was a student, a political activist or a journalist; their ethnicity; their religion (in particular Christianity); and whether they came from a former conflict area (such as the Nuba Mountains).
- e) ‘Whilst the question of perception of political opposition underlying (c) above remains

the same since the 2019 political developments, when assessing any risk to an individual now, the effects of the 2019 political developments are relevant and are likely to affect the Sudanese authorities' view of, and attitude towards, those who might be perceived as political opponents. Further, the 2019 political developments are likely to have greatly reduced the interest of the Sudanese government in suppressing political opposition by violent or military action [...]' (paragraph 252)

② ソーシャルメディア上の政府批判者への攻撃

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - スーダン」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Freedom of Expression and Assembly

...

In July, the transitional government amended the 2007 Cybercrimes Act, increasing its penalties rather than repealing vaguely worded offenses criminalizing the “spread of false news” and publication of “indecent materials.” On July 18, the Sudanese army appointed a special commissioner to bring lawsuits against individuals who “insult” the military online, both inside and outside the country.

...

③ バシール前大統領支持者

ア ●EASO [「COI クエリー回答 スーダン：反政府活動家の暫定政府による取扱い」](#) (2020年5月19日)

2020

On 14 January 2020, a revolt by some intelligence agency members occurred in Khartoum. The head of Sudan's Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan, called it a coup and warned that the armed forces would ‘confront any attempt to “destabilise security and stability and every attempt to abort revolution”’. 24

...

Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir supporters protested on 16 April 2020 in Sudan's capital requesting the fall of the Transitional Government. In northern Sudan, pro-democracy activists and al-Bashir supporters clashed.³¹

...

Another demonstration occurred on 10 May 2020, as al-Bashir's supporters rallied in Sudan's capital. Protests took place albeit the imposed lockdown measures to curb the spread of the coronavirus. The police broke up the rally and arrested several people. Demonstrations also took place in ‘the states of Kassala, West Kordofan and South Darfur.’³³ According to the same source, ‘the national army has been deployed in some

areas in the downtown of Khartoum, closing the main roads that lead to the army headquarters [...] hundreds of demonstrators took to the streets in Khartoum and other states to demand the former president's release.' 34

(3) ダルフールでの反対運動への攻撃

ア ●EASO [「COI クエリー回答 スーダン：反政府活動家の暫定政府による取扱い」](#) (2020年5月19日)

2020

...

There are reports of anti-corruption demonstrations held in April 2020 in South Darfur's El Radoom region, during which no violent incidents occurred. According to protestors, 'a protest like this [without violence] would have not been possible during al-Bashir's [...] rule [...] The mere fact that people can protest without fearing being slaughtered is a huge change.' 32

イ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - スーダン」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Crackdowns on Protesters

...

In North Darfur, armed militia attacked a sit-in in Fata Borno, a displaced persons camp near Kutum, in North Darfur, on July 13, killing at least nine. The day before, government forces dispersed a protest in Kutum, arresting, beating and detaining dozens suspected of organizing the protests, witnesses told Human Rights Watch.

...

Arbitrary Detentions

Security officials continued to arbitrarily detain civilians. Throughout the year Rapid Support Forces (RSF) reportedly detained several members of the Mahamid Arab tribe due to their links to Musa Hilal, the former pro-government militia leader who is subject to UN sanctions for his role in Darfur atrocities.

RSF officials detained Abdulmalik Musa Saleh, a political activist and a relative of Hilal, several times during the year in Khartoum, and Osama Mohamed al-Hassan, 40, also an activist, from July 5 until September 17. At time of writing, while neither man is in custody, neither have they been charged with any offence and were never brought to court throughout their detention.

Hilal has been detained since November 2017 and is reportedly facing charges by a military court for crimes against government forces in Darfur.

On June 29, the former military governor of West Darfur ordered the imprisonment of 72 men and boys for six months under the emergency law, which allows authorities to detain people without judicial oversight. They were among a group of 122 arrested by the RSF in the preceding weeks during counter migration operations in Darfur.

Authorities charged them with crimes including looting, illegal migration, and illegal possession of firearms. They were never brought to trial.

Government security forces arrested and detained civilians in Kutum, North Darfur, and Kass, South Darfur, following protests in both locations. At least one of the released detainees from Kutum held by military officials told Human Rights Watch he was subjected to ill-treatment that could amount to torture while in detention.

(4) 東部地方での反対運動への攻撃

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - スーダン」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Crackdowns on Protesters

...

...On October 15, security forces killed at least eight and injuring others in the eastern state of Kassala. Protests were called for by tribal leaders of Beni Amir after the dismissal of the state governor by the prime minister. ...

(5) イスラエルとの関係を疑われる者

ア 外務省海外安全ホームページ [「スーダンの危険情報【危険レベル継続】\(内容の更新\)」](#) (2020年1月17日)

査証、出入国審査等

2 出入国審査

スーダンはイスラエルに対してアラブボイコットを実施している国であるため、入国審査の際イスラエルへの渡航歴が判明した場合は、入国を拒否されることがあります。ただし、2020年10月23日に両国の国交正常化が発表されたことから、スーダンによるアラブボイコットの実施については今後見直しが行われる可能性があります。

(6) 前バシール政権末期の反政府抗議活動家の状況

ア ●EASO [「COI クエリー回答 スーダン：反政府活動家の暫定政府による取扱い」](#) (2020年5月19日)

Background

...

Throughout 2019, protests continued and nearly 40 people died during mass demonstrations connected to the former presidents' state of emergency declaration in February 2019. 4 A climax was reached on 6 April 2019 when protestors gathered in front of the military headquarter, demanding the army to support the ousting of president Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir.⁵ The Sudanese army did not always turn against the protestors, for example, on 6 April 2019, 'soldiers permitted the protesters to stay'.⁶ Less than a week later, after 30 years in office, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir was removed from office on 11 April 2019.⁷

However, the news of the replacement of president al-Bashir by General Ahmed Ibn Auf, former Defense Minister and head of military intelligence under al-Bashir's rule - who had been accused of supporting militias and perpetrating atrocities in Sudan's Darfur region -, originated protests. Activists continued to demand democracy and civilians to take over: 'a civilian is needed, not one of these army officers [...] we want a real democracy, with real freedom and human rights [and a] civilian-led transition.'⁸

Another major event during Sudan's pro-democracy movement was a crackdown on 3 June 2019, during which the security apparatus reportedly killed dozens of protestors 'and some had their bodies thrown into the River Nile';⁹ a report by Freedom House mentions 127 fatalities as a result of the 3 June 2019 crackdown on protestors. 10

...

イ ●EASO [「COI クエリー回答 スーダン : Information on treatment of political activists by Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir's government between January 2018 and August 2019」](#) (2020年6月16日)

2. Treatment of opposition/activists and targeting

2.1 General

Economic hardship pushed Sudanese from all kind of backgrounds to protest in the streets, at the same time, 'the protesters are mostly young, reflecting the country's demographics, but people of all ages have been seen in the crowds.'³⁶ Political activists come together under the coalition FFC. 37 The FFC unifies Sudan's political opposition. According to France24, the opposition 'is made up of the [...] Nidaa Sudan, the National Consensus Forces and the Sudanese Professionals Association [SPA].'³⁸ The SPA is part of the FFC³⁹ and exists since 2016, combining professional groups who are seeking to improve working conditions.⁴⁰ Much of Sudan's street protest was organised by the SPA.⁴¹

The response by the Sudanese government towards protestors has been criticised internationally.⁴² Since the beginning of the uprising, 'security forces cracked down on the demonstrators, killing dozens and arresting hundreds more.'⁴³ CCN believes, that more than 3 000 people have been arrested since Sudan's 'revolution' and that most of them have been abused. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir's government is accused of beating and other

forms of torture, which is often used at detainees in so called ‘ghost houses’, torture houses, spread over Sudan’s capital, according to CCN.⁴⁴

As stated by the UN, during Sudan’s uprising

‘thousands of people might have been arrested and detained in circumstances linked to protests [between 28 September 2018 and 30 June 2019] [...] many individuals were arrested multiple times [...] those arrested and detained included opposition leaders, political activists, civil society activists, journalists, university professors and students, and professionals such as doctors, lawyers and engineers. Reports also included allegations of instances of torture, illtreatment and other human rights abuse in detention by Sudanese authorities [between 28 September 2018 and 30 June 2019] [...] at least 100 women were among those detained between December [2018] and 11 April [2019].’⁴⁵

A great number of protesters was arbitrarily arrested, including opposition leaders, political activists, journalists, lawyers, members of civil society, doctors and medical personnel, university professors, engineers, students and high school pupils. At the same time, Human Rights Watch indicates the calculated use of force by the Sudanese government, while responding to protests, noting that security forces intentionally targeted protesters, shooting at demonstrators and directing guns at protesters; shouting ‘kill them, kill them.’⁴⁶

The UN Independent expert on Sudan ‘received allegations of rape and other forms of sexual violence perpetuated against both women and men during the crackdown, and information alleging that possibly hundreds of protesters were missing as of the end of June 2019.’⁴⁷

4. ジェンダー、DV および子ども

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - スーダン」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Reforms

Authorities repealed an abusive public order law, outlawed female genital mutilation, removed the death penalty and lashing as punishments for consensual same-sex conduct and many other offenses, and abolished apostasy as a crime. However, many of the other reforms envisioned in the 2019 Constitutional Charter were not implemented.

5. LGBT

6. 汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護

7. 兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の）

8. 司法制度・刑事手続

9. 警察・治安部隊（刑務所等の状況含む）

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - スーダン」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Reforms

...

The government has yet to set up a legislative council and key transitional commissions. It has not embarked on security sector reform beyond renaming the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) as the General Intelligence Service (GIS) and removing its arrest and detention powers.

10. 報道の自由

11. 宗教の自由

12. 国籍、民族および人種

(1) 非アラブ系ダルフル人

ア ●英国内務省「[国別政策情報ノート スーダン：非アラブ系・ダルフル人、5.0版](#)」（2021年10月）

イ ●[ACCORD「スーダンに関するクエリー回答 \[a-11472-1\]：2020年以降のダルフルとハルツームでのフル族の状況」](#) ecoi（2021年1月27日）

About Fur in Khartoum

No information on the treatment of Fur in Khartoum could be found. A response from the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) on this subject in June 2020 also does not contain any specific information on the issue. EASO points to the UK Home Office report below, which states that Darfuris make up about 10 percent of Khartoum's population, and non-Arab Darfuris often live in informal settlements or slums on the outskirts of the city, and are working on aid work to survive. (EASO, 16. June 2020, p. 2)

For more information, please refer also to the comprehensive ARC report on Darfur of January 2020 and the report of a fact-finding mission of the UK Home Office in November 2018:

- ・ ARC - Asylum Research Centre: Sudan: Country Report; Updated Country Report on Darfur, January 2020,
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2022861/ARC_Darfur_country_report_January_2020_final.pdf
- ・ UK Home Office: Report of a fact-finding mission to Khartoum, Sudan; Conducted between 10 and 17 August 2018, November 2018
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1452806/1226_1543569310_sudan-ffm-report-2018-nad-returns.pdf

(2) ヌバ族

ア ●英国内務省「[国別政策情報ノート スーダン：ヌバ、1.0版](#)」（2020年12月）

(3) 国籍

ア ●（法律）「[1994年スーダン国籍法及び2011年改正スーダン国籍法](#)」UNHCR
英語仮訳

4.(1) In respect of persons born before the coming into force of this Act, a person shall be Sudanese by birth if he satisfies the following conditions:
...
(4) A person born to a parent who is a Sudanese national by naturalization shall be Sudanese birth if his parents acquired Sudanese nationality by naturalization before his birth.

13. 出入国および移動の自由

14. その他

略称

ACCORD	オーストリア出身国・庇護研究ドキュメンテーションセンター
ACLED	武力紛争位置・事件データプロジェクト
AI	アムネスティ・インターナショナル
BAMF	ドイツ連邦移民難民庁
CGRS	ベルギー難民及び無国籍者庁
CIA	米国中央情報局
CNDA	フランス庇護権裁判所
CRS	米国議会調査局
DFAT	オーストラリア外務貿易省
DIS	デンマーク移民庁
DRC	デンマーク・レフュジー・カウンセル
EASO	欧州難民支援局
HRW	ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ
ICG	インターナショナル・クライシス・グループ
IDMC	国内避難民監視センター
IRBC	カナダ移民難民局
IRDC	アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター
ジェトロ	日本貿易振興機構
Landinfo	ノルウェー政府出身国情報センター
MRGI	マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル

OECD	経済協力開発機構
OFPRA	フランス難民・無国籍庇護局
OHCHR	国連人権高等弁務官事務所
OSAC	米国海外安全保障評議会
RRTA	オーストラリア難民再審査審判所
RSAA	ニュージーランド難民地位不服申立機関
RSF	国境なき記者団
UKIAT	イギリス移民難民審判所
UNHCR	国連難民高等弁務官事務所
USCIRF	米国連邦政府国際宗教自由に関する委員会