

チュニジア

2021年7月8日ドラフト作成

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1 一般情報

(1) 地理・人口等

ア 外務省「チュニジア基礎データ」(2021年6月30日)

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|-----|----|-----------------------------------------------|
| 1 | 面積 | 16万3,610平方キロメートル（日本の約5分の2） |
| 2 | 人口 | 1,169万人（2019年，世銀） |
| ... | | |
| 4 | 民族 | アラブ人（98%），その他（2%） |
| 5 | 言語 | アラビア語（公用語），フランス語（国民の間で広く用いられている） |
| 6 | 宗教 | イスラム教スンニ派（ごく少数だがユダヤ教，イスラム教シーア派，キリスト教も信仰されている） |

(2) 内政

ア 外務省「チュニジア基礎データ」(2021年6月30日)

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| <p>(1) 仏からの独立以来就任していたブルギバ大統領に続き，1987年以降，ベン・アリ大統領は近代化・西欧化を推進。その一方で，社会主義運動及びイスラム過激主義運動を弾圧して政治的安定を維持してきた。これにより経済は安定成長を遂げたが，政治的自由や複数政党制の導入等の民主化が課題となった。</p> <p>(2) 2010年12月にチュニジア中南部で発生した貧困・雇用対策を求める大規模抗議デモを機に，国内各地で反政府デモが発生。住民と治安部隊の間で衝突も頻発。2011年1月14日，反政府デモ・暴動が急速に拡大・深刻化し，23年間国家元首の座にあったベン・アリ大統領は国外に亡命。憲法規定に従い，ムバッザア代議院議長が暫定大統領に就任した（「自由と尊厳の革命」）。</p> <p>(3) 2011年10月，新憲法制定のための議会（制憲国民議会）議員を選出する選挙が実施された。同選挙はチュニジア史上初の自由選挙であり，我が国の選挙監視団を含む多数の国際選挙監視団が派遣された。選挙の結果，議会に多数議席を獲得した穏健イスラム主義政党「エンナハダ」，中道政党「共和国のための会議（CPR）」，左派政党「エタカトル（FDTL）」の間で，大統領・首相・議長ポストに関する3党合意が結ばれ，FDTLのベン・ジャアファル党首が議長に，CPRのマルズーキ党首が大統領に選出された。その後，マルズーキ大統領はエンナハダのジェバリ幹事長を次期首相候補に任命し，12月にジェバリ氏を首相とする新内閣が議会で承認された。</p> <p>(4) 2013年2月，野党「民主愛国主義者運動」のベライード党首暗殺事件が発生。同事件を受け，ジェバリ首相は国家を政治的危機から救うべくテクノクラート（実務者）内閣の形成を提案したが，同提案は首相の出身政党であるエンナハダ</p> |
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から反対を受け失敗に終わり、同首相は辞表を提出。同月末、エンナハダはラアレイエド内務大臣を次期首相として選出し、翌3月に内務・外務・司法・国防の主要4閣僚等にテクノクラートを配したラアレイエド内閣が議会で承認された。

(5) 2013年7月、野党「人民運動」のブラヒミ制憲国民議会議員の暗殺事件が発生したことを受け、政府・議会の解散支持派と反対派の対立による抗議活動が各地に広まった。また、議会内でも与野党の対立が深まり、議会は一時麻痺状態に陥った。硬直した政治状況を打開するため、チュニジア労働総連盟 (UGTT)、工業・手工業連合会 (UTICA)、人権擁護連盟 (LTDH)、全国弁護士協会 (ONAT) の国内主要4団体 (注: これら4団体は「チュニジア・ナショナル・ダイアログ・カルテット」と総称され、2015年にノーベル平和賞を受賞した。) が与野党間協議の仲介役となり、テクノクラート内閣の組閣や憲法制定、独立高等選挙機構 (選挙管理委員会) 設置等の主要政治日程を定めたロードマップを提示した。その結果、11月、主要21政党がロードマップに署名し、国民対話会議 (与野党間協議) が開始され、12月にジョマア産業大臣 (当時) が次期首相に選出された。

(6) 2014年1月、制憲国民議会において新憲法が賛成多数で可決され、同年2月に施行された。また、同月、ジョマア首相率いるテクノクラートによる新内閣が誕生した。

(7) 2014年10月、新憲法下で初となる議会選挙が実施され、2012年に結党された「ニダー・トゥーネス (チュニジアの呼びかけ)」が217議席中85議席を獲得し第一党に、2011年の制憲国民議会選挙では第一党であったエンナハダは69議席を獲得し第二党となった。

(8) 2014年11月から12月にかけて革命後初の直接大統領選挙が実施された。マルズーキ候補 (現職大統領) とニダー・トゥーネス党首のエセブシ候補 (元首相) の決選投票の結果、エセブシ候補が大統領に就任。2015年2月、元内務相のエシード氏首相率いるニダー・トゥーネス、エンナハダ、自由愛国連盟 (UPL)、アフエック・トゥーネス等からなる連立内閣が成立し、革命後初の本格政権が発足した。2016年6月、エセブシ大統領が「国民統一政府」構想を発表、各政党及び国内主要団体 (UGTT, UTICA 等) による協議を経て、同年8月、シェーヘッド地方問題担当大臣 (当時) が率いる新内閣が発足した。

(9) 2019年9月～10月に大統領選挙及び国民代表議会選挙を実施。カイス・サイード氏が大統領に就任。2020年2月、ファフファーフ首相率いる新内閣が発足した。

(10) チュニジアは独立以来一貫して初等教育の普及と高等・専門教育の充実に力を入れている (義務教育対象年齢は6歳から16歳までの9年間)。また、女性の権利保障と社会進出を重視した法整備も進められてきた。特に、1956年個人地位法により一夫多妻制の禁止や夫の一方的決定による離婚の禁止等が保障されており、家族計画の普及にも積極的である。2017年7月には、女性に対する

暴力を防止、処罰するための新法が制定され、同年 8 月にはエセブシ大統領が、相続における両性の平等実現とチュニジア人女性と非ムスリムの結婚手続きの簡素化に向けた議論の開始を提言した。

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イ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - チュニジア」](#) (2021 年 1 月 13 日)

President Kais Saied, elected in 2019, renewed on May 30 a state of emergency that the government imposed following a 2015 attack in the capital Tunis that killed 12 members of the presidential guard.

ウ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - チュニジア」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

A state of emergency remained in effect throughout the year, renewed by President Essebsi and then by interim President Mohamed Ennaceur.

2 人権状況

(1) 人権状況全般

ア 外務省 [「チュニジア基礎データ」](#) (2021 年 6 月 30 日)

(11) ベン・アリ政権下では、言論・報道の自由、情報アクセス権の制限、政府による検閲等、政府による人権の抑圧が指摘されていたが、革命後の新政権はこれらの自由・権利を認めた。その結果、多くの報道機関が生まれ、NGO 等の市民活動が活発になったが、他方で労働争議や暴力的な抗議活動、また、サラフィストと呼ばれる保守的なイスラム主義者による暴力行為が頻発した。特に南部・内陸部を中心に、雇用・開発を要求する若者による座り込みなどの抗議運動が 2017 年現在も継続しており、経済活動に打撃を与えている。

イ 外務省海外安全ホームページ [「チュニジアの危険情報【危険レベルの継続】\(内容の更新\)」](#) (2021 年 6 月 17 日)

1 概況

(1) 2015 年から 2016 年にかけて、チュニジア国内では大規模なテロ事件が連続して発生しました。2015 年 3 月には、首都チュニスのバルドー国立博物館における襲撃テロ事件により、日本人 3 人を含む 22 人が死亡しています。

(2) このような状況を踏まえ、チュニジア治安当局は大幅に警備強化を図り、また、日本を含む主要先進国などから治安分野で多くの人的・物的支援を受けました。その結果、治安当局のテロ対処能力は大幅に向上し、現在、チュニジアの治安情勢はおおむね落ち着きを見せています。

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(5) チュニジア国内の治安状況は改善しているものの、「イラク・レバントのイスラム国」(ISIL)等のイスラム過激派組織又はこれらの主張に影響を受けているとみられる者によるテロが世界各地で発生しており、とりわけ過去に観光客を標的としたテロ事件が連続して発生しているチュニジアにおいては、再び日本人がテロを含む様々な事件に巻き込まれる可能性がないとは言い切れません。チュニジアからは多数の戦闘員がISILに参加していたことから、イラク、シリアでのISILの退潮に伴う、これら戦闘員の動向にも注意が必要です。

ウ ●米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2020年 - チュニジア](#)」(2021年3月30日)

概要

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Significant human rights issues included: reports of unlawful or arbitrary killings, primarily by terrorist groups; allegations of torture by government agents; arbitrary arrests and detentions of suspects under antiterrorism or emergency laws; undue restrictions on freedom of expression and the press, including criminalization of libel; widespread corruption, although the government took steps to combat it; societal violence and threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons; criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual conduct that resulted in arrests and abuse by security forces; and the worst forms of child labor.

The government took steps to investigate officials who allegedly committed abuses, but investigations into police, security force, and detention center abuses lacked transparency and frequently encountered long delays and procedural obstacles.

エ ●OSAC「[Tunisia 2019 Crime & Safety Report](#)」(2019年4月29日)

Local, Regional, and International Terrorism Threats/Concerns


There is considerable risk from terrorism in Tunis. A state of emergency put in place after a November 2015 terrorist attack in Tunis continues; the government reinstates it monthly, with an unknown expiration date.

(2) 国境地帯の状況

ア 外務省海外安全ホームページ「[チュニジアの危険情報【危険レベルの継続】\(内容の更新\)](#)」(2021年6月17日)

●アルジェリア及びリビアとの国境地帯を含む南部砂漠地帯の一部は、テロリストが頻繁に往来する地域とされ、軍事緩衝地帯に設定されています。不測の事態に巻き込まれるおそれがありますので、同地域への渡航は止めてください。

- カスリン県のシャアンビ山周辺はテロ組織が潜伏・活動している主要拠点とみられており、地元住民がテロ組織により埋設された地雷で死傷する事件等が発生しています。同地域への渡航は止めてください。
- ジャンドゥーバ県（タバルカに至る幹線道路（国道7号線）以北を除く）、ケフ県、シディブ・ジッド県、ガフサ県、トズール県（アルジェリア国境付近に限る）及び南部砂漠地帯の一部には、テロリストが潜伏している可能性があります。同地域への不要不急の渡航は止めてください。



1 概況

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(3) 一方で、西部山岳地帯では、現在も治安部隊によるテロ掃討作戦が実施されています。また、アルジェリア及びリビアとの国境地帯を含む南部砂漠地帯の一部においては、政情不安定なりビア等からテロリストが侵入する可能性があるため、引き続き注意が必要です。

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2 地域別情勢

(1) アルジェリア及びリビアとの国境地帯を含む南部砂漠地帯の一部及びカスリン県

レベル3: 渡航は止めてください。(渡航中止勧告) (継続)

ア アルジェリア及びリビアとの国境地帯を含む南部砂漠地帯の一部

2013年8月、マルブーキ大統領(当時)は、密輸武器の流入阻止等のテロ対策のため、アルジェリア及びリビアとの国境地帯を含む南部地域一帯を軍事緩衝地帯に設定することを宣言しました。設定された軍事緩衝地帯はテロリストや武器商人などが頻繁に往来する地域とされており、同宣言は現在も有効です。

その範囲は、西はアルジェリア国境地帯に位置するアル・マトローハ (Al-Matrouha) 以南、東はリビア国境の検問所が位置するラスジェディール (Ras Jedir) 以南の国境地帯、そしてタタウィン県のエル・ボルマ (El-Borma) とロルゾット (Lorzot) を結ぶ線より南側全域となります。

これらの地域への立入りには管轄する県知事の許可が必要なほか、カンボート (Kambout)、アル・カモール (Al-Kamour)、アル・ジベイル (Al-Jbeil) もしくはアル・マトローハ、または申請者が許可を得た際に指定される場所で検問を受け

る必要があります。また、仮に許可を得た後でも、同地域においては当局の指示・命令に従う義務があり、従わなかった場合、治安当局は警告射撃なしで発砲することが許されています。

イ カスリン県

同県のシャアンビ山周辺は、「イスラム・マグレブ諸国のアル・カーイダ」(AQIM)に忠誠を誓うテロ組織「ウクバ・イブン・ナーフィア旅団」及びISILに忠誠を誓うテロ組織「ジュンド・アル・ヒラーファ」が潜伏・活動している主要拠点とみられています。

2013年以降、治安当局が大規模な掃討作戦を展開し、現在では小規模なグループが主に山中に潜伏するだけとなっていますが、掃討作戦は現在も継続中です。また、同地域では、地元住民がテロ組織により埋設された地雷で死傷する事件も発生しています。

については、これらの地域への渡航は、どのような理由であれ止めてください。

イ ●OSAC [「Tunisia 2019 Crime & Safety Report」](#) (2019年4月29日)

The security situation in parts of the country, especially in certain areas along borders with Libya and Algeria, has deteriorated since the 2011 revolution. Police and military are engaged in operations to combat terrorism and disrupt terrorist cells, especially near the Algerian and Libyan border areas, included but not limited to Kasserine, El Kef, Jendouba, Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa, and Ben Guerdane. Most border operations occur in the closed military area of Mount Chaambi.

3 関連する政治組織、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）

(1) 政府批判者の取扱い

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - チュニジア」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Freedom of Expression, Association and Assembly and Conscience

Authorities relied on repressive provisions of the penal code as well as other laws to punish speech, including criticism of public officials. Two social media activists, Anis Mabrouki, from Tebourba, and Hajer Awadi, from El Kef, were arrested in April in separate incidents and charged for criticizing on Facebook what they considered to be the government’s inadequate or corrupt response to financial hardship caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Prosecutors charged both with “creating a public disturbance.” They also charged Mabrouki with “accusing public officials of crimes related to their jobs without furnishing proof of guilt” and Awadi with “insulting a civil servant.” The courts acquitted Mabrouki and sentenced Awadi to two-and-a-half months in prison and a fine; she was free on appeal at time of writing.

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イ ●AI [「Tunisia: Freedom of expression at risk as prosecutions rise」](#) (2020年11月9日)

Amnesty International found that at least 40 bloggers, administrators of widely followed Facebook pages, political activists and human rights defenders have faced criminal prosecution between 2018 and 2020 simply for publishing online posts critical of local authorities, the police or other state officials.

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While most of these cases did not lead to a prison sentence, the summons for interrogation, the indictments and the trials themselves on charges that carry prison sentences amount to harassment and intimidation of people who express critical opinions about a public official and will have a chilling effect.

Whilst Tunisia is perceived as the only success story of the Arab uprisings and has been hailed for fostering a safe environment for all kinds of expression, the Ministry of Interior now openly threatens to prosecute people for legitimate criticism of police conduct and there has been a steady increase of prosecutions for Facebook posts that reveal cases of alleged corruption, criticize the authorities, or are deemed to "insult" officials online.

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ウ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - チュニジア」](#) (2020年1月14日)

Tunisian authorities continued to prosecute peaceful expression on the basis of repressive articles in the penal code and other codes, despite adopting, in November 2011, Decree Law 115 on freedom of the press that liberalizes the legal framework applicable to written media. The ongoing prosecutions affected whistleblowers and would-be whistleblowers.

On May 28, police arrested Yacine Hamdouni at his home in Tunis. They brought him to the Anti-Crime Police Brigade in Gorjani and interrogated him about two Facebook posts from May 2019. In those posts, he accused a senior security official of corruptly using an official car for private purposes. On June 6, a Tunis First Instance court convicted Hamdouni of defamation, dissemination of “false information,” accusing officials of wrongdoing without providing proof, and “harming others via public telecommunication networks,” and sentenced him to one year in prison, reduced to six months on appeal.

4 ジェンダー、DV および子ども

(1) 女性

ア ●IRBC [「クエリー回答 \[TUN105651.FE\] Tunisia: The situation of women who live alone, whether they are single or divorced, particularly in Tunis; incidence of](#)

[their social status, level of education and financial autonomy on their situation; whether they can access employment and housing; support services available to them \(2014-October 2016\)](#) (2017年1月20日)

2. Situation of Women Who Live Alone

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Tunisian women are increasingly living alone. Besides [reasons relating to divorce, being single or a widow], living away from family may now stem from professional life or a training program. (LTDH 24 Oct. 2016)

However, the Representative noted that [translation] “the status of divorced women and widows is still difficult to assume, which is why women tend to fear this situation. Nevertheless, they have the option to divorce when it is deemed necessary” (ibid.). Amnesty International (AI) also reports that divorced women are the victims of [AI English version] “stigma” (AI 25 Nov. 2015, 22). The organization adds that, according to a lawyer that it consulted, who works in the area of domestic violence, [AI English version] “divorced women are, in general, perceived badly by society” (ibid.).

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イ ●IRBC [「クエリー回答 \[TUN105307.FE\] Tunisia: Domestic violence, including legislation, state protection, and support services \(2012-November 2015\)](#) (2016年1月8日)

2.1 Domestic Violence

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The Freedom House publication titled Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa indicates that the Penal Code was amended in 1993 to criminalize domestic violence (Freedom House 2010, 5). Sources indicate that the Penal Code provides for heavier punishment if the victim is the spouse (ibid.; US 25 June 2015, 15; FIDH 2 June 2014). Article 218 of the consolidated version of the Penal Code is as follows:

[translation]

Art. 218 (new) – Amended by Bill No. 93-72 on July 12, 1993 – Any individual who wilfully injures, strikes or commits any other violent act or battery not set out in Article 319 [2] shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of one year and a fine of 1,000 dinars (1000d [approximately C\$683]).

If the attacker is a relative or spouse of the victim, the punishment shall be a term of imprisonment of two years and a fine of 2,000 dinars (2000d).

If the act is carried out with premeditation, the punishment shall be increased to a term of imprisonment of three years and a fine of 3,000 dinars (3000d).

Withdrawal by the victimized relative or spouse halts prosecution, proceedings and

administration of the sentence. (Tunisia 1913, Art. 218)

Amnesty International states that [AI English version] “[c]omplaints of assault [family violence, including domestic violence] are often withdrawn because of pressure from the perpetrator or family” (AI Nov. 2015, 5). In the report it submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in 2013, the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice states that it is [UN English version] “concerned at the fact that article 218 provides for the termination of proceedings or the vacation of a conviction with the withdrawal of the complaint by the victim of an assault” (UN 30 May 2013, para. 36). This source indicates that [UN English version] “the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women noted a very high number of complaints withdrawals” in 2010 (ibid.). However, the journalist stated that [translation] “if there is a serious injury, the prosecutor can decide to continue with the proceedings ... even if the complaint has been withdrawn” (Journalist 31 Aug. 2015). ...

...

(2) DV 被害者等の保護

ア ●IRBC [「クエリー回答 \[TUN105307.FE\] Tunisia: Domestic violence, including legislation, state protection, and support services \(2012-November 2015\)」](#) (2016年1月8日)

3.2 Police

...

During an interview with Rue89, Karima Brini, one of the founders of AFC, stated that the treatment of victims of violence at police stations was [translation] “deplorable” (Rue89 7 June 2013). According to the Freedom House publication, published in 2010, “[p]olice officers often lack the training and resources necessary to conduct objective investigations or protect victims” from domestic violence (Freedom House 2010, 10). The same source adds that “many cases of [gender-based] violence are not reported by victims or their families, in part because it is difficult to secure effective inquiries into such claims” (ibid.). In September 2015, the Chair of the parliamentary commission also noted the lack of training provided to police officers on domestic violence and their lack of resources, such that the police [translation] “sometimes refuse to intervene” (Chair, 1 Sept. 2015). Sources indicate that the police tend to blame the women who are victims of domestic violence for what has happened to them (ibid.; AI Nov. 2015, 5). According to Amnesty International,

[AI English version]

[s]ome women interviewed by Amnesty International said that police officers either dismissed their reports or blamed them for the violence. In general, the police attempted to discourage them from filing a complaint, convincing them not to break up the family and to put the interests of children first. Instead of enforcing the law and protecting women from

further violence, police see their role as promoting mediation and reconciliation. (AI Nov. 2015, 21)

...

4. Support Services

4.1 Public Services

Country Reports 2014 indicates that the government opened a hotline in 2012 (US 25 June 2015, 16). According to EuroMed Rights, the hotline was set up by the Secretary of State in Charge of Women and Families (Secrétariat d'État à la femme et à la famille, SEFF) [3] (EuroMed Rights 6 Mar. 2015, 3). However, according to Amnesty International, [AI English version] “[t]he national helpline for women victims of violence is nonoperational” (AI Nov. 2015, 73).

Country Reports 2014 indicates that there are “two dozen” social centres throughout the country that offer services, the nature of which are not described by this source, to women victims of domestic violence (US 25 June 2015, 15). According to the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice, ONFP centres, which exist in each of the country’s 24 governorates, provide free psychological help to women victims of violence (UN 30 May 2013, para. 64). ...

...

4.2 Services Provided by NGOs

...

Amnesty International indicates that there are no shelters for women victims of domestic violence in south-eastern Tunisia and notes that the services provided by civil society organizations [AI English version] “are only available in major cities” (AI Nov. 2015, 70, 74).

...

イ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - チュニジア」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Women’s Rights

...

In April, the Ministry of Women, Family, Childhood, and Seniors opened a new shelter for female victims of domestic abuse. It also extended the hours of operation of the hotline for domestic violence complaints to 24 hours. ...

(3) ISIS 戦闘員の家族の取扱い

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - チュニジア」](#) (2021年1月13日)

Counterterrorism and Detention

...

Tunisia allowed the return from Libya on January 23 of six orphaned children of Tunisian nationals who were suspected of being Islamic State members. At least 36 more children of suspected ISIS members remain stranded in Libya, as well as an estimated 160 Tunisian children believed to be held in camps in Syria or prisons in Iraq.

イ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - チュニジア」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

Counterterrorism and Detention

...

About 200 children and 100 women Tunisians who are ISIS suspects or family members of ISIS suspects remained trapped without charge in squalid conditions in Libya and Syria. Authorities rebuffed demands by Tunisian family members to bring them home.

5 LGBT

(1) LGBT に関する法律

ア ●国際レスビアン・ゲイ協会 (ILGA) [「ILGA State-sponsored Homophobia 2019, Dataset」](#) (2019 年)

Provisions in force

Penal Code (1913) (as amended).

Sodomy: Article 230.

Sodomy, when not covered by any of the cases provided for in preceding articles, is punishable by three years' imprisonment.¹

Promotion of indecency: Article 226.

Anyone found guilty of deliberately and publicly promoting indecency shall be subject to six months' imprisonment and a fine of 48 dinars.

Amended in 2004, Article 226bis of the Penal Code of 1913 criminalises any act that publicly draws attention to the opportunity to commit debauchery through any form of writing, audio or visual recording. This law is found in the same section titled "Section III: attacks on morals" where the law criminalising same-sex intimacy is located.

(2) 政府当局による LGBT の取扱いの事例

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2021 - チュニジア」](#) (2021 年 1 月 13 日)

Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

...

On June 6, the Kef First Instance Tribunal sentenced two men charged with sodomy to two years in prison, reduced to one year on appeal. The men had refused police's demands to subject them to an anal exam, an invasive and discredited practice that Tunisian authorities routinely use to "prove" homosexual conduct. Despite accepting a recommendation during its Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council in May 2017 to end anal testing, the government has not yet taken steps to carry out this pledge.

イ ●米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2018年 - チュニジア](#)」(2019年3月13日)

Media reported that on June 8, a police officer and two friends sodomized a 32-year-old man in Monastir governorate using a police baton. The man filed a complaint with his local police station, which the LGBTI rights Shams Association published online. According to media reports, after the man filed a complaint against the officers, authorities requested that he undergo an anal examination to collect evidence with which to charge him with violating Article 230, which criminalizes sodomy. Police officers reportedly escorted the man to the examination room. As of September there was no verdict on his case.

ウ ●国際レズビアン・ゲイ協会 (ILGA)「[ILGA State-sponsored Homophobia 2019, Dataset](#)」(2019年)

On Human Rights Day 2015 (10 December), six students were each given three years jail time under Article 230, but following an Appeals Court ruling in early-March 2016, their sentences were reduced to time already served. It is reported that one of these students refused to undergo a forced anal examination, and was subsequently tortured.⁴

Similar violations have since been reported,⁵ such as the arrest of two young men in Sousse in December 2016 and their conviction in early 2017.⁶ According to a joint press release from NGO Damj and the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), they were also subject to anal examinations without their consent.⁷

In January 2017, a district court in Hammamet ordered the detention of a trans woman with a public indecency charge after the police arrested her at a Halloween party for dressing as a woman and telling a police officer she considered herself one.⁸ Her lawyer claimed she had been subjected to torture, humiliation and taunting at the police station due to the reveal of her gender identity.

In March 2017, SHAMS Facebook page described a new case where forced anal examinations were being carried out to find "proof" of proscribed same-sex sexual conduct.⁹

In April, the National Council of the Medical Order issued a statement strongly condemning "any medical examination that is unjustified and/or that touches the dignity or the physical and mental integrity of the person examined", including forced anal and genital

exams aimed to “prove” ‘homosexuality’, and clarifying that doctors must inform people that they have the right to refuse them.¹⁰ In September, Minister for Human Rights, Mehdi Ben Gharbia, stated that “[anal] exams can no longer be imposed by force, physical or moral, or without the consent of the person concerned”.¹¹ Yet, Human Rights Watch warned about “the possibility that someone accused of same-sex conduct might ‘consent’ to an anal exam under pressure from police, because they believe their refusal will be held against them, or because they believe it will prove their innocence”.¹² Credible sources revealed that the practice was still taking place in 2018.¹³

(3) 政府当局による LGBT 権利活動の取扱い

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - チュニジア」](#) (2020年1月14日)

The government has also continued to harass Shams, an NGO supporting sexual and gender minorities. On February 20, the government appealed a 2016 court decision affirming Shams’s status as a legally registered NGO. The government argued that Shams’ objective, as stated in its bylaws, to defend sexual minorities, contravenes “Tunisian society’s Islamic values, which reject homosexuality and prohibit such alien behavior.” It further argued that Tunisian law, which criminalizes homosexual acts in article 230 of the penal code, prohibits the establishment and activities of an association that purports to defend such practices. On May 20, the government lost the appeal.

イ ●国際レズビアン・ゲイ協会 (ILGA) [「ILGA State-sponsored Homophobia 2019, Dataset」](#) (2019年)

Despite ardent opposition following its formation as an NGO in June 2015, the Tunisian organisation SHAMS (Sun) managed to get NGO accreditation as the deadline for complaint had expired in May 2015. However, the organisation was court-ordered to suspend its activities for 30 days in early January 2016.²

...

A 2018 report further highlighted discrimination and violence from family and community members and, particularly, from law enforcement agents.¹⁴ Since the ‘Arab Spring’, Tunisian LGBT groups have allegedly enjoyed greater visibility,¹⁵ and activism has grown.¹⁶ However, hostility against human rights defenders and NGOs supporting the rights of LGBTI people has also been reported.¹⁷

In December 2017, NGO SHAMS launched what was referred to as one of the first LGBTIQ online stations in the Arab world. According to the association, they have been receiving threats ever since.¹⁸ After the National Union Council of Imams’ brought a lawsuit against the radio station, rumours about its imminent shutdown began circulating, but were later dismissed (see below).¹⁹

In June 2018, the Individual Freedoms and Equality Committee, a presidential

commission comprised of legislators, professors and human rights advocates, suggested decriminalising same-sex acts, stating that “the state and society have nothing to do with the sexual life amongst adults [...] sexual orientations and choices of individuals are essential to private life.”²⁰ However, LGBTI activists remarked the lack of real political will to repeal Article 230 of the Penal Code.²¹

Tunisia

In May 2015, Shams became the first LGBT group to receive official authorisation from Tunisia’s interior ministry.³⁵ In February 2016, Shams succeeded on appeal to the Administrative Court against a suspension order by the Tunisian government which accused the organisation of violating.³⁶ The Government had argued on the basis that Shams' aim to “defend homosexuals” was contrary to Article 3 of the NGO Law (Law No. 88/2011). Since this argument was rejected by the judiciary, it should mean that LGBT-related objectives are not any more a legal ground for refusing registration to SOR CSOs.

(4) 社会による LGBT の取扱いの事例

ア 国際レズビアン・ゲイ協会 (ILGA) [「ILGA State-sponsored Homophobia 2019, Dataset」](#) (2019年)

6 汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護

(1) イスラム教サラフィスト及びテロ組織による危害

ア 外務省 [「チュニジア基礎データ」](#) (2019年3月6日)

(10) ベン・アリ政権下では、言論・報道の自由、情報アクセス権の制限、政府による検閲等、政府による人権の抑圧が指摘されていたが、革命後の新政権はこれらの自由・権利を認めた。その結果、多くの報道機関が生まれ、NGO等の市民活動が活発になったが、他方で労働争議や暴力的な抗議活動、また、サラフィストと呼ばれる保守的なイスラム主義者による暴力行為が頻発した。特に南部・内陸部を中心に、雇用・開発を要求する若者による座り込みなどの抗議運動が2017年現在も継続しており、経済活動に打撃を与えている。

イ ●米国国務省 [「国別テロリズム報告 2018年 - チュニジア」](#) (2019年10月)

The risk of terrorist activity in Tunisia remained high in 2018, including the potential for terrorist attacks and the infiltration of arms and terrorists from neighboring countries. In 2018, aspiring ISIS affiliate Jund Al Khilafa-Tunisia (JAK-T), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-aligned Uqba bin Nafi’ Battalion, and others conducted primarily small-

scale attacks against Tunisian security personnel, including one in July against the Tunisian National Guard that killed six officers. Nonetheless, Tunisian security forces continued to improve their ability to preempt terrorist activities by identifying and dismantling numerous terrorist cells.

2018 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist organizations remained active in Tunisia, primarily targeting Tunisian security elements. The list below highlights the most significant terrorist incidents of 2018:

- On July 8, armed terrorists ambushed a group of Tunisian National Guard officers in Jendouba near the Tunisia-Algeria border, killing six officers. Two days later, Algerian military forces conducted operations along the border, killing three terrorists and arresting three others suspected of involvement in the July 8 ambush.
- On October 29, a 30-year-old woman affiliated with ISIS detonated a suicide IED near several police officers on Habib Bourguiba Avenue in central Tunis. The explosion killed the terrorist and injured 20 police officers and six civilians.
- On December 15, 12 terrorists affiliated with JAK-T stole approximately US \$110,000 from a local bank in Kasserine before killing a Tunisian civilian in his home. The group targeted the individual for being a relative of a Tunisian soldier whom terrorists killed in 2016.

ウ ●OSAC [「Tunisia 2019 Crime & Safety Report」](#) (2019年4月29日)

The Tunisian government expanded its counterterrorism efforts in 2016, particularly after several high-profile terrorist attacks; major terrorist incidents in 2017 and 2018 included:

- November 2018: Twelve terrorists stole \$110K from Kasserine bank and killed a civilian.
- October 2018: A female suicide bomber detonated a device near a police patrol in downtown Tunis, injuring several police officers and civilians.
- July 2018: Nine police officers died in a gun and grenade assault in Jendouba, close to the Algerian border
- November 2017: One Tunisian police officer died and another was wounded when a man attacked them outside Parliament near the Bardo area of Tunis. According to prosecutors, the attacker had adopted extremist views and intended to join terrorist groups in Libya.
- March 2017: A police officer died and another received injuries in an overnight ambush by four attackers in Kebili, 500 kilometers south of Tunis. According to the MOI, police response resulted in the deaths of two of the motorcycle-mounted attackers died and seriously wounding of another, while one fled on foot.

エ ●国連安全保障理事会「[Letter dated 15 January 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 \(1999\), 1989 \(2011\) and 2253 \(2015\) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant \(Da'esh\), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council](#)」 ecoi (2019年1月15日)

34. In Tunisia, Uqbah ibn Nafi' Battalion, affiliated to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QDe.014), carried out two major attacks during the reporting period: one against a patrol of the national guard in Jendouba Governorate in July 2018, and another targeting a military convoy in the Chambi Mountain area in October. Despite these attacks, it is believed that the group employs only about 50 fighters, with activities limited to the mountainous areas of Kasserine and Jendouba. 24 The weakened status of the group follows the death of most of its leaders, including Khalid Al-Shayib and Murad Al-Gharsalli.25 Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia (QDe.143) was inactive during the reporting period. Remnants of its forces may have moved on to Libya under pressure from a sustained military campaign. 26 One Member State

(2) 主なテロ組織

ア 公安調査庁「[国際テロリズム要覧 \(Web版\) チュニジアのアンサー・アル・シャリーア Ansar al Shari'a in Tunisia](#)」 (2020年5月7日閲覧)

同組織は、シャリーアの施行を目標に掲げ、2012年5月には、同国北部・ケルアン県で数千人を集めて年次総会を開催する一方、同年9月に発生したチュニジア米国大使館襲撃事件では、同組織関係者の関与も指摘された。チュニジア政府は、2013年2月及び同年7月に発生した世俗派の野党指導者射殺事件への関与などを理由に、同年8月、同組織をテロ組織に指定した。

同組織は、リビア国内のチュニジア国境付近で、訓練施設を運営しているとされ、2015年7月、米軍がリビアで実施した空爆を受け、同組織指導者セイフ・アッラー・ベン・ハスィーン（別名アブ・イヤド。「チュニジア戦闘集団」(TCG)の設立者）が死亡したと報じられた。

なお、同組織の元幹部ブバカル・ハキムが、「イラク・レバントのイスラム国」(ISIL)のオンライン英語機関誌「ダービク」第8号(2015年3月)にISIL構成員として登場するなど、同組織からISILへの戦闘員流出が指摘された。

イ ●Stanford University 「Ansar al-Shariah (Tunisia)」 (2018年8月)

Formed: April 2011

Disbanded: 2015

...

Ansar al-Shariah in Tunisia (AST) wasa Salafi-jihadist militant organization established

in 2011 that combined community service, proselytization, and violence to promote its Salafi ideology and goals in Tunisia. The group aimed to establish Shariah law in Tunisia and promoted the idea of global jihad. The group targeted the Tunisian government and armed forces, utilizing a dawa, or charitable works, campaign to gain trust among Tunisian communities. Since its establishment, AST supported Al Qaeda; however in 2014, multiple AST leaders, including AST spokesman Seifeddine Rais, swore loyalty to IS. Many left the group to fight in Syria. It is unclear whether the group continues to operate secretly or its members have dispersed to join other jihad groups.

...

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

...

C. SIZE ESTIMATES

- 2012: 30,000-40,000 (New York Times)²⁸
- 2013: 1,000 (Foreign Policy)²⁹
- 2014: 70,000 (The Economist)³⁰

(3) サラフィスト及びテロ組織による勧誘

ア 後記 [7\(2\)](#)を参照

(4) 政府によるテロの取締り

ア ●米国国務省「[国別テロリズム報告 2018年 - チュニジア](#)」(2019年10月)

Overview: The government continues to prioritize counterterrorism, and Tunisia cooperated with the United States and other international partners to professionalize its security apparatus. U.S. security assistance to Tunisia grew in 2018 and Tunisia made tangible progress on several of its counterterrorism goals, including enhanced border security, new proposed legislation, asset freezing of terrorist financiers, and implementation of CVE programming. Tunisia also made positive strides in developing its military and civilian security capacity to conduct counterterrorism efforts. Tunisia is currently working on a strategy for the return, trial, and incarceration of captured Tunisian FTFs from battlefields in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Tunisia is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and is active in the Coalition’s FTF and Counter-ISIS Finance working groups.

...

イ ●OSAC「[Tunisia 2019 Crime & Safety Report](#)」(2019年4月29日)

Police Response

Tunisia’s police and military forces have increased their effectiveness in recent years.

Tunisian police are capable and professional with varying levels of capacity, including some highly skilled specialized units with the ability to respond to crisis and critical incidents. Many senior police officials have received advanced training in Western Europe or the U.S. In an effort to maintain its image and protect Tunisia’s tourism industry, the police are generally responsive to visitors in need of assistance. The police presence is particularly high in tourist areas and other areas foreigners frequent.

ウ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - チュニジア」](#) (2020年1月14日)

Counterterrorism and Detention

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The government eased conditions of house arrests in 2018. But many who remained under house arrest were also banned from travel under a procedure called “S17,” which the state can impose on any person who is presumably suspected of intending to join an armed group abroad. The procedure allows restrictions on movement both abroad and inside Tunisia. A person placed under the S17 procedure risks lengthy questioning whenever they are stopped at a routine police check.

7 兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の）

(1) 兵役義務

ア CIA [「The World Factbook - Tunisia」](#) (2020年5月7日閲覧)

Military service age and obligation:

20-23 years of age for compulsory service, 1-year service obligation; 18-23 years of age for voluntary service (2019)

(2) サラフィスト及びテロ組織による勧誘

ア ●Stanford University [「Ansar al-Shariah \(Tunisia\)」](#) (2018年8月)

INTERACTIONS

...

B.COMMUNITY RELATIONS

AST earned much of its popular support through its dawa, or charitable work, campaign for the communities of Tunisia. The group provided food and medical services for the poor, organized Islamic lectures for the general public, and ran religious classes for local children.⁵¹ AST also exploited widespread frustration with the Tunisian government in order to attract recruits.

AST distributed its printed propaganda in markets and publish edits materials online, establishing itself as a charitable rather than violent organization. AST’s media branch, the

al-Qayraw an Media Foundation handled the group's social media and propaganda.⁵²

イ ●Haim Malka「[Tunisia: Searching for a postrevolutionary religious equilibrium](#)」
CSIS (2019年10月28日)

First, Islamist political parties were legalized, allowed to organize, recruit, and participate in the country's elections for the National Constituent Assembly following the revolution.¹² Previously exiled religious and political leaders returned to the country, and those imprisoned were released. After being repressed for more than a half century, these groups not only became visible and operated openly but became part of the debate on public affairs.

Second, in an environment of newly achieved freedom of speech, Tunisia's first postrevolutionary governments were unsure how to address growing vigilante violence perpetrated by salafists, which contributed to a chaotic postrevolutionary social-political environment. At the same time, a government amnesty released hundreds of prisoners, including up to 250 jihadi-salafists. These activists were able to revive militant recruiting and operational networks in Tunisia and abroad, while amassing followers and recruiting several thousand young Tunisians to join the ranks of the ISG in Syria and Libya.¹³ Eventually, jihadi-salafists launched a terrorism campaign against civilians and the state.

...

The Security Component

As Tunisia became a more open society and religious space opened up after the revolution, Tunisian authorities, including Ennahda, struggled to address growing violence and terrorism associated with jihadi-salafi movements. These movements, such as Ansar alSharia and later the ISG, used religious arguments and ideology to take advantage of widespread grievances and expectations to recruit followers. Within two years, Tunisia faced a homegrown terrorism threat that was shaped in part by the growth of the ISG in Libya and Syria.

ウ ●CRS「[Tunisia: In Brief](#)」(2020年3月16日)

Terrorist Threats

...

In early 2019, the head of Tunisia's National Counterterrorism Commission told members of parliament that 1,000 Tunisian foreign fighters had returned to the country between 2011 and 2018, and that authorities had prevented at least 17,000 others specifically from leaving the country for combat zones abroad.³⁸ Tunisia was a top global source of Islamist foreign fighters at the height of the Islamic State's territorial influence (2014-2015), with U.N. investigators reporting in 2015 that an estimated 4,000 Tunisians were fighting in Syria, plus as many as 1,500 in Libya, 200 in Iraq, 60 in Mali, and 50 in Yemen.³⁹ Several

terrorist attacks in Europe have also been carried out by individuals of Tunisian descent. Youth marginalization and the release of terrorism suspects under a general amnesty in early 2011 may partly explain Tunisia’s high number of foreign fighters—as well as the emergence of domestic Islamist extremist networks.⁴⁰ Perceptions among some Tunisian youth that despite political changes since 2011, state institutions and personnel remain corrupt, unresponsive, and/or abusive, may also be a driver.⁴¹

エ ● CRS [「Tunisia: In Brief」](#) (2018年7月5日)

Terrorist Threats

…

Tunisia has been a top source of Islamist foreign fighters in Syria and Libya, and several terrorist attacks in Europe have been carried out by individuals of Tunisian origin. In April 2017, then Interior Minister Hadi Majdoub stated that some 3,000 Tunisian militants remained active abroad and 760 had been killed, adding that the authorities had prevented over 27,000 Tunisian youths from joining their ranks since 2012.¹⁸ Majdoub added that some 800 fighters had returned to Tunisia at that point. Youth marginalization and the mass release of terrorism suspects in 2011 may partly explain Tunisia’s high number of foreign fighters, as well as perceptions that state institutions remain corrupt, unresponsive, and/or abusive.¹⁹

…

Outlook

…Despite a relative lack of conflict, Tunisia remains a potential locus of regional struggles among rival political ideologies, and among violent extremist groups vying for prominence and recruits. …

オ ● 国連人権理事会 [「Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination on its mission to Tunisia」](#) ecoi (2016年8月2日)

16. The Working Group learned that, after the revolution, mosques began to proliferate, and at least 400 of them were under the control of extremists. Groups such as AST reportedly began to disseminate its propaganda by targeting individuals in mosques that were not legally registered, usually located in impoverished or marginalized communities, where school drop-out rates and unemployment are high. In such an environment, frustration and a sense of vulnerability were reportedly manipulated to develop hatred of established systems and support for the establishment of an Islamic State. In addition, groups acting in the guise of charitable organizations were allegedly targeting and converting individuals.

17. In some cases, imams who were not part of the AST network were forced out of their mosques and replaced by members of the group. The Working Group was informed that some people had stopped frequenting their local mosque owing to the extremist views of certain imams. Such venues have, however, become strategic in attracting potential followers given their success in doing so and the difficulty of closing them down, especially those in remote areas. Radicalization has therefore proved more effective outside of the capital and in towns located in the interior of the country.

...

VI. Recruitment

47. The Working Group was informed that the recruitment of fighters in Tunisia is varied, often rapid and increasingly sophisticated. The process often involves foreign terrorist groups or individuals establishing themselves in the country. Large amounts of funding are received from outside countries, including for non-governmental associations, purportedly charitable organizations, political parties, travel, social media and families of foreign fighters. Funding is reportedly also earmarked for building mosques and recruitment venues.

...

52. In one village of 10,000 inhabitants, 12 young people were reported to have gone to the Syrian Arab Republic to fight. Recruiters often operate in communities without the families of potentially fighters being aware. One man informed the Working Group that his son, a university student who was financially comfortable, had told him that he was leaving to attend a conference in Libya and was subsequently located in the Syrian Arab Republic.

53. Some fighters travel abroad to fight with the consent of their parents; others are recruited by teachers. The Working Group was informed of one university teacher who radicalized students while supposedly tutoring them in mathematics. Even when the operation of these networks is reported to the authorities, arrests are often not possible owing to lack of evidence. The Working Group was however informed that, recently, more arrests are being made.

54. Young people are exposed to messages conveyed by ISIL on YouTube, Facebook and other social media, accessed in Internet cafes. The Working Group was informed that people who “like” a video on Facebook may be contacted by recruiters. Others may simply be drawn to jihadist websites. Once recruiters have established communication, they reportedly provide users with videos and articles on extremist ideology.

...

カ [Nate Rosenblatt 「The Architects of Salvation : How is foreign fighter recruitment hubs emerged in Tunisia」](#) The George Washington University Program on

Extremism (2019年9月)

Jihadi Salafist groups in Tunisia did not just offer spiritual benefits, new joiners had access to material, social, and psychological benefits as well. Jihadi Salafi groups gave members micro-credit loans and economic cooperatives that helped new members start businesses or design activities that benefitted their community. These opportunities provided structure, meaning, and personal advancement that had previously not been available for new joiners.

The mosque was crucial for recruitment purposes as well because it gave AST a friendly and innocuous place to bring new recruits after they were first approached. Although the initial recruitment ‘pitch’ varied, the goal was usually to get potential recruits to agree to come to a nearby mosque. This gave the recruiter a chance to speak in private and surround the potential recruit with other members of the group who could peer pressure him.⁴⁷ The use of the mosque also appealed to the potential recruit’s identity as a Muslim, as the recruitment appealed to his or her sacred religious values in a place of worship.⁴⁸

...

Because AST controlled the neighborhood, AST recruiters could use their local contacts to learn everything they needed to know about potential new recruits before convincing them to join. This was the beginning of an indoctrination process that led many members to eventually join IS. The AST control over the neighborhood also allowed them to raise money to finance its operations. This section will describe how AST recruited new members and financed its activities in the Hub.

...

In sum, AST used its network of informants in the community to identify targets for recruitment and to study them in advance in order to pick the right time to approach them. Their pitch was often customized and persuasive, and within months after the revolution, they began to control the community. For those young men who were joining gangs and loitering in cafes before the revolution, the AST recruitment pitch offered something better. The group also had money, much of which was raised from ideological supporters inside Tunisia.⁷¹ This gave AST the chance to increase their initial appeal to young men by giving them small amounts of cash.

...

...Those who were vulnerable to recruitment had a hard time resisting the appeal to join. Once a member, it was even harder to leave. Only those with close personal relationships actively trying to prevent them from joining the group stood a chance of either leaving the group or refusing to join in the first place.

...

キ 【書籍】 Aaron Y. Zelin [「Your Sons Are at Your Service: Tunisia's Missionaries of Jihad」](#) Colombia University Press (2020年2月)

8 司法制度・刑事手続

9 警察および治安部隊による人権侵害（刑務所等の状況含む）

ア ●米国国務省 [「人権状況報告 2020年 - チュニジア」](#) (2021年3月30日)

C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

Although the law prohibits such practices, police reportedly subjected detainees to harsh physical treatment, according to firsthand accounts provided to national and international organizations. Several prominent local human rights lawyers decried the practice of torture in police stations and detention centers. Human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) criticized the government for its application of the antiterrorism law, the appearance of impunity for abusers, and for reluctance to investigate torture allegations.

...

イ ●米国国務省 [「人権状況報告 2018年 - チュニジア」](#) (2019年3月13日)

...In a presentation for the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture in Tunis on June 27, the National Authority for the Prevention of Torture (INPT) stated that abuse and ill treatment of detainees in police and National Guard detention centers has continued despite an overall decrease in instances of torture in prisons.

ウ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - チュニジア」](#) (2020年1月14日)

Counterterrorism and Detention

...

Violence in police stations or prisons is still present; Tunisian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported tens of cases of alleged torture in 2018. A case of suspicious death took place in Bouhajla, a small town in the region of Kairouan. Police detained peddler Abderrazek Selmi, 58, on June 8, following a dispute with officers. Doctors at a Kairouan hospital pronounced Selmi dead later that day and informed the general prosecutor that Selmi's death was suspicious, citing injuries to his face and body. Authorities had not released an autopsy report at time of writing, and no charge had been filed in connection with his death.

10 報道の自由

ア 前記 3(1)を参照

11 宗教の自由

ア ●HRW「[ワールドレポート 2020 - チュニジア](#)」(2020年1月14日)

Authorities also undermined freedom of conscience by using a vague provision of the penal code on “publicly offending morality” to convict café owner Imed Zaghouani on May 29, 2019, for keeping his café in Kairouan open during Ramadan fasting hours. Zaghouani spent 10 days in jail before a court sentenced him to a suspended term of one month in prison and a fine of 300 dinars (US\$100).

12 国籍、民族および人種

13 出入国および移動の自由

略称

AI	アムネスティ・インターナショナル
CGRS	ベルギー難民及び無国籍者庁
CIA	米国中央情報局
CRS	米国議会調査局
DFAT	オーストラリア外務貿易省
EASO	欧州難民支援局
HRW	ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ
IDMC	国内避難民監視センター
IRBC	カナダ移民難民局
IRDC	アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター
Landinfo	ノルウェー政府出身国情報センター
MRGI	マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル
OHCHR	国連人権高等弁務官事務所
OSAC	米国海外安全保障評議会
UNHCR	国連難民高等弁務官事務所
USCIRF	米国連邦政府国際宗教自由に関する委員会