

## ロシア

2021 年 8 月 30 日ドラフト作成

1. 一般情報 .....	2
(1) 地理・人口 .....	2
(2) 内政 .....	2
2. 治安・人権状況 .....	4
(1) 総論 .....	4
(2) コーカサス .....	4
3. 関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い .....	5
(1) 反政府政治活動 .....	5
(2) 政府批判 .....	8
(3) 市民・人権活動 .....	9
(4) チェチェン .....	10
(5) Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) .....	11
(6) 北方領土（南部クリル諸島）とクリミア .....	12
4. ジェンダー、DV および子ども .....	12
5. LGBT .....	12
6. 汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護 .....	13
(1) 国家保護 .....	14
(2) テロ組織 .....	14
7. 兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の） .....	15
8. 司法制度・刑事手続 .....	16
9. 警察・治安部隊（刑務所等の状況含む） .....	17
10. 報道の自由 .....	20
11. 宗教の自由 .....	22
(1) 総論 .....	22
(2) エホバの証人 .....	23
12. 国籍、民族および人種 .....	23
(1) 国籍 .....	23
(2) 人種差別・ヘイトクライム .....	23
13. 出入国および移動の自由 .....	24
(1) 国外で庇護を求めた者 .....	24

(2) 不法出国をした者.....	24
(3) チェチェン出身者の帰国.....	25
14. その他.....	25
(1) HIV/エイズ患者.....	25
(2) 障がい者.....	25
略称.....	27

1. 一般情報

(1) 地理・人口

ア CIA「[ワールドファクトブック - ロシア](#)」(2021 年 8 月 26 日閲覧)

<p><b>Ethnic groups</b></p> <p>Russian 77.7%, Tatar 3.7%, Ukrainian 1.4%, Bashkir 1.1%, Chuvash 1%, Chechen 1%, other 10.2%, unspecified 3.9% (2010 est.)</p> <p>note: nearly 200 national and/or ethnic groups are represented in Russia's 2010 census</p> <p><b>Languages</b></p> <p>Russian (official) 85.7%, Tatar 3.2%, Chechen 1%, other 10.1%; note - data represent native language spoken (2010 est.)</p> <p>...</p> <p><b>Religions</b></p> <p>Russian Orthodox 15-20%, Muslim 10-15%, other Christian 2% (2006 est.)</p> <p>note: estimates are of practicing worshipers; Russia has large populations of non-practicing believers and non-believers, a legacy of over seven decades of official atheism under Soviet rule; Russia officially recognizes Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as the country's traditional religions</p>
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(2) 内政

ア 外務省「[ロシア基礎データ](#)」(2018 年 4 月 2 日)

<p><b>5 内政状況</b></p> <p>(1) 第 1-2 期プーチン政権 (2000 年 5 月～2008 年 5 月)</p> <p>プーチン大統領は、チェチェン紛争を終了させ、国内の分離主義を掃討したほか、「強い国家」の建設を掲げ、議会勢力及び地方勢力の掌握といった中央集権化や反政権の新興財閥の解体やマスコミの統制等、政治的な安定を追求。また、持続的な経済発展に成功し、「優先的国家プロジェクト」(保健, 教育, 住宅建設, 農業)を通じて国民生活の向上を図った。退任直前の 2008 年 2 月には「2020 年までの国家発展戦略」を策定し、イノベーション型の経済発展, 肥大化した官僚主義や、行き過ぎた中央集</p>
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権の改善等を提唱。

(2) メドヴェージェフ政権 (2008 年 5 月～2012 年 5 月)

メドヴェージェフ大統領 (当時) はプーチン路線を継承しつつ (プーチン首相とのタンデム)、経済の「近代化」を最重要視し、経済改革と同時に政治改革の実施の必要性を提唱。大統領の任期 (4 年から 6 年へ) 及び国家院の任期 (4 年から 5 年へ) の延長、連邦院の構成変更、NPO 法改正、連邦構成主体首長 (知事等) の住民による直接選挙制の復活等、種々の政治改革を実現。

(3) 第 3 期プーチン政権 (2012 年 5 月～)

国内批判を容易に抑え込めた第 1-2 期と異なり、大規模な抗議デモを経験した第 3 期プーチン政権は、従来以上に国内世論を注視。2014 年 3 月のクリミア「併合」後には、プーチン大統領は愛国主義的傾向を強める国民世論の圧倒的な支持を獲得。ロシア経済が苦境にある 2015 年以降も、2016 年 9 月の国家院 (下院) 選挙で政権与党「統一ロシア」が 450 議席中 343 議席を獲得し、また大統領としても高い支持率を維持。一方、2017 年には、大規模な反汚職デモが 3 月、6 月に発生したほか、プーチン大統領の 65 歳の誕生日 (10 月 9 日) に合わせた反政府集会が国内約 80 都市で実施されるなどの動きも見られた。

2018 年 3 月 18 日、大統領選挙が実施され、プーチン大統領が 76.69% の得票率を獲得し、再選 (投票率は 67.54%)。

イ オランダ外務省「[出身国情報報告 - ロシア](#)」(2021 年 4 月)

**1 Political developments**

The Russian Federation is a presidential republic in which the president, Vladimir Putin, plays a central role and has far-reaching powers. The position of the president was further strengthened by a constitutional amendment passed on 1 July 2020. For example, the president now determines domestic and foreign policy, heads the armed forces, can veto legislative processes, appoints the prime minister after confirmation by the State Duma<sup>1</sup>, dismisses the prime minister without consultation with parliament, independently appoints the heads of the state security departments such as Foreign Affairs, Defence and the investigation and intelligence service FSB (Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii) after consultation with the Federation Council. He also appoints and dismisses the highest prosecutors and federal judges, has a leading voice in citizenship matters and can pardon detainees. Following the recent constitutional amendment, the maximum term for the office of president remains two times six years. However, because earlier terms do not count after the amendment, the current president could theoretically stay on until 2036 and could serve a total of six terms. In addition, the new constitution changed the balance of power in favour of the central power – for example by involving regional and central authorities in the formation of local government.<sup>2</sup> See also section 1.3, which deals with the constitutional amendments.

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## 2. 治安・人権状況

### (1) 総論

#### ア 米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2020年 ロシア](#)」(2021年3月30日)

Significant human rights issues included: extrajudicial killings and attempted extrajudicial killings, including of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons in Chechnya by local government authorities; enforced disappearances; pervasive torture by government law enforcement officers that sometimes resulted in death and occasionally involved sexual violence or punitive psychiatric incarceration; harsh and life-threatening conditions in prisons; arbitrary arrest and detention; political and religious prisoners and detainees; politically motivated reprisals against individuals located outside the country; severe arbitrary interference with privacy; severe suppression of freedom of expression and media, including the use of “antiextremism” and other laws to prosecute peaceful dissent and religious minorities; violence against journalists; blocking and filtering of internet content and banning of online anonymity; severe suppression of the right of peaceful assembly; severe suppression of freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on “foreign agents” and “undesirable foreign organizations”; severe restrictions of religious freedom; refoulement of refugees; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; severe limits on participation in the political process, including restrictions on opposition candidates’ ability to seek public office and conduct political campaigns, and on the ability of civil society to monitor election processes; widespread corruption at all levels and in all branches of government; lack of investigation of and accountability for violence against women; coerced abortion and forced sterilization; trafficking in persons; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence against persons with disabilities, members of ethnic minorities, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons.

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### (2) コーカサス

#### ア 外務省海外安全情報ホームページ「[ロシアの危険情報【危険レベル継続】\(内容の更新\)](#)」(2019年3月15日)

##### 2. 地域別情勢

(1) チェチェン, イングーシ, ダゲスタン, カバルダ・バルカル, 北オセチア・アラニア, カラチャイ・チェルケスの各共和国及びスタヴロポリ地方  
レベル3: 渡航は止めてください。(渡航中止勧告)(継続)

これらの地域においては, 武装勢力による攻撃や自爆テロ事件が多数発生して

おり、特に、チェチェン、イングーシ、ダゲスタンの各共和国でのテロの脅威には警戒が必要です。これらは主に警察等治安機関を標的にしたものですが、一部には不特定多数を標的としたテロも見られ、民間人にも多くの犠牲者が出ています。2016年から2018年にかけて、ダゲスタン共和国やチェチェン共和国にて警察等の治安機関を標的とした爆弾テロが発生しました。これらに対し、連邦政府は、FSBを中心に大規模な掃討作戦（反テロ作戦）を継続的に行っており、武装勢力と当局との間で銃撃戦が頻繁に発生しています。しかしながら、武装勢力の活動を完全に阻止するには至っておらず、治安情勢は依然として不安定です。チェチェン共和国では、ロシア当局の集中的な掃討作戦によって、武装勢力は主要メンバーの多くを失い弱体化しているとされていますが、北コーカサス地域を拠点とする武装勢力が ISIL に忠誠を誓う旨の声明を発出し、「ISIL コーカサス州」と称して活動しており、2016年には同名でロシアへのテロを呼びかけるビデオ声明も発出されています。このような背景に鑑み、テロが発生するおそれもあることから、警戒が必要です。

北コーカサス地域の長期化する混乱の中で、こうした武装勢力の他にも、犯罪集団による誘拐、武装勢力や当局に対する個人的な報復のための襲撃、殺人事件等も発生しています。

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イ [EASO「EASO COI レポート：ロシア チェチェン人の状況」](#)（2018年8月）

ウ [ACCORD「ロシアに関するテーマ別調査：ダゲスタンの治安状況&攻撃の時間系列」](#) eoi（2020年1月13日）

### 3. 関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い

#### (1) 反政府政治活動

ア [外務省海外安全情報ホームページ「ロシアの危険情報【危険レベル継続】（内容の更新）」](#)（2019年3月15日）

#### 2. 地域別情勢

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一般国民による反体制抗議運動は、集会法の罰則強化やNPO外国エージェント法採択等により実施されにくい状況になっていますが、モスクワ市内では、反政権活動家の抗議集会等が断続的に開催されています。これらの活動はSNSを通じて参加が呼びかけられ、参加者は数千人、数万人規模となる場合があります。一部の無許可集会等の参加者が治安当局に逮捕されていますので、無用なトラブルを回避するためにもこれらの集会やデモには近づかず、万一遭遇した場合には直ちに現場から離れるよう留意してください。

イ 米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2020年 ロシア](#)」(2021年3月30日)**Political Prisoners and Detainees**

There were credible reports of political prisoners in the country and that authorities detained and prosecuted individuals for political reasons. Charges usually applied in politically motivated cases included “terrorism,” “extremism,” “separatism,” and “espionage.” Political prisoners were reportedly placed in particularly harsh conditions of confinement and subjected to other punitive treatment within the prison system, such as solitary confinement or punitive stays in psychiatric units.

As of December Memorial’s list of political prisoners contained 358 names, including 295 individuals who were allegedly wrongfully imprisoned for exercising religious freedom. Nevertheless, Memorial estimated that the actual number of political prisoners in the country could be two to three times greater than the number on its list. Memorial’s list included journalists jailed for their writing, such as Abdulmumin Gadzhiyev (see section 2.a.); human rights activists jailed for their work, such as Yuriy Dmitriyev; many Ukrainians (including Crimean Tatars) imprisoned for their vocal opposition to the country’s occupation of Crimea; Anastasiya Shevchenko, the first individual charged under the “undesirable foreign organizations” law; students and activists jailed for participating in the Moscow protests in July and August 2019; and members of Jehovah’s Witnesses and other religious believers. Memorial noted the average length of sentences for the cases on their list continued to increase, from 5.3 years for political prisoners and 6.6 years for religious prisoners in 2016 to 6.8 and 9.1 years, respectively, in 2018. In some cases sentences were significantly longer, such as the case of Aleksey Pichugin, a former security official of the Russian oil company Yukos, imprisoned since 2003 with a life sentence for conviction of alleged involvement in murder and murder attempts; human rights organizations asserted that his detention was politically motivated to obtain false evidence against Yukos executives.

**b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association**

The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

**Freedom of Peaceful Assembly**

The law provides for freedom of assembly, but local authorities restricted this right. The law requires organizers of public meetings, demonstrations, or marches by more than one person to notify the government, although authorities maintained that protest organizers must receive government permission, not just provide notification. Failure to obtain official permission to hold a protest resulted in the demonstration being viewed as unlawful by law enforcement officials, who routinely dispersed such protests. While some public demonstrations took place, on many occasions local officials selectively denied groups

permission to assemble or offered alternate venues that were inconveniently or remotely located. Many public demonstrations were restricted or banned due to COVID-19 measures. Each region enforced its own restrictions. As of September, Moscow and St. Petersburg had banned all mass events.

...

The law provides heavy penalties for engaging in unsanctioned protests and other violations of public assembly law. Protesters convicted of multiple violations within six months may be fined substantially or imprisoned for up to five years. The law prohibits “involving a minor in participation in an unsanctioned gathering,” which is punishable by fines, 100 hours of community service, or arrest for up to 15 days.

Arrests or detentions for organizing or taking part in unsanctioned protests were common.

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#### ウ オランダ外務省「[出身国情報報告 - ロシア](#)」（2021 年 4 月）

##### 1 Political developments

...

During the reporting period, the government continued to take increasingly repressive action against political opposition in society, such as during demonstrations, but displayed more flexibility in relation to apolitical protests about environmental issues, for example. For example, the authorities continued to crack down on protests in Khabarovsk against the arrest of Governor Sergei Furgal, the exclusion of political opposition members from local elections in Moscow in 2019- 2020, and the prosecution of individual political opposition members, journalists and NGOs. During demonstrations following the arrest of Alexei Navalny in January 2021, thousands of protesters were arrested. On the other hand, the government did respond to demands from protesters who spoke out on less political topics, such as protests against the building of a church in a popular park in Yekaterinburg, against a waste depot in Shiyes and against an industrial mine on Mount Kushtau.<sup>9</sup>

エ [記事「ロシア反体制指導者のオフィス襲撃、正体不明の液体で3人が病院搬送」](#)  
CNN（2020 年 9 月 9 日）

オ [記事「毒物中毒のロシア反体制指導者、独病院で意識回復」](#) CNN（2020 年 9 月 8 日）

カ [HRW「警察が平和的な抗議デモを粉砕：未成年者を含む1000人以上が逮捕される」](#)（2018 年 9 月 13 日）

キ AI「[デモ参加者の弁護士が警察から暴行を受け、恣意的に拘束される](#)」(2018年9月12日)

ク 記事「[抗議運動を受けロシア当局が反対派活動家に厳しい取締り](#)」The Guardian (2018年5月24日)

## (2) 政府批判

ア 米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2020年 ロシア](#)」(2021年3月30日)

### Internet Freedom

The government monitored all internet communications (see also section 1.f.).

The law requires internet providers to install equipment to route web traffic through servers in the country. The government continued to employ its longstanding use of the System for Operative Investigative Activities, which requires internet service providers (ISPs) to install, at their own expense, a device that routes all customer traffic to an FSB terminal. The system enables police to track private email communications, identify internet users, and monitor their internet activity. Internet advocates asserted the measure allows for surveillance by intelligence agencies and enables state authorities to control information and block content. The law also envisions the creation of an independent domain name system (DNS) for the country, separate from the global DNS. In July the Account Chamber announced that the proposed plan to create an independent DNS did not meet its deadline, citing COVID-19 related delays.

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イ HRW「[ワールドレポート 2021 - ロシア](#)」(2021年1月13日)

### Freedom of Expression

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By March 2020, 12 months after a law banning “disrespect to authorities” was adopted, an independent group found that the overwhelming majority of such charges involved alleged insults against Putin.

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### Digital Rights, Right to Privacy

In 2020, Russia tightened control over internet infrastructure and online content, expanding the capacity of authorities to filter and block online content in violation of the rights to freedom of expression and access to information.

These restrictions built on other internet censorship measures, such as legislative amendments in December 2019 required manufacturers to pre-install Russian apps, including browsers, messengers and maps on smartphones, computers, and Smart TVs sold

in Russia.

ウ 記事「[Activist Arrested Over Putin Spokesman ‘Execution’ Video](#)」 *The Moscow Times* (2020 年 1 月 13 日)

### (3) 市民・人権活動

ア 米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2020 年 ロシア](#)」(2021 年 3 月 30 日)

#### **Freedom of Association**

The constitution provides for freedom of association, but the government did not respect it. Public organizations must register their bylaws and the names of their leaders with the Ministry of Justice. The finances of registered organizations are subject to investigation by tax authorities, and foreign grants must be registered.

The government continued to use the “foreign agents” law, which requires NGOs that receive foreign funding and engage in “political activity” to register as “foreign agents,” to harass, stigmatize, and, in some cases, halt their operation, although fewer organizations were registered than in previous years. As of December the Ministry of Justice’s registry of organizations designated as “foreign agents” included 75 NGOs. NGOs designated as “foreign agents” are banned by law from observing elections and face other restrictions on their activity.

...

イ HRW「[ワールドレポート 2021 - ロシア](#)」(2021 年 1 月 13 日)

#### **Human Rights Defenders**

In July, police indicted human rights lawyer Semyon Simonov, holding him personally accountable for an unpaid fine issued against his human rights organization over alleged non-compliance with Russia’s abusive “foreign agents” law.

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#### **Freedom of Association**

Russian authorities raided the offices of independent groups under various pretexts and targeted their staff and affiliates, including under the “foreign agents” and “undesirable foreign organizations” laws.

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#### **Counterterrorism**

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In February and June, in two separate trials, courts issued guilty verdicts, with prison

terms ranging from five to eighteen years, against nine defendants for alleged involvement in “Network” which prosecutors claimed was a terrorist organization. Most defendants insisted that no such organization existed. Authorities dismissed without proper investigation defendants’ torture complaints. The judges accepted testimonies by secret witnesses and allegedly rigged evidence.

In August, seven defendants were convicted for establishing an “extremist organization,” New Greatness. Sentences ranged from four years’ probation to seven years in prison. The defendants complained security officials had entrapped them. The prosecution relied on secret witnesses’ testimony. Torture complaints by one of the defendants were dismissed without a full investigation.

ウ 記事 [「Russia names Golos monitor as 'foreign agent' ahead of election」](#) BBC (2021 年 8 月 19 日)

Independent Russian vote monitor Golos has been labelled a foreign agent a month ahead of parliamentary elections.

...

#### (4) チェチェン

ア HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - ロシア」](#) (2021 年 1 月 13 日)

##### **Chechnya**

Chechnya’s leadership continued its onslaught on all forms of dissent and criticism.

In February, a group of thugs violently attacked human rights lawyer Marina Dubrovina and investigative journalist Elena Milashina shortly after a court hearing against Dubrovina’s client, a blogger who had criticized the opulent lifestyle of Chechnya’s governor, Ramzan Kadyrov. The women documented their injuries and filed a police report, describing the attacks as work-related. There was no effective investigation.

In September, a video circulated on social media showing 19-year-old Salman Tepsurkayev being forced to penetrate himself anally with a glass bottle in retaliation for “spread[ing] lies” about Chechen authorities. Tepsurkayev moderated the Telegram channel 1ADAT, which routinely features Chechen dissident voices, including those critical of Kadyrov. At time of writing, he remains disappeared and authorities have not opened an investigation.

...

イ HRW [「"Like Walking a Minefield" Vicious Crackdown on Critics in Russia's](#)

**Chechen Republic** (2016 年 8 月 31 日)

For close to a decade, Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Russia's Chechen Republic, has steadily tried to eradicate all forms of dissent and gradually built a tyranny within Chechnya. Kadyrov has been in this post since 2007 by virtue of appointment from the Kremlin, but he now faces elections for the head (governor) of Chechnya scheduled for September 2016. In the months before those elections local authorities have been viciously and comprehensively cracking down on critics and anyone whose total loyalty to Kadyrov they deem questionable. These include ordinary people who express dissenting opinions, critical Russian and foreign journalists, and the very few human rights defenders who challenge cases of abuse by Chechen law enforcement and security agencies....

- ウ ACCORD「[クエリー回答 \[a-11231\] : Aslan Mashadov の支持者や家族の状況](#)」  
ecoi (2020 年 3 月 23 日)
- エ ACCORD「[クエリー回答 \[a-11151\] : 欧米で育った若いチェチェン人の取扱い、ほか](#)」  
ecoi (2020 年 2 月 7 日)
- オ ACCORD「[クエリー回答 \[a-11165\] : チェチェン武装勢力の元戦闘員と家族の状況、ほか](#)」  
ecoi (2020 年 1 月 31 日)
- カ ACCORD「[クエリー回答 \[a-10624-2 \(10625\)\] 反対派 \(チェチェンの反政府勢力の支持者や家族\) の状況](#)」  
ecoi (2018 年 6 月 29 日)

**(5) Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT)**

- ア Landinfo「[Russland: Reaksjoner mot Hizb ut-Tahrir](#)」(2021 年 3 月 26 日)

- イ HRW「[ワールドレポート 2021 - ロシア](#)」(2021 年 1 月 13 日)

**Counterterrorism**

...

Russian authorities continued to prosecute people over alleged involvement in Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), a pan-Islamist movement that seeks to establish a caliphate but denounces violence to achieve that goal. Russia banned HuT as a terrorist organization in 2003. In February, 11 defendants in two separate military trials received prison sentences ranging from 11 to 23 years. In September, in a separate case, the Supreme Court upheld sentences ranging from 10 to 24 years for 21 men. At least one of the convicted alleged he had been tortured to extract a confession. Five more men were detained over alleged involvement in HuT in November in Tatarstan.

In August, a military court sentenced opposition writer Airat Dilmukhametov to nine years' imprisonment on extremism, separatism and justification of terrorism charges for a legitimate speech.

Neither the charges against Dilmukhametov nor against the 32 HuT defendants related to planning, carrying out or abetting any act of violence for political or ideological aims.

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#### (6) 北方領土（南部クリル諸島）とクリミア

ア オランダ外務省「[出身国情報報告 - ロシア](#)」（2021 年 4 月）

##### 1.3 Constitutional amendments

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Furthermore, the amendments introduce a number of abstract values in the hitherto purely legal constitution:

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- It is not permitted to discuss changes to Russian territory – for example the return of annexed areas such as the Kuril Islands (Japan) or the Crimea (Ukraine).

#### 4. ジェンダー、DV および子ども

ア HRW「[ワールドレポート 2021 - ロシア](#)」（2021 年 1 月 13 日）

##### Gender-Based Violence

Serious gaps continued in the official response to widespread domestic violence, including lack of sufficient protection and recourse for survivors.

The draft law on domestic violence, introduced in November 2019, fell short of providing a comprehensive definition of domestic violence. It also failed to address several issues crucial to ensuring effective protection for survivors. In early 2020, parliament deprioritized the draft law’s review, and it remained pending.

Several politicians and experts advocating for a robust domestic violence law reported threats against them and their families, including by those claiming to promote “traditional” or “family” values.

...

#### 5. LGBT

ア 英国内務省「[国別政策及び情報ノート ロシア：性的指向とジェンダー・アイデンティティ、1.0 版](#)」（2020 年 11 月）

イ IRBC「[クエリー回答 \[RUS106279.E\] : Russia: Situation and treatment of sexual and gender minorities; legislation, state protection and support services \(2017-February 2020\)](#)」（2020 年 2 月 27 日）

**1. Legislation**

Sources indicate that homosexuality was decriminalized in Russia in 1993 (BBC 28 Oct. 2013; Sociologist 1 June 2019; WSJ 11 June 2013).…

Sources indicate that in June 2013, a bill banning the promotion of "non[-]traditional" sexual relations was passed (AP 30 June 2013; RIA Novosti 11 June 2013; WSJ 11 June 2013), and signed into law (Russia 30 June 2013). According to ILGA's State-Sponsored Homophobia 2019 report, "Federal Law No 135-FZ [2013] which prohibits the promotion of non-traditional sexual relations among minors has been used to prosecute a range of people since it was enacted, including activists, websites and the media" (ILGA Mar. 2019a, 211). The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 states that, in 2018, authorities invoked the 2013 law "prohibiting the 'propaganda' of 'non[-]traditional sexual relations' to minors to punish the exercise of free speech by LGBTI persons and their supporters," and that "what the government considered LGBTI propaganda included materials that 'directly or indirectly approve of persons who are in non[-]traditional sexual relationships'" (US 13 Mar. 2019, 18, 50). The same source also notes that

[d]espite a Supreme Court ruling that LGBTI persons should be allowed to engage in public activities, the law prohibiting 'propaganda' of homosexuality to minors ... provides grounds to deny LGBTI activists and supporters the right of assembly and was often used to interrupt public demonstrations by LGBTI activists. (US 13 Mar. 2019, 29)

…

ウ [HRW「ワールドレポート 2021 - ロシア」](#) (2021年1月13日)

**Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity**

The government continued its trajectory of homophobic discrimination and used the “gay propaganda” ban to justify a criminal prosecution.

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) activist Yulia Tsvetkova faced six years in prison on pornography charges for posting body-positive drawings of nude women on social media. In December 2019, a court fined Tsvetkova 50,000 rubles (US\$665) for violating the “gay propaganda” law over LGBT-friendly and feminist posts in two social media groups which she administered.

エ [記事「ロシアのLGBT活動家らがサンクトペテルブルクの集会で拘束される」](#)  
BBC (2018年8月4日)

6. 汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護

## (1) 国家保護

ア EASO [「COI レポート - ロシア : 国家保護の主体」](#) (2017 年 3 月)**2.1.11 Police corruption**

The United States Department of State (US DoS) describes corruption as widespread in all branches and at all levels of the Russian government ( 186). Taylor argues that the corruption is so systematic that no one within the structures has any interest combating it – corruption goes upwards and downwards within the hierarchy ( 187). Serguei Cheloukhine et al. place their analysis of police integrity in the context of their wider assessment that ‘the phenomenon of corruption in Russia has penetrated political, economic, judicial, and social systems so thoroughly that it has ceased to be a deviation from the norm and has become the norm itself’ ( 188).

This is also reflected in the public perception of the police. Citizens view the police as one of the most corrupted state institutions ( 189). According to a poll conducted by Levada-Center in 2014, 39 % of respondents among the Russian population consider police employees to be ‘most corrupt’, 38 % that they are ‘averagely corrupt’, and 9 % that they are ‘least corrupt’ ( 190).

...

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...

イ 米国国務省 [「人権状況報告 2020 年 ロシア」](#) (2021 年 3 月 30 日)

The government failed to take adequate steps to identify, investigate, prosecute, or punish most officials who committed abuses, resulting in a climate of impunity.

## (2) テロ組織

ア CIA [「ワールドファクトブック - ロシア」](#) (2021 年 8 月 26 日閲覧)**Terrorist group(s)**

Aum Shimrikyo (AUM/Aleph); Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Caucasus Province

note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T

## 7. 兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の）

ア CIA「[ワールドファクトブック - ロシア](#)」（2021年8月26日閲覧）**Military service age and obligation**

18-27 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service; males are registered for the draft at 17 years of age; one-year service obligation (Russia offers the option of serving on a two-year contract instead of completing a one-year conscription period); reserve obligation for non-officers to age 50; enrollment in military schools from the age of 16, cadets classified as members of the armed forces (2019)

note: in April of 2019, the Russian government pledged its intent to end conscription

イ IRBC「[クエリー回答 \[RUS105142.E\] : Russia: Military service, including amendments to military service; whether women are treated differently than men; whether holders of military books are treated differently than conscripted persons; consequences of draft evasion and availability of an appeal process \(2006-April 2015\)](#)」（2015年4月23日）

**1. Amendments to Military Service**

According to an article published on 22 May 2013 by EUDO Citizenship, an "observatory within the European Union Observatory on Democracy (EUDO) web platform hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence," on 15 May 2013, an amendment to Article 23 of the 1998 Federal Law No. 53 on Military Obligation and Military Service passed through second reading in Parliament (EUDO Citizenship 22 May 2013). The amendment, which was "set to be adopted into law" and enter into force on 1 August 2013, makes it mandatory for all 18 to 27 year old Russian citizens, including dual citizens residing in Russia, to serve in Russia's military forces even if they have already performed mandatory military service in another country's army (ibid.)...

...

**2. Alternative Civilian Service**

According to RT, "ideological or religious pacifists can take alternative civilian service, but that term is twice as long as regular military service" (27 Mar. 2015). According to a report on conscientious objection in Russia from 2002-2012 by Citizen Army Law, a human rights group for conscripts, military and alternative servicemen in Russia (Citizen Army Law n.d., 1), the length of alternative civilian service is 21 months, compared to a length of 12 months for regular military service (ibid., 2).

...

**3. Consequences of Draft Evasion**

Sources report that evading the military draft is considered a criminal offence, punishable

by up to two years in prison (ibid.; RT 27 Mar. 2015). According to Major General Alexander Nikitin, a department head at the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office in Russia, as cited in the October 2013 Moscow Times article, in the spring [of 2013], "more than 15,000 conscripts were convicted of administrative offences related to evading the draft, and an average yearly number of such offenders amounts to about 30,000 people" (The Moscow Times 1 Oct. 2013). In the Moscow Times 2013 article, Nikitin was quoted as stating that about 1,000 conscripts per year are convicted of this offence in Russia (1 Oct. 2013). According to the lawyer from Citizen Army Law,

[t]here are administrative and criminal penalties for draft evasion. The kind of penalty depends on the moment when the evasion took place: if this is evasion from medical examination, for example, the evader will be fined with approx. 10 EUR. [approx. \$C13]; if there is evasion from coming to the assembly point for sending to the army, there may be criminal responsibility, including imprisonment. (21 Apr. 2015)

...

## 8. 司法制度・刑事手続

ア 米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2020 年 ロシア](#)」(2021 年 3 月 30 日)

### **d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention**

While the law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, authorities engaged in these practices with impunity. The law provides for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention, but successful challenges were rare.

#### **Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees**

By law authorities may arrest and hold a suspect for up to 48 hours without court approval, provided there is evidence of a crime or a witness; otherwise, an arrest warrant is required. The law requires judicial approval of arrest warrants, searches, seizures, and detentions. Officials generally honored this requirement, although bribery or political pressure sometimes subverted the process of obtaining judicial warrants. After an arrest, police typically took detainees to the nearest police station, where they informed them of their rights. Police must prepare a protocol stating the grounds for the arrest, and both the detainee and police officer must sign it within three hours of detention. Police must interrogate detainees within the first 24 hours of detention. Prior to interrogation, a detainee has the right to meet with an attorney for two hours. No later than 12 hours after detention, police must notify the prosecutor. They must also give the detainee an opportunity to notify his or her relatives by telephone unless a prosecutor issues a warrant to keep the detention secret. Police are required to release a detainee after 48 hours, subject to bail conditions, unless a court decides, at a hearing, to prolong custody in response to a motion filed by police not less than eight hours before the 48-hour detention period expires. The defendant and his or her attorney must be present at the court hearing, either in person or through a

video link.

...

#### **e. Denial of Fair Public Trial**

The law provides for an independent judiciary, but judges remained subject to influence from the executive branch, the armed forces, and other security forces, particularly in high-profile or politically sensitive cases, as well as to corruption. The outcomes of some trials appeared predetermined. Acquittal rates remained extremely low. In 2019 courts acquitted 0.36 percent of all defendants.

...

#### **Trial Procedures**

The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial, but executive interference with the judiciary and judicial corruption undermined this right.

The defendant has a legal presumption of innocence and the right to a fair, timely, and public trial, but these rights were not always respected. Defendants have the right to be informed promptly of charges and to be present at the trial. The law provides for the appointment of an attorney free of charge if a defendant cannot afford one, although the high cost of legal service meant that lower-income defendants often lacked competent representation. A Yekaterinburg-based legal and human rights NGO indicated many defense attorneys do not vigorously defend their clients and that there were few qualified defense attorneys in remote areas of the country. Defense attorneys may visit their clients in detention, although defense lawyers claimed authorities electronically monitored their conversations and did not always provide them access to their clients. Prior to trial, defendants receive a copy of their indictment, which describes the charges against them in detail. They also may review their file following the completion of the criminal investigation.

...

イ オランダ外務省「[出身国情報報告 - ロシア](#)」(2021 年 4 月)

#### **4.5 Legal process**

...

#### **4.6 Corruption in the legal system**

...

### **9. 警察・治安部隊（刑務所等の状況含む）**

ア オランダ外務省「[出身国情報報告 - ロシア](#)」(2021 年 4 月)

#### 4.7 Arrests and detention

...

According to NGOs, arrests were made arbitrarily during demonstrations on a large scale and with the use of force. ...

Living conditions in prisons and detention centres vary considerably from region to region and by type of detention facility. Detainees in prisons faced ill-treatment and humiliation by guards (see section 4.8) and fellow inmates, food shortages, inadequate sanitation, lack of medical staff and, as a result, poor medical care in the event of serious health problems. They also face overcrowded cells, especially in detention facilities for suspects who were remanded in custody.<sup>191</sup> Forced psychiatric treatment as punishment was common during the reporting period and the medical staff in prison hospitals do not always provide independent medical advice due to their close ties with prison guards.<sup>192</sup>

...

#### 4.8 Ill-treatment and torture

...

According to HRW, the risk of torture or ill-treatment is greatest during pre-trial detention.<sup>210</sup> A confidential source says that the risk of torture varies according to the facility and the type of detention. During custody, there is reportedly a risk of torture as investigators attempt to extract confessions. On the other hand, there was reportedly a risk of assault by prison staff after a conviction, in part to enforce payment of bribes in exchange for better living conditions.<sup>211</sup> Abuse during interrogations by the FSB almost always went unpunished in Russia. The first time an FSB agent was convicted of torturing a suspect was in September 2019.<sup>212</sup>

For perpetrators of torture and other ill-treatment in detention centres – after the detainee's conviction, therefore – there was almost complete impunity, according to Amnesty International.<sup>213</sup> In a high-security penal camp in Angarsk, Irkutsk, guards brutally suppressed a mass protest by inmates against their treatment in April 2020

According to the detainees, they face daily abuse and humiliation by the guards, and even enforced disappearances. NGOs, lawyers, human rights defenders and the Public Oversight Committee (see below) pushed for an investigation, the results of which are not yet known.<sup>214</sup> Also in Yaroslavl, where there was a widespread public outcry after video evidence of prisoner abuse by guards was made public in 2018, abuse in prisons was found to be a persistent problem. While eleven guards of the prison in question were sentenced in part to detention for torturing detainees<sup>215</sup>, the NGO Public Verdict released another video showing continued abuse in the same prison in Yaroslavl and again reported systematic abuse in another prison in the same region in December 2019.<sup>216</sup>

...

イ 米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2020 年 ロシア](#)」(2021 年 3 月 30 日)**a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings**

...

There were multiple reports that, in some prison colonies, authorities systematically tortured inmates (see section 1.c.), in some cases resulting in death or suicide. According to media reports, on April 10, prisoners in Penal Colony Number 15 (IK-15) in Angarsk rioted after a prison employee beat one of the inmates, leading him to make a video about his ordeal and slash his veins in a failed suicide attempt. Afterwards, 17 other inmates slashed their veins as well, then set fire to parts of the penal colony. The Federal Penitentiary Service sent in approximately 300 special force officers, who beat the inmates, doused them with water, and set dogs on them. Human rights activists reported that two inmates were killed during the clashes and called for an investigation. ...

**c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment**

...

There were reports of authorities detaining defendants for psychiatric evaluations to exert pressure on them or sending defendants for psychiatric treatment as punishment. Prosecutors and certified medical professionals may request suspects be placed in psychiatric clinics on an involuntary basis. For example, on May 12, approximately two dozen riot police stormed the home of Aleksandr Gabyshev, a Siberian shaman who announced in 2019 that he and his supporters planned to walk from Yakutsk to Moscow to “expel” Vladimir Putin from the Kremlin. Police detained Gabyshev and forcibly hospitalized him for psychiatric treatment. On May 29, Gabyshev filed a claim refusing further hospitalization, after which the clinic’s medical commission deemed him a danger to himself and others and filed a lawsuit to extend his detention there. The clinic released Gabyshev on July 22.

...

**Prison and Detention Center Conditions**

Conditions in prisons and detention centers varied but were often harsh and life threatening. Overcrowding, abuse by guards and inmates, limited access to health care, food shortages, and inadequate sanitation were common in prisons, penal colonies, and other detention facilities.

...

There were reports political prisoners were placed in particularly harsh conditions and subjected to punitive treatment within the prison system, such as solitary confinement or punitive stays in psychiatric units. For example, on May 21, a court ordered the forced

psychiatric treatment of Kamchatka opposition activist Vladimir Shumanin during a criminal prosecution for libel stemming from a 2018 article in which he accused a law enforcement officer of engaging in criminal behavior. In the Far East region, Shumanin was known for running a personal YouTube channel in which he sharply criticized regional and federal authorities.

...

## 10. 報道の自由

ア 米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2020 年 ロシア](#)」(2021 年 3 月 30 日)

### a. Freedom of Expression, Including for the Press

While the constitution provides for freedom of expression, including for the press, the government increasingly restricted this right. Regional and local authorities used procedural violations and restrictive or vague legislation to detain, harass, or prosecute persons who criticized the government or institutions it favored. The government exercised editorial control over media, creating a media landscape in which most citizens were exposed to predominantly government-approved narratives. Significant government pressure on independent media constrained coverage of numerous topics, especially of Belarus, LGBTI persons, the environment, elections, COVID-19, criticism of local or federal leadership, as well as secessionism or federalism. The government used direct ownership or ownership by large private companies with government links to control or influence major national media and regional media outlets, especially television. Censorship and self-censorship in television and print media and on the internet was widespread, particularly regarding points of view critical of the government or its policies. The government's failure to investigate or prosecute attacks on human rights defenders and peaceful protesters further stifled freedom of assembly and association.

Freedom of Speech: Authorities continued to misuse the country's expansive definition of extremism, under which citizens may be punished for certain types of peaceful protests, affiliation with certain religious denominations, and even certain social media posts, as a tool to stifle dissent. As of August the Ministry of Justice had expanded its list of extremist materials to include 5,080 books, videos, websites, social media pages, musical compositions, and other items, an increase of approximately 80 items from 2019. According to the prosecutor general, authorities prosecuted 585 extremism cases in 2019, the majority of which included charges of "extremism" levied against individuals for exercising free speech on social media and elsewhere.

...

イ HRW「[ワールドレポート 2021 - ロシア](#)」(2021 年 1 月 13 日)

### Freedom of Expression

In several cases, authorities resorted to wrongful prosecutions against journalists on terrorism and treason-related charges and other tactics aimed at interfering with their journalistic work.

In July, journalist Svetlana Prokopyeva was sentenced to a hefty fine on bogus terrorism charges for arguing that Russia’s repressive policies on speech and assembly radicalized youth. Due to the verdict, she remains on the government’s list of “terrorists and extremists” and is barred from foreign travel.

...

Dozens of journalists were detained while covering peaceful protests in Moscow and other cities, even when they wore press badges and other identification.

...

By March 2020, 12 months after a law banning “disrespect to authorities” was adopted, an independent group found that the overwhelming majority of such charges involved alleged insults against Putin.

#### ウ [欧州評議会「報道の自由を手放す：欧州での報道機関への攻撃を新たな当たり前のことにしてはならない」](#) ecoi (2020 年 4 月)

Independent journalists and bloggers continued to be harassed and intimidated in Russian Federation in 2019, through prosecutions, physical attacks or threats. Other chilling effects on media freedom included attempts to limit access to information both online and offline, and the introduction of several restrictive laws.

...

In March, President Putin signed into law two bills criminalising “insult” of the state and the dissemination of “fake news“. In August, Mikhail Romanov, a correspondent with the weekly Yakutsk Vecherniy, was found guilty of “abuse of freedom of information by publishing fake news that poses a threat to the public” and fined 30,000 rubles (approximately €408.15). His fine was cancelled on appeal in December 2019, over “lack of sufficient evidence”.<sup>125</sup>

#### エ AI [「Russia: Kremlin designates Dozhd TV “foreign agent” in yet another attack on press freedom」](#) ecoi (2021 年 8 月 21 日)

The Russian Ministry of Justice added Dozhd (TV Rain) television, Vazhnye Istorii news website (based in Latvia), and seven journalists, including Vazhnye Istorii’s editor-in-chief Roman Anin, to the list of “foreign agents.” This move will obligate these media outlets and journalists to identify themselves as “foreign agents” in their publications, including on social media, and to submit to invasive audits.

## 11. 宗教の自由

### (1) 総論

ア [HRW「ワールドレポート 2021 - ロシア」](#) (2021 年 1 月 13 日)

#### Counterterrorism

...

Authorities continued to prosecute people over affiliation with religious groups designated extremist under Russia's overly broad counter-extremism law.

In 2020, courts handed guilty verdicts to dozens of people for their religious activity as Jehovah's Witnesses, banned as extremist in Russia. At least 10 people are currently serving prison terms of up to six years, while 417 remain under criminal investigation, and 35 are in pre-trial detention. These figures include people arrested in Russia-occupied Crimea.

Authorities arrested at least four people for supposed affiliation with Nurdzhular, a group of followers of the late Turkish theologian Said Nursi, banned as extremist in 2008, even though it has no history of incitement or violence. Experts repeatedly questioned the existence of such an organization in Russia and stated that the works of Said Nursi do not contain any extremist views. At least seven Nursi followers remain on Russia's "List of Terrorists and Extremists," their assets frozen, and travel restricted.

Yevgeniy Kim, stripped of his Russian citizenship in 2019 following his prison sentence on charges of alleged involvement with Nurdzhular, remained in deportation custody. Authorities stripped two Jehovah's Witnesses currently serving sentences on extremism charges of their citizenship in 2020. All three are now stateless.

イ 記事「[Post-sentence: Curfews, regular registration, movement restrictions, job bans](#)」RSF via eoi (2021 年 8 月 24 日)

Jehovah's Witnesses and Muslims jailed on "extremism"-related charges for exercising freedom of religion or belief face years of restrictions once the sentence ends. With sudimost (the state of being a convicted person with an active criminal record), they risk harsher punishment if prosecuted again. Courts can impose post-sentence restrictions on freedom and administrative supervision, entailing curfews, movement restrictions, and regular registration with police or probation authorities. Individuals are barred from certain jobs. Many have bank accounts blocked for years. Jehovah's Witnesses have also been banned from leading or participating in religious organisations. Those fined or given suspended sentences face shorter restrictions.

...

## (2) エホバの証人

ア 英国内務省 [「国別政策及び情報ノート ロシア：エホバの証人、1.0 版」](#) (2021 年 4 月)

イ (事例) [フィンランド行政最高裁判所判決 \[KHO:2020:94\] \(概要のみ\)](#) refworld (2020 年 9 月 10 日)

ロシア出身のエホバの証人の信者について、宗教の自由に対する重大な干渉は迫害に相当するとし、事件を一次手続に差し戻した判決

## 12. 国籍、民族および人種

## (1) 国籍

ア オランダ外務省 [「出身国情報報告 - ロシア」](#) (2021 年 4 月)

**2.3 Russian citizenship**

In the Russian language, a distinction is made between natsionalnost (ethnic origin) on the one hand and grazhdanstvo (citizenship) on the other to indicate the legal relationship between a person and the state. To avoid confusion between the Russian term natsionalnost and the English term ‘nationality’, the term ‘citizenship’ will be used in this report.

Russian citizenship can be obtained by birth to Russian parents, after admission to Russian territory, by reacquisition after previous loss and on other grounds based on Russian law, including the powers of the president, or an international treaty. An explanation of the different ways of acquisition and loss is included below.

...

## (2) 人種差別・ヘイトクライム

ア HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - ロシア」](#) (2021 年 1 月 13 日)

**Nondiscrimination, National Minorities, Xenophobia**

The Black Lives Matter protests in the US following the murder of George Floyd sparked debate in the Russian press and social media about racism and discrimination in the country. A biracial Russian vlogger who discussed racism and racist violence in Russia faced threats and online bullying. Authorities responded by cautioning her against “spreading extremist materials.”

According to a watchdog organization, the first eight months of 2020 saw at least 23 hate crimes, with one fatality, and at least 17 episodes of hate-motivated vandalism.

Migrants continued to encounter racial profiling, mass arbitrary detentions, police brutality, and xenophobia. Some Russian officials falsely claimed that crime by migrants had risen in the wake of the economic downturn caused by the pandemic. Authorities used

this as a pretext to propose a mandatory, intrusive tracking app for migrants and tying migrant workers' visas to their employers.

### 13. 出入国および移動の自由

#### (1) 国外で庇護を求めた者

ア オランダ外務省「[出身国情報報告 - ロシア](#)」(2021年4月)

##### 11 Russians returning to Russia

There is a shortage of information about possible problems with the Russian authorities of migrants after their return to Russia. There is also no information available about problems that migrants face when they return as part of the Return and Readmission Agreement. It is therefore not known whether there are special groups that run a greater risk of problems on their return.<sup>638</sup>

There is no information available about whether the submission of an asylum application in the Netherlands on returning to Russia is known to the Russian authorities, and whether this asylum application itself has consequences for the person concerned.

#### (2) 不法出国をした者

ア オランダ外務省「[出身国情報報告 - ロシア](#)」(2021年4月)

##### 11 Russians returning to Russia

...

Illegal border crossings – for example in violation of an exit ban or with false documents – is stipulated as an administrative offence in Chapter 18 of the Russian Administrative Offences Act, and additionally as a criminal offence in Article 322 of the Russian Criminal Code. People who return to Russia after exiting the country illegally can therefore be prosecuted under administrative law<sup>639</sup> or criminal law<sup>640</sup>. However, according to a confidential source the grounds<sup>641</sup> on which an overrun exit ban was imposed would determine the type of treatment upon the person's return. For example, illegal travellers who had an exit ban due to debts would be prosecuted on their return on the basis of administrative laws because their exit causes less social damage<sup>642</sup> to Russia; illegal travellers whose departure could have greater social consequences despite an exit ban could indeed be prosecuted. This would be the case, for example, for people with access to state secrets. However, according to the source, prosecution for other crimes, namely for leaking state secrets in this case, is more likely than prosecution for illegal exit under Article 322.<sup>643</sup> It is not known whether and how many people who have left the country illegally are actually placed in detention after their return.

...

Returnees who are on a joint list of member states of the Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation (SCO)<sup>647</sup> as suspects of extremism, separatism or terrorism are virtually assured of arrest upon their return. An expert for the Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) cites human rights organisations saying that the Member States are using these lists to deport each other's political refugees. The number of organisations and individuals on this list grew significantly between 2006 and 2016<sup>648</sup> and, according to this expert, is used by courts in Member States to evict people who are being persecuted for political reasons, despite the principle of non-refoulement.<sup>649</sup>

Returnees from certain areas also have an increased risk of arrest on suspicion of extremism or terrorism....

### (3) チェチェン出身者の帰国

ア オランダ外務省「[出身国情報報告 - ロシア](#)」(2021 年 4 月)

#### 11 Russians returning to Russia

...

For returnees from Chechnya, one source says that if their return is known to the Russian authorities, the Chechen authorities will also be informed and await them upon return, with an immediate forced return to Chechnya.<sup>644</sup> Amnesty International says they are aware of several cases of returning Chechen asylum seekers who have disappeared after their return.<sup>645</sup> Chechen asylum seekers and political refugees are summoned by Kadyrov to return to Chechnya. According to two researchers, Kadyrov is attempting to increase his control over the Chechen diaspora; see sections 5.6.11 (LGBTI in Chechnya) and 5.5.4 (activists in the Northern Caucasus).<sup>646</sup>

...

Returnees from certain areas also have an increased risk of arrest on suspicion of extremism or terrorism. For example, Chechen women returning from Syria are often subject to criminal prosecution, although cases of pardons by President Kadyrov have also been reported.<sup>650</sup>

## 14. その他

### (1) HIV／エイズ患者

ア ACCORD「[クエリー回答 \[a-10589-3 \(10591\)\] : Anfragebeantwortung zur Russischen Föderation: Lage von Personen mit HIV](#)」(2018 年 5 月 30 日)

### (2) 障がい者

ア 米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2020 年 ロシア](#)」(2021 年 3 月 30 日)

**Persons with Disabilities**

The law provides protection for persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental disabilities, including access to education, employment, health services, information, communications, buildings, transportation, the judicial system, and other state services. The government often did not enforce these provisions effectively.

...

In many cases persons with intellectual or physical disabilities were confined to institutions, where they were often subjected to abuse and neglect. Roszdravnadzor, the Federal Service for Surveillance in Health Care, announced that it found abuses in 87.4 percent of institutions for children and adults with intellectual disabilities during a 2019 audit. On November 3, Russian media reported that it was not uncommon for persons with intellectual disabilities who had recently turned 18 to die within a few months of transferring from a children's institution to an adult neuropsychiatric boarding house due to harsh conditions. The report noted that residents were sometimes given haloperidol and other suppressive substances, sent to isolation wards, tied to beds, and prohibited from going outside freely. On May 6, media outlets reported that a Bogotolsk neuropsychiatric hospital's junior nurse physically abused an elderly person with a disability by grabbing him and dragging him on the floor without his pants on.

...

## 略称

ACCORD	オーストリア出身国・庇護研究ドキュメンテーションセンター
ACLED	武力紛争位置・事件データプロジェクト
AI	アムネスティ・インターナショナル
ARC	難民調査センター
BAMF	ドイツ連邦移民難民庁
CGRS	ベルギー難民及び無国籍者庁
CIA	米国中央情報局
CNDA	フランス庇護権裁判所
CRS	米国議会調査局
DFAT	オーストラリア外務貿易省
DIS	デンマーク移民庁
DRC	デンマーク・レフュジー・カウンセル
EASO	欧州難民支援局
FIS	フィンランド移民庁
HRW	ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ
ICG	インターナショナル・クライシス・グループ
IDMC	国内避難民監視センター
IRBC	カナダ移民難民局
IRDC	アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター
ジェトロ	日本貿易振興機構
Landinfo	ノルウェー政府出身国情報センター
MIRGI	マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル
OECD	経済協力開発機構
OFPRA	フランス難民・無国籍庇護局
OHCHR	国連人権高等弁務官事務所
OSAC	米国海外安全保障評議会
RRTA	オーストラリア難民再審査審判所
RSAA	ニュージーランド難民地位不服申立機関
RSF	国境なき記者団
UKIAT	イギリス移民難民審判所
UNHCR	国連難民高等弁務官事務所
USCIRF	米国連邦政府国際宗教自由に関する委員会