

## アフガニスタン：2007年当時のロガール州 Baraki Baraku 地区でのタリバンによる強制徴募に関する情報

アフガニスタンの「2007年当時のロガール〔Logar〕州 Baraki Baraku 地区でのタリバンによる強制徴募」に関する調査依頼に対し、難民研究フォーラムが規定の時間的制約の中で調査したところ、関連しうる情報として以下の情報が見つかりました。

略称：.....	1
1. 2007年頃のロガール州の状況-タリバン勢力の再台頭.....	1
2. タリバンによる強制徴募.....	6
(1) タリバンによる民族マイノリティ構成員の勧誘.....	7
(2) タリバンによる子どもの強制徴募.....	7
(3) ロガール州におけるタリバンによる強制徴募.....	9
参照：.....	12

### 略称：

ACCORD	オーストリア出身国・庇護研究ドキュメンテーションセンター
ANSO	アフガニスタン NGO 安全室〔Afghanistan NGO Safety Office〕
ARC	難民調査センター〔Refugee Research Centre〕
BAMF	ドイツ連邦移民難民庁〔Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge〕
HRW	ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ〔Human Rights Watch〕
ICG	インターナショナル・クライシス・グループ〔International Crisis Group〕
IRBC	カナダ移民難民局〔Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada〕
IRDC	アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター〔Refugee Documentation Centre (Ireland)〕
Landinfo	ノルウェー政府出身国情報センター

### 1. 2007年頃のロガール州の状況 - タリバン勢力の再台頭

ア ACCORD [「Country Report Afghanistan, 11th European Country of Origin Information Seminar \(Vienna, 21-22 June 2007\)」](#) 米国司法省ウェブ (2007年11月)

ACCORD は、2007年頃までのアフガニスタン南東部のロガール〔Logar〕州におけるタリバン勢力の再台頭について、次のように記載しています。

**5.1. Afghans Perceived as Critical of Factions or Individuals Exercising Control over**

**an Area:**

...

The so called “night-letters” are letters distributed by the Taliban or other AGEs requesting Afghans, for example, not to work with the government or with international organisations. Recently, a UNHCR driver was killed two days after a night-letter was distributed in the area. While in the period from 2002 to 2005, these night-letters were not considered particularly important, the situation has now changed. This is connected to the expanded Taliban presence. They now even have presence in parts of Logar province, 20 to 40km from Kabul City. This risk of not following orders from the Taliban is now much greater than previously, because they now have direct access to more villages – if not during daytime then at night.

同じく、ACCORD の同文書は、[BBC の 2007 年 6 月 12 日付け記事](#)を引用して、次のように記載しています。

**8. Security Developments**

...

**Right to Education**

Due to security situation, schools remain inaccessible in many parts of the country. There are continuous threats and attacks on female teachers, girl’s schools and on families who send their girls to school. In a Tajik valley at a 30 minutes distance from Kabul, no girl is allowed to attend school.

Case 3: June 12th: teacher and a girl killed when gunmen opened fire on girl’s school in Logar

イ [ANSO 「Bi-Weekly Data Report, Issue 01; April 15 - May 01 2008」](#) eoi (2008年5月)

ANSO は、2008年4月頃のロガール州の Baraki Barak を含む地域の治安状況について、次のように述べています。

**ロガール州**

Logar is becoming increasingly risky for NGO operations. AOG incidents in the first quarter of this year are nearly double that of the same time last year (15 vs. 8). There has been no slowdown in April, and incidents can be expected to continue to climb in May. While the predominant threat this year has been small arms, rocket, and RPG attacks on security forces/police, this month saw several incidents that indicate a move toward more direct threats to the general and NGO communities. These include the burning of three schools, the surrounding of two INGO staff in Baraki Barak by gunmen, and the possible kidnapping of two NGO workers by criminals.

Most incident areas are in the high traffic areas of Muhammad Agha and Puli Alam, but the southern districts of Kwawar, Charkh, and Baraki Barak (which combined have borders with Paktya, Ghazni, and Wardak) are likely the most heavily AOG infiltrated and dangerous areas for NGO.

ウ [ICG「アフガニスタンの中心地の反政府武装勢力」](#) [ecoi](#) (2011年6月27日)

ICGは、ロガール州の Baraki Barak を含む地域におけるタリバン勢力の支配状況について、次のように述べています。

Hekmatyar's rival, Rabbani, who was eager to wrest control of central and south-eastern provinces from Hizb-e Islami, secretly supported the Taliban push into Ghazni, Wardak and Logar provinces. Hekmatyar's attack in Ghazni in 1995 forced a tenuous alliance between the province's governor Taj Mohammad Qari Baba<sup>21</sup>, a top Harakat-e Inqelab-e Islami commander, and the Taliban, which led to the Taliban's takeover of Wardak and Logar. In May 1996, the Taliban drove the Northern Alliance's Ahmad Shah Massoud out of Kabul. Key to this pivotal offensive was the Taliban capture of Charasyab and Baraki Barak districts in Logar and Chak, Sayadabad and Sheikhabad districts in Wardak, areas that remain largely under insurgent control today.

...

Having consolidated their hold on the south-eastern provinces of Zabul and Uruzgan by 2006, the Taliban and other insurgent groups began to expand their presence along the western edge of Kabul province. The Taliban also officially announced the start of an offensive against the capital the same year. In 2006 and 2007, armed groups proliferated in Baraki Barak, Charkh and Puli Alam districts in Logar and in Chak, Nirkh, Sayadabad and Jalrez in Wardak.<sup>49</sup> Penetration of these areas provided access to the Kabul-Kandahar highway, which allowed the insurgency greater mobility, augmenting its ability to attack ISAF supply convoys and to collect taxes on goods on the route....

...

An independent analysis of security incidents indicates that Logar province accounted for one fifth of attacks by insurgents in the central region in 2010.<sup>135</sup> The Taliban and the Haqqani network maintain a strong presence in the districts of Kharwar, Baraki Barak, Charkh and most recently Azrah. Because a number of Taliban shadow government officials have been killed or captured since the surge began in 2009, it is difficult to identify current provincial leaders and ascertain the current state of the leadership.<sup>136</sup> Nonetheless, several Taliban fighters from Logar are well known for having distinguished themselves on the battlefield. In a departure from the norm, some Taliban commanders in Logar also oversee groups that operate in both Logar and Ghazni.<sup>137</sup>

...

The insurgency's dependence on taxes, to some extent, dictates the tempo and scope of

its territorial advances, as does its need for access to strategic areas and lines of communication. Although insurgents have been careful to avoid setting up major bases, the Taliban and other groups have consolidated their hold in the areas surrounding Kabul by attempting to control mountain districts close to the ring road, the country's main highway. In areas such as Badpakh, Garouch and Alishang in Laghman, Qarabagh, Khogiyani and Andar in Ghazni and Charkh, Baraki Barak and Kharwar in Logar where there is little to no government presence, access to the roads and the income gained from controlling them is important to the insurgency's survival and growth. As discussed below, however, the Taliban, the Haqqani network and Hizb-e Islami also benefit from corrupt Afghan government officials who frequently collaborate with local insurgent commanders in schemes aimed at aimed at profiting from the conflict.

エ **ACCORD** [「クエリー回答 \[a-7821-1 \(ACC-AFG-7821-1\)\]」](#) ecoi (2011年11月30日)

ACCORD は、2011年頃までのアフガニスタン南東部のロガール州におけるタリバン勢力の状況について、Landinfo と ICG の文書を引用して、次のように記載しています。

[Google 訳 (原文ドイツ語)]

In a report from the Norwegian country of origin information center Landinfo from September 2011, the Afghanistan expert Antonio Giustozzi discusses the conflict situation in the central region. It is mentioned that in the province of Logar only the strong presence of international troops prevented the insurgents from gaining complete control. Support for the government is particularly weak in Logar (Landinfo, September 9, 2011, p. 17).

The International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in a report from June 2011 an intensification of insurgent activities in the provinces of Logar, Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Wardak, Laghman and Ghazni. The Taliban would control large areas between the provinces of Logar and Laghman. In these central and eastern provinces, followers were mainly recruited through religious leaders and institutions. This central region around Kabul has the highest number of madrassas and numerous mosques in the country, making the region a fertile breeding ground for the spread of radical Islam, according to the ICG. Furthermore, ICG writes that, according to the result of an independent analysis of security-related incidents, one fifth of all attacks by insurgent groups that took place in the central region in 2010, perpetrated in the province of Logar. The Taliban and the Haqqani network maintained a strong presence in the districts of Kharwar, Baraki Barak, Charkh and Azrah:

“Insurgent activity in Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Logar, Wardak, Laghman and Ghazni provinces has greatly intensified as the nexus between insurgent groups, political elites and criminal networks solidifies in and around the capital.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 1)

“The Taliban control large swathes of territory stretching from Logar to Laghman; as of May 2011, shadow governors appointed by the Taliban's Quetta Shura operate in 35

out of 62 districts in the seven provinces examined for this report. These mini-shadow states operate as parallel governments, administering taxes, settling disputes and distributing power through the appointment of local military commanders.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 8)

“Notwithstanding the mix of motivations, religious leaders and institutions remain the focal point for recruitment. The central region around Kabul has one of the highest numbers of madrasas in Afghanistan, making it fertile ground for the spread of militant Islam. Deobandi scholars and mullahs have extended their influence in the traditionally conservative provinces bordering the capital such as Logar, Parwan and Wardak, making these areas pivotal in terms of recruitment and operational support for the Taliban and other insurgent groups. This well-tended network of mosques, mullahs and madrasas in and around Kabul also provides the insurgency with a vital source of intelligence.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 11)

“A wide network of official and unofficial mosques in the central heartland, many headed by militant mullahs and imams, is as vital to the insurgency as the madrasas. While the number of mosques registered with the government stood at 2,634 in March 2011, Afghan officials estimate that unregistered mosques number in the tens of thousands. About one fifth or 554 of the country’s registered mosques are located in the central-eastern provinces of Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Logar, Wardak, Ghazni and Laghman. The government’s Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs has in recent years tried to exert tighter control over mosques and mullahs, including through weekly distribution of recommended sermon topics to registered mosques and an examination process that tests mullahs on their level of competence in religious practices. More recently, the NDS has made an attempt to monitor mosque activities and mullahs’ sermons. Afghan officials, while concerned that the militant message is resonating more and more with the population, acknowledge that the government lacks the capacity to provide any meaningful oversight.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 12)

“An independent analysis of security incidents indicates that Logar province accounted for one fifth of attacks by insurgents in the central region in 2010. The Taliban and the Haqqani network maintain a strong presence in the districts of Kharwar, Baraki Barak, Charkh and most recently Azrah. Because a number of Taliban shadow government officials have been killed or captured since the surge began in 2009, it is difficult to identify current provincial leaders and ascertain the current state of the leadership.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 17)

オ [EASO 「COI レポート : アフガニスタン 武装勢力の戦略 - アフガン人に対する脅迫と標的暴力」 \(2012年12月\)](#)

EASO は、2007年頃のロガール州におけるタリバン勢力の状況について、元タリバン政権時に閣僚をつとめたアフガン情勢専門家の研究を引用し、次のように

述べています。

#### 1.1.4 Abduction

...

Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias (脚注 51) mentioned in his study on the Taliban in Logar and Wardak the kidnapping of people by the Taliban in order to receive ransom. He refers to the Lahya of January 2007 in which it is stated that Taliban can ask for money for the release of government, NGO and private company staff or truck drivers transporting loads for foreign troops or the government. In some cases, the Taliban purchased kidnapped victims from criminal elements when they expected political or financial gains. According to Christophe Reuter and Borhan Younus, abductions in Ghazni started targeting suspected Taliban opponents since 2007. Ghazni became one of the most dangerous kidnapping areas for government workers and NGO staff. In April 2012, ANSO reported, for example, that most kidnappings along the Sar-e Pul to Shiberghan road in Sar-e Pul were targeted. The targets were, for example, government employees.

...

(脚注 51) Tariq was a mujahideen fighter in the 1980s and worked as a development worker afterwards. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Taliban's regime. After the fall of the regime, he assisted in the UN special mission in Afghanistan in the south-east, was coordinator for the National Solidarity Programme in this region and worked in the Asia Foundation Afghanistan. He has a master's degree in governance and development.

EASO の同じ文書は、2012 年頃までのロガル州におけるタリバン勢力の状況について、次のように述べています。

#### 1.1.6 Taliban courts and death sentences

...

An Afghan reporter trained by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) reported in August 2012 that the Taliban's control of the province of Logar was so complete that their justice system practically completely replaced the state courts: even government officials turned to Taliban courts for dispute settlement (脚注 65) 。

(脚注 65) Azizi, A. M., Taleban Justice dominant in Logar Province, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 2 August 2012 (<http://iwpr.net/report-news/talebanjustice-dominant-logar-province>) (accessed 28 August 2012)

## 2. タリバンによる強制徴募

(1) タリバンによる民族マイノリティ構成員の勧誘

ア EASO [「COI レポート：アフガニスタン タリバンの戦略 - 勧誘」](#) (2012年7月)

EASOは、タリバンによるタジク人やウズベク人などの非パシュトゥン民族の勧誘について、次のように述べています。

**3.5 Recruitment of different ethnicities**

In the early years of the Insurgency the recruitment among non-Pashtun groups was negligible (see Section 2.5). Some exceptions were reported, such as the Nuristani and the Pashai in the east of Afghanistan. Starting in 2006, the Taliban's attitude changed. They infiltrated new areas in the west and the north and they accessed non-Pashtun regions. Giustozzi and Ibrahimi indicate that there is growing evidence of the Taliban trying to recruit non-Pashtun ethnicities. In 2009, the Taliban recruited among some non-Pashtun groups in Takhar and Baghlan (e.g. Uzbeks and Tajiks). Uzbeks appear to be the largest group of recruits in the Insurgency in the north apart from the Pashtun. Turkmen have also been recruited in the north. Since the spring of 2010, ethnically mixed Taliban fronts have been seen. Non-Pashtuns are appointed as local commanders, in order to be able to connect to non-Pashtun village elders. In early 2010, the Taliban leadership for the north decided that the fronts and shadow government should be ethnically mixed.

...

During the Danish Immigration Service's fact-finding mission in Afghanistan, 25 February to 4 March 2012, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) stated that in non-Pashtun areas, the Taliban would often ask the community to join them or in poor areas individuals would be offered money to fulfil tasks for them. A contact in Afghanistan pointed out that where other ethnicities than the Pashtun were recruited, financial incentives are often key. When insurgents try to reach out to other ethnicities than the Pashtun, religious motives as well are important as a mobilising factor.

(2) タリバンによる子どもの強制徴募

ア IRDC [「調査回答」](#) eoi (2011年9月12日)

IRDCの調査回答は、タリバンによる子どもの強制徴募について、米国国務省人権報告2010年版等を引用し、次のように述べています。

The US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices published in April 2011 notes under the heading Child Soldiers:

...

The previous years report states:

“Anecdotal evidence suggests that insurgent recruitment of underage soldiers was on the rise. There were numerous credible reports that the Taliban and other insurgent forces

recruited children younger than 18, in some cases as suicide bombers and in other cases to assist with their work. For example, in Uruzgan the Taliban reportedly used children to dig hiding places for IEDs. There were many reports of insurgents using minor teenage boys as combatants in Paktya province. In July in Helmand province, authorities apprehended a child before he allegedly would have been equipped to become a suicide bomber. NDS officials held several children in the juvenile detention facility in Helmand on insurgency-related charges. Although most of the children were 15 or 16 years old, reports from Ghazni province indicated that insurgents recruited children as young as 12, particularly if they already owned motorbikes and weapons. NGOs and UN agencies reported that the Taliban tricked, promised money to children, or forced them to become suicide bombers.” (US Department of State (11 March 2010) Afghanistan: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2009 )

A report from Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict states on page 32 under the heading ‘Recruitment by the Taliban and Other Armed Opposition Groups’:

“The Taliban, Haqqani network, Hezbi-i-Islami, Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia and other armed groups have recruited children to be used as fighters, camp guards or suicide bombers, particularly along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In some cases, children had been trained in foreign countries to undertake suicide missions. In other cases, children have been involuntarily involved in the insurgency as explosives were hidden in their bags or clothing unbeknownst to them.<sup>177</sup> For example, on April 12, 2009, a young boy was killed when a bomb planted in his wheelbarrow exploded 50 feet from a government building in Aybak city, in Samangan. The boy was not aware that he was carrying the explosive device, according to UNAMA.

There are no precise figures on child soldiers in Afghanistan but several reports attest to the severity of the concern. In particular, widespread displacement and the consequent absence of protective community structures have increased the vulnerability of children to recruitment. The March 2009 Secretary-General’s report on Children and Armed Conflict noted that forced recruitment of children by armed groups is “prevalent in areas with high concentrations of returnees or internally displaced persons, particularly in the south and southeastern provinces.” The surge in international armed forces is feared to trigger a new rise in the recruitment and use of child soldiers by armed opposition groups as part of new large-scale recruitment drives.” (Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict (14 June 2010) Afghanistan: "Setting the Right Priorities: Protecting Children Affected by Armed Conflict in Afghanistan")

イ [HRW「今がタリバンの児童兵使用を止めるチャンスだ」](#) (2021年9月20日)

For more than two decades, the Taliban have put children on the front lines of Afghanistan’s armed conflicts. They have used children as fighters, to plant and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and as suicide bombers. Thousands of children may



remain in their ranks today.

...

The Taliban have denied that they use children in “jihadic operations” and their code of conduct states that “boys without beards” are not allowed in military centers. Nevertheless, the U.N. has verified hundreds of individual cases in which the Taliban have recruited and used children in recent years, including a sharp spike in 2020, and warned that the true figures are likely much higher.

...

### (3) ロガル州におけるタリバンによる強制徴募

ア ACCORD [「クエリー回答 \[a-7821-1 \(ACC-AFG-7821-1\)\]」](#) ecoi (2011年11月30日)

ACCORD は、ロガル州の Baraki Barak を含む地域での強制徴募について、国連特別者の報告書や報道等を引用し、次のように述べています。

In a report on a mission to Afghanistan in February 2010, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict stated that there had been reports of recruitment from all parts of Afghanistan, including the eastern regions, where Logar Province is also located given by children. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and communities living in isolation are particularly at risk of recruitment by non-state armed groups such as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Hezb-i-Islami and the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia. Cases are documented in which the Taliban also used children as suicide bombers. The children concerned were between 13 and 16 years old and they were reportedly misled, offered money or coercion, among other things,

“Reports of recruitment and use of children have been received from all regions, and particularly from the south, south-east and eastern regions, but the security environment and the lack of human resources dedicated to monitoring and verifying cases has limited reporting on these trends of abuse. Internally Displaced People (IDP) and isolated populations in conflict-affected areas in particular are at risk of child recruitment into non-state armed groups, including the Taliban, Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islami and Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia. [...]

Documented cases show that children are also used as suicide bombers by the Taliban. Children involved range from 13-16 years of age and, according to testimonies of failed bombers, have been tricked, promised money or otherwise forced to become suicide bombers. However, some children who have attempted suicide attacks have been heavily indoctrinated, many times in foreign countries, and efforts must be undertaken to combat this practice. That said, some reports suggest that, in the latest incidents of children used in bombings, they may not have been aware of what they were carrying, and explosives were set off remotely without their knowledge.” (Office of the Special Representative of

the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, Februar 2010, S. 5)

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that in early May 2011, five children, all under the age of 13, from Logar and Ghazni provinces and allegedly trained to be suicide bombers, were arrested by the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) :

„Recent incidents of suicide bombing involving children include: [...]

In early May, five children, all under age 13, from Logar and Ghazni provinces who had allegedly been trained as suicide bombers were arrested by the National Directorate of Security.“ (HRW, 31. August 2011)

In a May 2011 report, Reuters reported on four boys, all of whom were under 13 years of age, who said they had been forced by insurgents to become suicide bombers in Pakistan, where they lived. They would then have received instructions to carry out an attack in Logar province:

“Afghan authorities paraded four young Afghan boys on Saturday who they said had been recruited as suicide bombers from homes in neighboring Pakistan and detained as they came back across the border on a mission to attack foreign troops. The four boys, all under 13, giggled and smiled shyly at one another as they were led on to a stage before television cameras to tell how they were coerced by insurgent leaders into becoming unwitting suicide attackers. ‘We were told to go and carry out a suicide attack in Logar province. I was told to press the detonating button and they said the (infidels) will be killed and you will live,’ said 13-year-old Fazil Rahman, who was dressed in bright green Afghan shalwar kameez clothing.” (Reuters, 7. Mai 2011)

In November 2011, National Afghanistan TV reported the arrest of a 15-year-old youth in Paktia province who had been prepared by the Taliban to commit a suicide attack. He is a resident of the Baraki Barak district of Logar province:

“A 15-year-old child who was prepared by the Taleban to carry out a suicide attack has been arrested by Ministry of Interior intelligence officials. Our colleague reports: [Correspondent] Sayed Zubair, son of Sayed Imam, a resident of Baraki Barak District of Logar Province, recently travelled to Paktia Province under direct instructions from Qari Ihsanollah, a local Taleban commander. He intended to go to a Taleban training facility in Miramshah of Pakistan when he was arrested by detectives in Paktia Province.” (National Afghanistan TV, 14. November 2011)

...

#### イ [EASO「COI レポート：アフガニスタン タリバンの戦略 - 勧誘」](#) (2012年7月)

ACCORD は、ロガール州でのタリバンによる勧誘について、報告書や記事等を引用し、金銭的なインセンティブによるものと述べつつ、ただしこれはタリバンの支配下にある地域では該当しないとして、次のように述べています。

### **3.2.1 Economic incentives**

...

A 22-year-old man from the district of Pushtrod in Farah testified about his work. He was the sole breadwinner of his family and faced difficulties in finding work. Two friends advised him to contact the local Taliban. He joined the insurgents and was involved in different operations. After an operation, he was paid, up to AFG400. He earned around AFG 1 000 each week. The rest of the week, he was a civilian and did not carry a weapon. According to a Taliban commander in Logar, in 2011, their fighters were paid an average income of USD 240 per month and an additional USD 170–240 for an attack on a school, clinic or dam. Targeting ISAF troops was even better paid. A local Haqqani district commander explained that his fighters were paid monthly salaries of USD 110–120. He, as a commander, received USD 170–220. Separately, a group received USD 4 000–5 000 for each foreign soldier they killed.

...

### **Individual threats, the use of force and coercion by Taliban**

...

In April 2012, a local correspondent in Logar stated the following about Taliban recruitment: “They did this by using religious persuasion rather than a political one. In Logar, people are joining the Taliban ranks voluntarily. Coercion or other means are not used”.

...

A local source in Afghanistan stated in April 2012 that there has been greater use of genuine persuasion and appeal to patriotic or religious duties to fight the ‘foreign invaders and the puppet regime’ and much less coercion which is currently rarer than before. According to the same source there are few recorded cases of actual violence against individuals escaping recruitment and it would be against the Taliban’s stated aims of justice and good governance and it would alienate communities.

According to Giustozzi and Ibrahimi, Taliban cadres suggested that the refugee camps are the only locations where they have been able to forcibly recruit fighters. Families were forced to contribute one man. Giustozzi states explicitly that forced recruitment has not been a salient characteristic of this conflict. The insurgents applied it very marginally. According to Giustozzi, the use of direct coercion happened only in areas under their control to force men to serve as porters. Since 2006, there have also been reports of forced recruitment by the Taliban of medical staff in some areas for the treatment of wounded fighters.

During interviews conducted in the framework of a fact-finding mission in Kabul in October 2011, Landinfo obtained information which corroborates the rare use of coercion in recruitment. It was mentioned that the Taliban have enough volunteers, so they didn’t

have to rely on this strategy. Exceptions might exist in areas under full control of the Taliban.

During the Danish Immigration Service's fact-finding mission in Afghanistan, 25 February to 4 March 2012, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) stated that "there is no reporting of forced recruitment by the Taliban and that most recruits joined voluntarily". The organisation mentioned Hazara communities in Uruzgan, subject to intimidation by the Taliban in order to make them join their ranks. This source explicitly added that this was exceptional. The Danish fact-finding mission report mentions UNHCR's statements about recruitment by the Taliban: 'UNHCR referred to a leaked ISAF report on the state of the Taliban in relation to the change of strategy of the Taliban. According to this report, the Taliban do not have difficulties in recruiting people for their force. They have many volunteers and there is a willingness to join the movement. The Taliban may recruit collectively in the villages by offering education to poor people's sons and by brain washing people. Considering the acceptance by the local population of the Taliban, it could be assumed that forceful recruitment is not widely taking place, however, UNHCR added that very little is known on this at the present time.' The Cooperation for Peace and Unity confirmed that there is no need for the Taliban to forcibly recruit. According to this source, they would rely on forced recruitment only in emergency situations. The source explained that the Taliban visited villages in the south to request a number of fighters, but that there was, in general, no need for them to recruit people by force, since there were sufficient volunteers. The Civil Society and Human Rights Organisation (CSHRO) stated that 'the Taliban doesn't have the possibility to approach people at home and force them to join their ranks'. An independent research institute in Kabul explained during the Danish fact-finding mission that the Taliban, in general, does not recruit by using force. According to this source, it could happen that the Taliban demands a number of fighters from a certain village, but they wouldn't put a request to an individual family.

参照：

(報告書等)

ACCORD [「Country Report Afghanistan. 11th European Country of Origin Information Seminar \(Vienna, 21-22 June 2007\)」](#) 米国司法省ウェブ (2007年11月)

\_\_\_\_\_ [「クエリー回答 \[a-7821-1 \(ACC-AFG-7821-1\)\]」](#) ecoi (2011年11月30日)

Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) 「Bi-Weekly Data Report, Issue 01; April 15 - May 01 2008」 ecoi (2008年5月)、オンライン：

[https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1331233/1002\\_1249209422\\_anso1.pdf](https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1331233/1002_1249209422_anso1.pdf)

Asylum Research Centre (ARC) 「Afghanistan COI Repository」 ASYLOS (2021年11月25日)、オンライン：<https://www.asylos.eu/afghanistan>

European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 「EASO Country of Origin Information report: Afghanistan - Taliban strategies — Recruitment (COI レポート：アフガニスタン

タリバンの戦略 - 勧誘)」(2012年7月)、オンライン:

[https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/EASO\\_COI\\_Report\\_AFG\\_Taliban\\_Recruitment.pdf](https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/EASO_COI_Report_AFG_Taliban_Recruitment.pdf)

\_\_\_\_\_ . 「EASO Country of Origin Information report: Afghanistan - Insurgent strategies — intimidation and targeted violence against Afghans (COI レポート: アフガニスタン武装勢力の戦略 - アフガン人に対する脅迫と標的暴力)」(2012年12月)、オンライン:

[https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/AFG\\_Insurgent\\_strategies\\_Intimidation\\_and\\_targeted\\_violence.pdf](https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/AFG_Insurgent_strategies_Intimidation_and_targeted_violence.pdf)

International Crisis Group (ICG) 「The Insurgency in Afghanistan's Heartland (アフガニスタンの中心地の反政府武装勢力)」 eoi (2011年6月27日)、オンライン:

[https://www.eoi.net/en/file/local/1265231/2016\\_1330940548\\_207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.pdf](https://www.eoi.net/en/file/local/1265231/2016_1330940548_207-the-insurgency-in-afghanistans-heartland.pdf)

Refugee Documentation Centre (Ireland) (IRDC) 「Afghanistan : Research and compiled by Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 12 September 2011 (IRDC 調査回答)」 eoi (2011年9月12日)、オンライン:

[https://www.eoi.net/en/file/local/1094590/1226\\_1316700021\\_q14366-afghanistan.pdf](https://www.eoi.net/en/file/local/1094590/1226_1316700021_q14366-afghanistan.pdf)

(記事等)

BBC 「Gunmen kill Afghan school girls」(2007年6月12日)、オンライン:

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/6744931.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6744931.stm)

Human Rights Watch (HRW) 「This is our opportunity to end the Taliban's use of child soldiers (今がタリバンの児童兵使用を止めるチャンスだ)」(2021年9月20日)、オンライン:

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/20/our-opportunity-end-talibans-use-child-soldiers>