

パキスタン

2020 年 3 月 19 日ドラフト作成

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1. 一般情報

(1) 地理・人口

ア 米国国務省「[宗教の自由に関する国別報告 2016 年 - パキスタン \(仮訳\)](#)」(2017 年 8 月 15 日)

米国政府の推計では、総人口は 2 億 120 万人である (2016 年 7 月の推計)。1998 年に実施された最新の人口調査によると、人口の 95%がイスラム教徒である (イスラム教徒の人口のうちの 75%がスンニ派および 25%がシーア派として正式に認定されている)。政府の出した数字によると、残りの 5%にはアフマディー派イスラム教徒、ヒンドゥー教徒、キリスト教徒、パルーシー/ゾロアスター教徒、バハーイー教徒、シク教徒、仏教徒、カラーシャ (Kalasha) 族、Kihal およびジャイナ教徒が含まれている。

イ 東京地判平成 15 年 7 月 30 日

パキスタンは、1947 年 (昭和 22 年) 8 月 14 日、ムスリム連盟の領導の下、イスラム教徒の国として、イギリス領インドより独立した。独立時には、インダス川流域部を占める西パキスタンと、インドを中に挟んで 1800 k m離れたガンジス川河口部の東パキスタンの両地域から構成されていたが、1971 年 (昭和 46 年) に東パキスタンはバングラデシュとして再度分離独立した。したがって、現在のパキスタンは、旧西パキスタンを指す。(…)

パキスタンの人口は約 1 億 7710 万人 (2011 年 (平成 23 年) 推計) であり、首都はイスラマバード、最大の都市はカラチである。

パキスタンは連邦共和制国家であり、パキスタンの行政区分は、パンジャーブ州、シンド州、ハイバル・パフトゥンハー州 (旧北西辺境州)、バローチスターン州の 4 つの州のほか、連邦政府直轄部族地域 (FATA) 及び連邦首都圏 (イスラマバード) から成り、FATA は、バジャウル管区、ムフマンド管区、ハイバル管区、

クッラム管区、オラクザイ管区、北ワジリスタン管区及び南ワジリスタン管区から構成される。(…)

FATA においては、大統領による命令がある場合を除いてパキスタン連邦法は施行されておらず、広範な自治権が認められており、地元部族の伝統的な慣習法であるパシュトゥン・ワリによる支配が行われている。(…)

パキスタンの民族は、パンジャブ人約 56%、パシュトゥン人約 16%、シンド人約 13%、バローチ人約 4%である。(…)

イスラム教は国教であり、人口の約 90%以上がイスラム教徒（その大部分はスンニ派）であり、ヒンズー教徒とキリスト教徒はそれぞれ約 2%である。公用語は定められていないが、ウルドゥー語、パンジャブ語、シンド語、パシュトゥー語などが話されている。(…)

(2) 内政

ア 外務省「[パキスタン 基礎データ](#)」(2019 年 3 月 26 日)

2018 年 5 月 31 日、下院議会在任期満了のため解散。7 月 25 日の総選挙の結果、パキスタン正義党 (PTI) が勝利し、8 月 18 日、イムラン・カーン PTI 党首が首相に就任した。

イ ●米国国会調査局 (CRS)「[Pakistan's Domestic Political Setting](#)」(2019 年 4 月 18 日)

2018 National and Provincial Elections

Elections to seat Pakistan's 15th NA and four provincial assemblies took place as scheduled in July 2018, successfully marking the country's second-ever and consecutive democratic transfer of power. The outcome saw a dramatic end to the decades-long domination of Pakistan's national politics by two dynastic parties, as the relatively young Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI or Movement for Justice) party swept a large plurality of NA seats (see Figure 1) and now leads a coalition in the Punjab assembly while retaining its majority in KPk. Party founder and leader Imran Khan was elected prime minister in August 2018 with support from several smaller parties in a PTI-led federal ruling coalition. The Pakistan Muslim League faction of Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) was ousted at both the federal and Punjab government levels (Punjab is home to more than half of all Pakistanis).

Figure 1. Major Party Representation in Pakistan's 15th National Assembly

PTI 46%, PM-N 25%, PPP 16%, MMA 5%, MQM 2%, All Others 6%

Zardari/PPP Era, 2008-2013

...

Sharif/PML-N Era, 2013-2018

…
Khan/PTI Era, 2018-Present
 …

ウ 記事「[パキスタン総選挙、カーン氏の野党勝利 他党は再投票要求](#)」AFP (2018 年 7 月 28 日)

パキスタン選挙管理委員会 (ECP) の 27 日の発表によれば、一部を残し票の集計が終わった段階で、カーン氏率いる PTI は 116 議席を獲得して他党を大きくリードしており、第 1 党となる。だが PTI の獲得議席は単独政権に必要な 137 には届かなかった。

専門家らは以前から、カーン氏が政権に就くのであれば連立を組む必要があると予測していた。それでも今回の大勝は驚きを持って受け止められ、投票に不正があったとの疑いを助長している。現与党・イスラム教徒連盟シャリフ派 (PML-N) を含む政党連合「全党協議会 (All Parties Conference)」は 27 日、選挙のやり直しを求める抗議行動を実施する意向を表明した。

エ 共同通信「世界年鑑 2018」(2019 年)

【議会】 二院制

▼上院 104 議席を州議会議員らによる間接選挙で選出。92 議席が 4 州、8 議席が部族地域、4 議席がイスラマバードに割り当て。任期 6 年。3 年ごとに半数改選。

▽17 年 11 月時点の主要党派別議席数

PML (N) 27
 PPP 26
 統一民族運動 (MQM) 8
 パキスタン正義運動 (PTI) 7
 アワミ民族党 (ANP) 6

▼下院 (国民会議) 定数 342 議席。272 議席が小選挙区制。残りは比例代表制で 60 が女性枠、10 が非イスラム教徒枠。任期 5 年。

▽17 年 11 月時点の主要党派別議席数

PML (N) 188
 PPP 47
 PTI 33
 MQM 24
 イスラム聖職者協会 (JUI) 13
 …

【地方行政】 4州のほか、連邦直轄地として首都イスラマバード、北西部アフガニスタン国境の部族地域など。各州ごとに知事、州政府、州首相、州議会。

▽パンジャブ州 州都ラホール

▽シンド州 州都カラチ

▽バルチスタン州 州都クエッタ

▽カイバル・パクトウンクワ（旧北西辺境）州 州都ペシャワール

オ オーストラリア外務貿易省（DFAT）「[出身国情報報告 パキスタン（仮訳）](#)」（2017年9月1日）

2.26 パキスタンの最近の総選挙は 2013 年 5 月 11 日に行なわれた。その選挙では、パキスタン・ムスリム連盟 Nawaz Sharif（ナワーズ・シャリーフ派：PML-N）が勝利を収めた。そして、1990 年代に首相を二期務めたナワーズ・シャリーフが 2013 年の 6 月 5 日に首相となった。国内の観測筋ならびに欧州連合の国際監視団は、武装グループによる攻撃や「手続き上の欠陥」はあったものの、選挙は「強固な民主的コミットメント」を示すものであったと評した。その選挙の結果、パキスタンの歴史上初めて、選出されたひとつの政府から別の政府への民主的な移行が実現した。軍部でも指導者の秩序ある交代が行なわれ、2016 年の後半に Qamar Javed Bajwa が陸軍参謀長に任命されたことも、パキスタンの民主的な統治制度が成熟していることを示している。ナワーズ・シャリーフ首相は、パナマの法律事務所から漏洩した文書に関わる汚職スキャンダルによって最高裁判所から議員資格を剥奪された後の 2017 年 7 月 28 日、辞職した。2017 年 7 月 29 日、国民会議は Shahid Abbasi（シャヒド・アバシ）氏を臨時首相に選任した。総選挙は 2018 年に予定されている。

カ 外務省「[パキスタン・イスラム共和国 基礎データ](#)」（2018年5月24日）

2013 年 3 月 16 日、下院議会が任期満了のため解散。パキスタン憲政史上初めて文民政権が任期を全うした。5 月 11 日の総選挙の結果、ムスリム連盟ナワズ派（PML-N）が勝利し、6 月 5 日、シャリフ PML-N 党首が首相に就任した。2017 年 7 月 28 日にシャリフ前首相が辞職したことに伴い、8 月 1 日、アバシ前石油天然資源大臣が首相に就任した。

2. 人権状況

(1) 一般的な人権状況

ア 外務省「[\(危険情報\)パキスタンの危険情報【一部地域の危険レベル引き上げ】](#)」（2018年7月31日）

1. 概況

(1) パキスタンにおいては、パキスタン・タリバーン運動 (TTP) や「ISIL ホラサーン州」を名乗る勢力等のイスラム過激派によるテロが頻発しています。テロ事件の多くは、危険レベル 3 及び 4 の地域で頻発していますが、それ以外の一部地域でも治安当局を狙ったものの他、宗教行事や礼拝所、デモ等の人の集まる場所でテロが発生しています。

イ ●ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ (HRW) [「ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

Scores of civilians were killed in attacks by the Pakistani Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other armed groups. Members of extremist groups, government officials, and politicians threatened the media and carried out violent attacks on journalists.

Women, religious minorities, and transgender people continued to face violence, discrimination, and persecution, with authorities often failing to provide adequate protection or hold perpetrators accountable.

ウ ●英国内務省 [「国別政策及び情報ノート パキスタン：治安・人道状況（過激派の恐怖を含む）、2.0 版」](#) (2019 年 1 月)

2.4.1 Insurgent, separatist and sectarian militant groups remain active across Pakistan and continue to carry out terrorist attacks – including gun violence, suicide attacks and bomb explosions – particularly against security personnel but also targeting civilians including political activists, journalists, teachers and students (especially female), and faith-based communities. Balochistan experiences the highest rate of militant and sectarian violence, followed by the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Sindh and Punjab

2.4.2 There are several militant groups active in Pakistan and their aims and capabilities may vary. The main cause of militant violence is the instability in the north-west of the country (Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)) after the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001

2.4.3 Simply living in an area where militant groups are active is unlikely to give rise to a protection need. The level of risk will depend on the particular profile of the person, the nature of the threat and how far it would extend. Decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors specific to the person which would place them at real risk. Each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to show that they would be at risk of being targeted by militant groups if returned to Pakistan.

...

2.4.6 From an approximate total of 5.3 million people who have been internally displaced in Pakistan due to internal conflict and subsequent military operations in the 9 years since

2008, up to 250,000 people remain displaced, predominantly in Pakistan’s tribal areas, living in host communities. Although displacement continued in the tribal areas in 2017 and 2018, thousands of IDPs have returned to their areas of origin following improvements in the security situation, with over 83,000 returning in the first 9 months of 2018; however, many people have lost access to their homes and livelihoods. Humanitarian aid is provided for many affected by conflict and natural disasters but recurring disasters, combined with chronic poverty, limit the ability of vulnerable persons to recover and result in additional displacement and humanitarian needs (see Humanitarian situation.

...

2.4.11 The security situation varies across Pakistan and is influenced by factors such as political violence, insurgent, separatist and sectarian militant groups. In 2017, the overall security situation improved compared to previous years. Between 2014 and 2017, the total number of violence-related fatalities declined by over 73%, from 7,655 fatalities in 2014 to 2,057 in 2017; the number of fatalities in the first 3 quarters of 2018 (930) compared to the same period in 2017 (1,585) decreased by 41%. The western provinces bordering Afghanistan, Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), remained the areas where most militant and sectarian violence (suicide attacks and targeted killings) occurred, with Sindh (outside of Karachi), and Punjab experiencing the least. Karachi and Quetta were the most violent cities in Pakistan (see Security situation.

エ ●米国国務省「[テロリズムに関する国別報告 2017 年 - パキスタン](#)」(2018 年 9 月 18 日)

Overview: Pakistan continued to experience significant terrorist threats in 2017, although the number of attacks and casualties has decreased from previous years. Major terrorist groups focused on conducting attacks in Pakistan included the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, and the sectarian group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi al-Alami (LJA). Islamic State's Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) claimed several major attacks against Pakistani targets, some of which may have been conducted in collaboration with other terrorist groups. Groups located in Pakistan, but focused on conducting attacks outside the country, included the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network (HQN), Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).

(2) SWAT を含む地域

ア 外務省「[\(危険情報\)パキスタンの危険情報【一部地域の危険レベル引き上げ】](#)」(2018 年 7 月 31 日)

(ウ) 旧 F A T A 全域

連邦直轄部族地域 (F A T A) はアフガニスタンに隣接する、部族による自治が行われていた地域で、2018 年 5 月 31 日の憲法改正により、K P 州に統合

されました。同地域は、パキスタン建国以来、同国の法制度が行き渡っておらず、反政府武装勢力の温床となっていた面があり、域内でテロや誘拐等が横行していました。K P 州統合後も、そうした事態が好転する見通しはなく、今後、新たに編成されることになる治安部隊が効果的に機能するかどうかも含めて、治安情勢は極めて不透明です。外国人旅行者が立ち入り、何か問題が生じた場合でも、パキスタン政府当局の迅速な対応を期待することは難しい状況ですので、立ち入らないでください。

ウ L o C 等付近一帯

管理ライン (L o C) は、パキスタンとインド間の軍事停戦ラインですが、現在も両国の軍・国境警備隊による銃撃戦等が続発し、民間人の死傷者も出ています。

仮にある時点で平穏が保たれているように見えても、付近一帯の情勢が急変する可能性があります。

以上の地域は非常に危険ですので退避を勧告します。

(3) バロチスタン州

ア ●記事「[3 killed, 2 injured in SW Pakistan's blast](#)」Xinhua (2018 年 9 月 14 日)

At least three security personnel were killed and two others injured when a bomb went off near a government official's vehicle in Pishin district of Pakistan's southwestern Balochistan province on Friday, local media reported.

(4) カラチ

ア ●米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2018 年 パキスタン](#)」(2019 年 3 月 23 日)

Political, sectarian, criminal, and ethnic violence in Karachi continued, although violence declined and gang wars were less prevalent than before security operations in the city. On March 13, however, gang members armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades attacked Sindh Rangers patrolling Karachi's Lyari neighborhood. One Ranger was killed and four injured, while five gang members died in the firefight.

(5) カシミール

[未]

3. 関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い

(1) 政府当局による反対派の取扱い（概論）

イ ●HRW「[ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン](#)」(2020 年 1 月 14 日)

The government cracked down on members and supporters of political parties. Several opposition leaders, including former heads of state and cabinet ministers, were arrested over corruption allegations. Members of the Pashtun Tahhaffuz Movement (PTM) held protests demanding accountability for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

(2) PTI

① 組織の概要

ア ●米国国会調査局 (CRS) [「Pakistan's Domestic Political Setting」](#) (2019 年 4 月 18 日)

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) was founded by Imran Khan in 1996. Centrist and nationalist in orientation, with anti-corruption as its flagship campaign issue, the party won numerous prominent converts after 2011. Although Khan had been a cricket superstar, “jet-setting playboy,” and philanthropist, he led the PTI in relative political obscurity for more than 16 years before emerging as a major player early this decade. In 2013, his party won a majority of provincial assembly seats in the Pashtunmajority KPk province, where it has seen a mixed governance record. Khan has been a vehement critic of the United States in the past and is viewed by some as sympathetic toward Islamist militants. The PTI holds 149 NA seats—almost half of them from the Punjab heartland— won nearly 32% of the 2018 vote nationally, leads both the Federal and Punjab ruling coalitions (the latter under Chief Minister Sardar Usman Buzdar) , and continues to run the KPk province (under Chief Minister Mahmood Khan) .

(3) PML-N メンバー／支持者への危害のおそれ

① 組織の概要

ア ●米国国会調査局 (CRS) [「Pakistan's Domestic Political Setting」](#) (2019 年 4 月 18 日)

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) was established in 1993 by then-Prime Minister Sharif as an offshoot of the country’s oldest party and the only major party existing at the time of independence. With a center-right orientation and home to many religious conservatives, its core constituency is in Punjab province. Under Shabaz Sharif’s campaign leadership the PML-N won 81 NA seats with over 24% of the 2018 vote, and it leads the national opposition alliance.

② 2018 年 7 月総選挙以降の状況

ア ●米国国務省 [「人権状況に関する国別報告 2018 年 パキスタン」](#) (2019 年 3 月 13 日)

In other instances, journalists were beaten, arrested, or disrupted while carrying out their work. On July 13, Punjab province police arrested and beat Kadafi Zaman, a reporter for a Norwegian television station, while he was covering a Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) political rally in Gujrat city. Authorities arrested him along with 38 other individuals, charged him with attempted murder and disruption of public order, and released him on bail after several days in jail.

Before the July national elections, media outlets seen as supportive of the PML-N faced distribution disruptions. The country's oldest newspaper, English-language daily *Dawn*, published a controversial interview with former prime minister Nawaz Sharif on May 12. Beginning on May 15, *Dawn* reported bans on its distribution in much of Balochistan province, many cities in Sindh province, and in all military-administered areas. The Jang/Geo media group also reportedly faced harassment and newspaper distribution blockages. Unidentified individuals reportedly pressured newspaper vendors not to distribute the Urdu language *Jang* newspaper and its sister English language paper *The News*, and discouraged advertisers from advertising with the Jang/Geo group's outlets. In many parts of the country, cable operators dropped the Geo news channel from their cable systems, or repeatedly changed its assigned channel.

Political Parties and Political Participation: There were no reports of restrictions on political parties participating in elections, with the exception of those prohibited due to terrorist affiliations. According to media reports, however, security agencies used pressure tactics--including threats of prosecution for corruption--to convince politicians associated with the former ruling party, PML-N, to switch affiliations prior to general elections. Media and analysts questioned whether the military and judiciary used selective prosecutions of political leaders on corruption charges as a tool to skew the electoral playing field against PML-N. Judges ordered media regulatory agencies to enforce constitutional bans on content critical of the military or judiciary, compelling media to censor politicians' speeches and elections-related coverage deemed "antijudiciary" or "antimilitary." Organizations that monitor press freedom reported direct pressure on media outlets to avoid content regarding possible military influence over judicial proceedings against politicians, and to refrain from reporting on PML-N leaders in a positive way. In most areas, there was no interference with the right of political parties and candidates to organize campaigns, run for election, or seek votes. In Balochistan, however, there were reports security agencies and separatist groups harassed local political organizations, such as the Balochistan National Party and the Baloch Students Organization. Attacks on political party campaign offices, politicians, and supporters spiked due to the July general elections.

イ ●記事 [「PML-N to hold protests against govt policies, rising inflation in Ramadan」](#)
DAWN (2019 年 4 月 17 日)

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) would take to the streets and hold protest demonstrations against the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) during the month of Ramadan, party leader and MNA Murtaza Javed Abbasi said on Tuesday.

ウ ●記事 [「Pakistani opposition leader ordered held for 10 days ahead of by-elections」](#)
RFE/RL (2018 年 10 月 6 日)

A Pakistani court has ordered that opposition leader Shahbaz Sharif be remanded in custody for 10 days after being arrested in a corruption case, meaning he will not be able to campaign for his party ahead of crucial by-elections next week.

(4) PPP

① 組織の概要

ア ●米国国会調査局 (CRS) [「Pakistan’s Domestic Political Setting」](#) (2019 年 4 月 18 日)

Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) was established in 1967 by former Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto. Democratic socialist and home to many so-called “secularists,” its main constituency is in Sindh, where it continues to run the provincial government (under Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah). The PPP Chairman is Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, son of former President Asif Zardari and former PM Benazir Bhutto. The PPP won 54 NA seats with 13% of the 2018 vote, and is part of the national opposition alliance.

(5) MMA

① 組織の概要

ア ●米国国会調査局 (CRS) [「Pakistan’s Domestic Political Setting」](#) (2019 年 4 月 18 日)

Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) is a coalition of five conservative Islamist parties, most notably the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam–Fazl-ur (JUI-F), a Deobandi party led by cleric Fazl-ur Rehman since 1988, ideologically similar to the Afghan Taliban and with links to Pakistani militant groups. The MMA won 15 NA seats—all of them from KP and Baluchistan provinces—with nearly 5% of the 2018 vote, and is part of the national opposition alliance.

(6) MQM

① 組織の概要

ア ●米国国会調査局 (CRS) [「Pakistan’s Domestic Political Setting」](#) (2019 年 4 月 18 日)

Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) is a regional party established by descendants of pre-partition immigrants (Muhajirs) from what is now India. Secular and focused on provincial issues, its core support is wholly limited to Karachi and other Sindh urban centers. The MQM won 7 NA seats with about 1.4% of the 2018 vote, and is part of the PTI-led ruling coalition.

4. ジェンダー、DV および子ども

(1) 女性への攻撃

ア ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所 (UNHCR) [「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#) refworld (2017 年 1 月)

The Prevention of Anti-Women Practices (Criminal Law Amendment Act) 2011 introduced Section 498B into the Penal Code, criminalizing forced marriage. 119 Nevertheless, Christian and Hindu girls and women in particular reportedly continue to be at risk of forced conversion to Islam and forced marriage, within a climate of impunity (see also, individual risk profiles, Christians, Section V.2; and Hindus, Section V.4) .120 The Child Marriage Restraint Act defines a child as a person who is under 18 years for a boy, and under 16 years for a girl. The Act stipulates that men above 18 years of age will be punished for marrying a girl under 16 years of age with a fine of up to 1,000 Rupees, or imprisonment of up to one month. A parent or guardian will also face the same punishment for acting to promote or permit, or for failing to prevent such a marriage or its solemnization.121 The Act does not, however, nullify a marriage involving a child.122 Consequently, once a girl has been forcibly married, there is no available legal recourse. On 14 January 2016, a proposal by a member of Pakistan’s parliament to reform this national law, by bringing the minimum age of marriage to 18 for women and by including more rigorous punishments for offenders, was reportedly withdrawn by the Council of Islamic Ideology who denounced the proposed amendments as “anti-Islamic” and “blasphemous”.123

イ ●英国内務省 [「出身国情報及びガイダンス パキスタン：ジェンダーを理由にした危害／暴力を恐れる女性、第 3.0 版」](#) (2016 年 2 月)

2.3 Assessment of risk
 2.3.1 Pakistan is ranked as the third most dangerous place in the world for women, and one of the most unequal. Violence against women is widespread, be it domestic violence, sexual abuse and harassment,

ウ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

In August, in an important enforcement of laws to prosecute so-called “honor killings,” the parents of Qandeel Baloch, a Pakistani social media celebrity who was murdered by her brothers in July 2016, were denied their request to “pardon” the perpetrators. After Qandeel’s murder, the parliament passed a law closing the pardon loophole used by families to protect perpetrators. However, very few cases of honor killings were prosecuted.

...

(2) 強制結婚

ア ●USCIRF [「USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国） パキスタン」](#) (2019 年 4 月)

Forced conversion of Hindu and Christian young women into Islam and marriage, often through bonded labor, remains a systemic problem. Several independent institutions, including the National Commission of Justice and Peace and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, recognize that an estimated 1,000 young women are forcibly converted to Islam each year; many are kidnapped, forcibly married, and subjected to rape. Hindu and Christian women were particularly vulnerable to these crimes because of the societal marginalization and lack of legal protections for religious minorities, combined with deeply patriarchal societal and cultural norm....

イ ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所 (UNHCR) [「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#) refworld (2017 年 1 月)

Amongst the most marginalized sections of society, Christian women and girls are reportedly particularly at risk of sexual and gender-based violence, forced conversion to Islam and forced marriage to Muslim men, as well as other forms of discrimination and violence.³⁰² It is reportedly difficult to estimate the prevalence of forced conversions and forced marriage due to a lack of reporting and monitoring of these cases; estimates range from 100 to 700 Christian girls being subjected to forced conversion and/or marriage each year in Pakistan; ³⁰³ while Christian men may reportedly also be victims of forced conversion.³⁰⁴

ウ ●英国内務省 [「国別政策情報ノート パキスタン：キリスト教徒及びキリスト教への改宗・3 訂版」](#) (2018 年 9 月)

2.4.15 Regarding women, the Upper Tribunal, in AK & SK, held that: ‘Like other women in Pakistan, Christian women, in general, face discrimination and may be at a heightened

risk but this falls short of a generalised real risk. The need for a fact-sensitive analysis is crucial in their case. Factors such as their age, place of residence and socio- economic milieu are all relevant factors when assessing the risk of abduction, conversions and forced marriages’ (paragraph 246) (see Women and Forced conversions) ...

...

2.4.17 Despite legal provisions to protect against forced conversion, Christian women and girls have been abducted, forced to convert to Islam and marry Muslim men. Government action to prevent forced conversions is reported to be inadequate (see Forced conversions).

※ [同書 1.0 版法務省仮訳](#)

エ ●記事 [「Pakistan : The Tragic Death of Asma Yaqoob」](#) 敞開的門 (2019 年 3 月 13 日)

A Christian woman from north east Pakistan has died from her injuries after being set on fire by a Muslim man. The tragedy took place after an argument about which of them should convert if they were to marry...

...

According to BBC Urdu the opinion of the police is that Gujur merely intended to threaten Asma, and that the fire was an accident. ...

...

Mumtaz Mughal, Provincial Head of the Aurat Foundation, a national women’s rights organisation, told World Watch Monitor, “The statement from the police shows that the suspect will be given a way to get out of this by describing it as an accident, and saying that Gujur is not mentally stable.”

オ ●記事 [「Pakistani Christian killed for spurning Muslim suitor」](#) UCA News (2018 年 4 月 24 日)

A 25-year-old Christian girl has died in Pakistan after a Muslim suitor set her ablaze for refusing to renounce her faith and marry him.

...

In a press statement released a few hours after her death, the Cecil and Iris Chaudhry Foundation, a Catholic group, condemned the "horrific act of brutality" and demanded justice for Yaqoob.

...

Christian housemaids are often subjected to torture and harassment in Pakistan. In 2010, Kiran George was raped and burned by the son of her Muslim employer in Sheikhpura. She also died in Mayo Hospital.

Also in 2010, Catholic maid Shazia Masih, 12, was found dead with torture marks on her body at the house of Chaudhry Muhammad Naeem, former president of the Lahore Bar Association. The Muslim advocate and his family were acquitted by a court in November 2010.

According to a report by the Acid Survivors Foundation, 153 acid attacks were reported in 2014 but the number of victims fell by 52 percent in 2016. Most victims of acid violence were females. About 85 percent of the acid attacks occurred in Punjab. Many children end up victims of acid attacks by being close to the victim.

(3) 女子教育機関等への攻撃

ア ●HRW [「パキスタンで武装集団による学校への攻撃が増加」](#) (2018 年 5 月 14 日)

Last week an improvised explosive device was used to target a girls' school in Hassokhel, North Waziristan, in northwest Pakistan. Thankfully, no children were injured in the attack, although a boundary wall was damaged. That bombing came just three days after another girls' school in North Waziristan was attacked, this time in the town of Mir Ali. Residents said that militants have been distributing pamphlets demanding authorities shut down girls' schools in the area.

...

Deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on schools and universities, their students, and staff have increased around the world over the past five years, according to a new report by the Global Coalition to Protect Education (GCPEA), which Human Rights Watch co-chairs. GCPEA found that the Pakistan Taliban is behind many of these horrendous attacks on Pakistani schools.

イ ●記事 [「パキスタンでさらに女学校 2 校が焼き討ちされる」](#) PTI/The Week (2018 年 8 月 8 日)

Karachi, Aug 8 (PTI) Two more girls' schools have been burnt down by unidentified persons in Pakistan amid a spate of such incidents that have raised concerns over the safety of educational institutions which are often attacked by the militants opposing women's education, a media report said today.

This is the second major incident of attack on educational institutions in Pakistan in a week. On Friday, unknown militants had set 12 schools, half of them all-girls', on fire in the country's north Gilgit Baltistan.

Yesterday's attack took place in Pishin district of the restive Balochistan province. No casualty was reported in the incidents as nobody was in the school in the night time, Duniya News reported.

...

5. LGBT

ア ●HRW「[ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン](#)」(2020 年 1 月 14 日)

According to local groups, at least 65 transgender women have been killed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province since 2015. In January, a transgender woman was killed in Karak, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after being attacked on her way back from a music concert. In July, police in Sahiwal district, Punjab, found the bodies of two transgender women who had been tortured to death. In August, Honey, a transgender woman, was shot and killed in Manshera district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Activists allege that authorities had not brought perpetrators to account.

Parliament passed a comprehensive transgender rights bill in 2018. However, Pakistan’s penal code criminalizes same-sex sexual conduct, placing men who have sex with men and transgender women at risk of police abuse, and other violence and discrimination.

6. 汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護

(1) イスラム教スンニ派過激派組織

① 概観

ア ●USCIRF「[USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国）](#) [パキスタン](#)」(2019 年 4 月)

Pakistan’s overall security has improved since 2015, with fewer casualties attributed to extremist groups’ attacks. However, groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), and Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistani Taliban) continued to challenge national security in 2018. These groups have directly threatened religious minority communities—particularly Hazara Shi’as in Quetta—and have targeted community leaders who advocated for religious freedom. …

② TTP (パキスタン・タリバン運動)

ア 東京地判平成 15 年 7 月 30 日

TTPは、2007年（平成19年）12月に、●●●●が率いるタリバン系の武装部族集団を中心として、パキスタン国内の武装勢力を含むタリバン系の組織が連合してできた連合体であり、イスラム教による国家支配を求めている。（…）

タリバン（TTP）は、イスラム教の戒律を極端に厳格に適用し、西洋的な服装の禁止、音楽や映画の禁止などを標榜している。（…）

イ ●IRBC「[クエリー回答 \[PAK106391.E\]：パキスタン・タリバン運動 \(2017 年](#)

～2020 年 1 月)』 (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

3. 目的

Sources indicate that the goals of the TTP are to establish or enforce Sharia law in Pakistan, combat the Pakistani military [and state (US 1 Nov. 2019, 328)] (Mapping Militant Organizations 6 Aug. 2017; SATP [2017]; US 1 Nov. 2019, 328) , and combat [US-led coalition forces (Mapping Militant Organizations 6 Aug. 2017)] [or NATO forces (SATP [2017])] in Afghanistan (Mapping Militant Organizations 6 Aug. 2017; SATP [2017]) . According to the Mapping Militant Organizations project, the group "seeks to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish an Islamic caliphate in Pakistan" (Mapping Militant Organizations 6 Aug. 2017) .

...

4. 過激派活動と標的

According to the article by Jadoon and Mahmood, the TTP's strategic document indicates that "legitimate targets for attacks" include state institutions such as the "military, police, judiciary, and civilian government," and "NGOs and institutions that promote 'obscenity'," as well as communities of "non-believers or kafir" who "are observed to be working in collaboration with the Pakistani state, or are guilty of insulting Islam"; however, the guidelines instruct the avoidance of "indiscriminate attacks," including against educational institutions and "religious seminaries, public gatherings, and markets ... to prevent mass casualties and loss of civilian life" (Jadoon and Mahmood Dec. 2018, 23)

ウ ●米国国務省「[テロリズムに関する国別報告 2017 年 - 外国テロ組織：パキスタン・タリバン運動](#)」(2018 年 9 月 18 日)

... Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a Pakistan- and Afghanistan-based terrorist organization formed in 2007 to oppose Pakistani military efforts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. ...TTP entered into peace talks with the Pakistani government in early 2014, but the talks collapsed in June of that year. In October 2014, the chief spokesperson and five regional commanders defected from TTP and publicly pledged allegiance to ISIS.

...

Between 2011 and 2017, TTP continued to carry out attacks against the Government of Pakistan and civilian targets, as well as against U.S. targets in Pakistan. In 2012, TTP carried out attacks against a mosque, a police checkpoint, a Pakistani Air Force base, and a bus carrying Shia Muslims. In 2013, TTP attacked churches, the home of a government minister in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, and a Shia neighborhood in Karachi, Pakistan. TTP's attacks in 2013 killed and wounded hundreds of civilians and Pakistani government and law enforcement officials. In 2014, TTP targeted military and police convoys, bazaars,

buses, and schools including two consecutive attacks against Karachi's international airport and a siege on a primary school in Peshawar, Pakistan that killed 145 people, 132 of whom were children. Throughout 2015, TTP focused many of its small-scale attacks on Pakistani government and law enforcement officials by targeting convoys, government buildings, motorcades, and police checkpoints. The group also bombed a Shia mosque near Peshawar and carried out suicide bombings at two churches in Lahore. In 2016, the group continued carrying out attacks, claiming responsibility for a December attack that left the Deputy Superintendent of the police counterterrorism department dead and his son injured in an attack on their vehicle in Peshawar.

エ ●カナダ移民難民庁 (IRBC) 「[パキスタン・タリバン運動 \(TTP\)](#)」 (2014 年 7 月 3 日)

Sources indicate that TTP attacks both security forces and civilians (AI 2013; CFR 18 Nov. 2013; CNN 17 Oct. 2012) . According to the New York Times, "thousands of people" have been killed by TTP in recent years, mostly through suicide bombings (The New York Times 1 Nov. 2013) . The BBC similarly states that "collectively they [TTP] are responsible for the deaths of thousands of Pakistanis" (BBC 9 June 2014) . Amnesty International (AI) states that TTP carries out "indiscriminate attacks using improvised explosive devices and suicide bombs" (AI 2013) . CNN states that TTP has "killed civilians for political and religious reasons" (CNN 17 Oct. 2012) . AI adds that TTP's targets include "members of religious minorities, aid workers, activists and journalists" (AI 2013)

...

In June 2014, TTP gunmen attacked the Karachi airport leading to the death of 28 people, including the gunmen (IHS 8 June 2014; The Guardian 9 June 2014b) . The Guardian states that "the six-hour assault on the airport of Pakistan's economic hub is one of the most serious attacks the country has suffered for years" (ibid.) .

The US Country Reports on Terrorism 2012 provides an overview of major attacks undertaken by TTP in recent years:

Attacks in 2011 included: a March bombing at a gas station in Faisalabad that killed 31 people; an April double suicide bombing at a Sufi shrine in Dera Ghazi Khan that left more than 50 dead; a May bombing of an American consulate convoy in Peshawar that killed one person and injured 12; a May siege of a naval base in Karachi; and a September attack against a school bus that killed four children and the bus driver.

...

In March [2012], a suicide bomber struck at a mosque in Khyber Agency, and killed over a dozen people while injuring approximately 10 others. In May, an attack in the Bajaur tribal region killed 24 people when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a police checkpoint near a crowded market. In August, TTP stormed a Pakistani Air Force base in

Kamra; five Pakistani soldiers were killed in the ensuing firefight. Also in August, TTP militants pulled 22 Shia Muslims off busses in the remote Pakistani district of Manshera before shooting them dead. (US 30 May 2013)

オ ●オーストラリア外務貿易省「[DFAT 出身国情報報告 パキスタン](#)」(2017 年 9 月)

2.84 Despite official disruption efforts, the TTP and its affiliated networks remained the greatest security threat to Pakistan, with the highest overall number of attacks in 2018. TTP is the largest banned group in Pakistan and was responsible for 79 terrorist attacks across the country, resulting in 185 fatalities and 3336 injuries in 2018 (compared to 70, causing 360 fatalities and 360 injuries in 2017) . The TTP—effectively an umbrella organisation for predominantly Pashtun Sunni militant groups—splintered into several separate groups reflecting Operation Zarb-e-Azb, leadership tensions and the rise of ISIL. Nevertheless, in early 2017, a number of these splinter groups re-joined the TTP or pledged support for its leader. The TTP and its splinter groups maintain a separate identity from the Afghan Taliban, although they remain ideologically aligned.

③ JeM (Jaish-e-Mohammed)

ア ●カナダ移民難民局 (IRBC)「[クエリー回答 \[PAK105064.E\] : Jaish-e-Mohammed \(JeM\)](#)」(2015 年 2 月 9 日)

The Pakistan-based group JeM was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the US Department of State in December 2001 (US 30 Apr. 2014, 288) .

...

In a report on terrorist organizations, the Australian National Security, the Australian government's portal on national security, describes JeM as a "fundamentalist Deobandi [1] Sunni Islamist organisation" operating primarily in Indian-administered Kashmir (IAK) (9 Mar. 2012) . The Anti-defamation League (ADL) , a US- and Israel-based civil rights and human relations agency that fights "all forms of bigotry," including anti-Semitism, extremism and hate crimes, by "developing materials, programs and services" (ADL n.d.b) , reports that JeM is a Pakistan-based Sunni "extremist group" that conducts terrorist operations against the Pakistan government, Indian interests in Kashmir, as well as civilians (ADL n.d.a) . Sources also indicate that JeM has targeted sectarian minority groups in Pakistan (ibid.; Mapping Militant Organizations 3 Aug. 2012a; CFR 9 July 2009) .

...

The Australian National Security states that JeM is estimated to have "several hundred members, including 300 to 400 fighters," but that the complete command structure is unknown (Australia 9 Mar. 2012) ...

Sources indicate that since its creation, JeM has had ties with the Taliban (Mapping Militant Organizations 3 Aug. 2012a; FAS 3 May 2004) . The Australian National Security states that Masood Azhar reportedly founded JeM with support from Usama bin Laden, the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) [2], and other Sunni extremist organizations in Pakistan (Australia 9 Mar. 2012) . According to Mapping Militant Organizations, a Stanford University research project that provides information on and "traces the evolution of militant organizations and the interactions that develop between them over time" (Mapping Militant Organizations n.d.) , JeM has created important relationships with other jihadi organizations, including the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba [3], Al-Rashid Trust [4] and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) [5] (ibid. 3 Aug. 2012a) . Furthermore, sources report that JeM has received funding from Al-Qaeda (ibid.; FAS 3 May 2004; GlobalSecurity.org 11 July 2011) . According to sources, JeM is aligned with the political party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F) (ibid.; Mapping Militant Organizations 3 Aug. 2012a; Australia 9 Mar. 2012) , a prominent Islamist party (ibid.; Mapping Militant Organizations 3 Aug. 2012a) .

...

According to Mapping Militant Organizations, JeM is a predominantly Pakistani organization focusing primarily on "high-security government targets, including army bases, camps, and public places" in Pakistan and Kashmir (ibid.) . A 6 November 2014 article published by the Express Tribune, a Pakistani daily newspaper, reports that the group "remains focused on Kashmir and India," has bases in Punjab and urban Sindh and has recently "resurfaced in places like Karachi" (6 Nov. 2014) . A 23 January 2014 report on violence in Pakistan by the International Crisis Group indicates that JeM has a base in Punjab and operates both inside and outside of the country. Sources indicate that Masood Azhar reportedly operates from Bahawalpur, in Pakistani Punjab (Dawn 2 Feb. 2014; The Economist 3 June 2010) . Similarly, a 7 February 2014 article by India Today, an Indian daily newspaper, indicates that JeM's headquarters are located in Bahawalpur.

④ SSP (Sepah-e-Sahaba) / ASWJ (Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat)

ア ●アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター「クエリー回答 : Sepah-e-Sahaba」(2011 年 2 月 21 日)

A profile from the South Asia Terrorism Portal states:

“Earlier termed Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectarian outfit that has been alleged to be involved in terrorist violence, primarily targeted against the minority Shia community in Pakistan” (South Asia Terrorism Portal (undated) Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Pakistan)

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism notes:

“Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) is a religiously-motivated terrorist organization

operating in Pakistan. SSP, a Sunni sectarian group, believes that Pakistan's Shia population possesses too much power and influence and that Pakistan should be governed as a Sunni state. Shias make up approximately 20% of Pakistan's population” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (undated) Terrorist Organization Profile: Sipah-e-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP))

In December 2010 a timeline from the South Asia Terrorism Portal includes for March 2010 that:

“The Interior Minister Rehman Malik said that the SSP and TTP were involved in terrorist activities in the country and warned of strict action against them. Referring to the SSP, the interior minister said it had close links to al-Qaeda and Taliban” (South Asia Terrorism Portal (December 2010) Incidents involving Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan)

...

A report by Reuters in May 2010 states:

“SSP is a pro-Taliban, anti-Shi'ite militant group based in central Punjab. The group was banned in 2002, but officials say its members were suspected of involvement in attacks in the province, including the burning to death of eight Christians on suspicions of blasphemy last year” (Reuters (30 May 2010) Factbox-Major militant groups in Pakistan)

⑤ LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi)

ア ●英国内務省「[国別政策及び情報ノート パキスタン:シーア派イスラム教徒、2.0 版](#)」(2019 年 1 月)

.2.2 The DFAT report added:

‘LeJ and its sub-groups such as LeJ al-Alami tend to be the main perpetrators of violence against Shi’a in Pakistan. The LeJ is a collection of loosely coordinated cells linked to other militant groups such as the TTP and, more recently, Islamic State. Originally based in Punjab province as an offshoot of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the LeJ’s reported objective is to establish an Islamist Sunni state in Pakistan. It also seeks to have Shi’a declared “non-believers” or apostates, and to eliminate other religious groups such as Jews, Christians and Hindus. The LeJ has claimed a number of attacks on the Shi’a community in recent years, particularly Hazaras in Quetta and other Shi’a groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Karachi.’

イ ●オーストラリア外務貿易省「[DFAT 出身国情報報告 パキスタン](#)」(2017 年 9 月)

2.89 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a Sunni paramilitary terrorist group, conducted seven terrorist attacks in 2018 (compared to 10 in 2017. LeJ faction, LeJ Al-Alami, also conducted 8 terrorist attacks in 2017). LeJ primarily targets Shi’a, especially the Hazara

community in Quetta, and also acts against Christians, Ahmadis and Sufi Muslims. In total, the two groups were responsible for killing 132 people. ISKP reportedly supported LeJ as a proxy in Afghanistan to target Shia.

ウ ●ICG [「Pakistan’s Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab」](#) (2016 年 5 月 30 日)

Southern Punjab must be central to any sustainable effort to counter jihadist violence within and beyond Pakistan’s borders, given the presence of militant groups with local, regional and transnational links and an endless source of recruits, including through large madrasa and mosque networks. The region hosts two of Pakistan’s most radical Deobandi groups, Jaish-e-Mohammed, held responsible by India for the 2 January 2016 attack on its Pathankot airbase; and the sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which was at least complicit in, if not solely responsible for, the 27 March Easter Sunday attack that killed more than 70 in Lahore...

⑥ HuA (Hizbul Ahrar)

ア ●オーストラリア外務貿易省 [「DFAT 出身国情報報告 パキスタン」](#) (2017 年 9 月)

2.85 Hizbul Ahrar (HuA), formed from a split within TTP-Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (TTP-JA) in November 2017, and claimed a large number of attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2018. HuA targets law enforcement agencies, and attacks have ranged from small scale IED attacks to complex, multiple attacker or successive attacks across multiple locations.

⑦ JuA (Jamaat ul Ahrar)

ア ●オーストラリア外務貿易省 [「DFAT 出身国情報報告 パキスタン」](#) (2017 年 9 月)

2.86 The UN listed Jamaat ul Ahrar (JuA), an autonomous faction of the TTP, as a terrorist group in 2017. JuA was involved in 15 terrorist attacks (all in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), killing 11 and injuring 16 in 2018 (compared to 37, killing 123 and injuring 306 in 2017). JuA leadership reportedly has close ties to al-Qaeda. Smaller militant groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former FATA, labelled the ‘local Taliban’ for their TTP sympathies, carried out 28 terrorist attacks in 2018 (compared to 29 in 2017).

⑧ LJ (Lashkar-e-Islam)

ア ●オーストラリア外務貿易省 [「DFAT 出身国情報報告 パキスタン」](#) (2017 年 9 月)

2.87 Banned in 2008, Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) is a militant group based in Khyber Agency,

former FATA, which has had contact with ISIL’s Khorasan chapter in Afghanistan. LI was involved in 10 attacks in 2018 (compared to 21 in 2017, 19 of which were in Khyber Agency) .

(2) イスラム教シーア派過激派組織

ア ●オーストラリア外務貿易省 [「DFAT 出身国情報報告 パキスタン」](#) (2017 年 9 月)

2.90 Several other banned Sunni militant groups continue to operate throughout Pakistan, including Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP, also known as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat or ASWJ) and Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM) (see India-focused Sunni groups) . Shi’a militant groups such as Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan (SMP) have attacked Sunnis, although Shi’a militancy has declined as the security situation has improved. SMP reportedly acts primarily in Punjab province to attack Sunni militant groups such as LeJ and SSP, and was responsible for targeted killings of Sunnis in Karachi and Quetta in 2014. DFAT is not aware of any major attacks by SMP or other significant Shi’a militant organisations in recent years, although Shi’a have killed suspected Sunni militants.

(3) 個別の政府関係者による暴力等

ア ●記事 [「Pakistani reporter gunned down after seeking police protection」](#) 国境なき記者団 (RSF) (2019 年 5 月 6 日)

A reporter for the Awami Awaz press group (which publishes the leading regional Sindhi-language daily) and president of the local press club in Padidan, in Naushahro Feroze district, Ali Sher Rajpar was slain in a chilling fashion on the evening of 4 May, when he was shot five times at close range just after locking the press club gate.

The complaint (known as a First Information Report) that his brother filed with the local police the next day names Padidan town committee chairperson Shakeel Ahmed Rajpar as the leading suspect. In several of his recent stories, Ali Sher Rajpar had linked this official to local corruption and had repeatedly been threatened by him.

(4) 過激派の標的とされる集団

① ANP (アワミ国民党 / Awami National Party)

ア ●記事 [「Anti-Taliban Party Official Gunned Down In Pakistan's Peshawar」](#) RFE/RL (2019 年 6 月 29 日)

A local leader of the secular Awami National Party (ANP) was gunned down in Peshawar, Pakistan, on June 29 by unknown assailants.

...

The party has supported the military campaign against militants in the Swat Valley and the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

イ ●ドイツ連邦移民難民庁 (BAMF) 「[Briefing Notes, 8. April 2019](#)」 ecoi (2019 年 4 月 8 日)

In Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, several attacks have claimed at least three lives. In other assaults in the same province, one border guard and two activists of the moderate Awami National Party ANP were killed.

ウ ●HRCP 「[State of Human Rights in 2018](#)」 (2019 年 3 月)

Violence

...

A second fatal attack on 10 July in Peshawar claimed the life of Awami National Party (ANP) leader Haroon Bilour, along with 21 others. Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) leader Akram Khan Durrani's survived an attack on his convoy on 13 July as it headed back from an election rally in Bannu, but four others were killed. Hours after, a suicide attack on a rally in Mastung targeted Balochistan Awami Party (BNP) provincial assembly candidate Nawabzada Siraj Raisani. At least 131 people lost their lives along with Raisani.

Clampdown on opinions and dissent

...

In November, it was reported that the Awami National Party had suspended the basic membership of its two stalwarts, Afrasiab Khattak and Bushra Gohar, for violating its discipline, but did not specify charges against them. It is generally known that both ANP leaders have been very vocal for the rights of the Pashtun, actively supporting the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement on social media by re-tweeting and liking its tweets. The party they are associated with maintains a distance from the social rights movement.

Election-related violence

There were genuine fears of violence during the electoral process though no significant group had issued a clear threat. Yet there was no room for complacency in view of the hostility of religious extremists to any democratic activity.

When ANP's candidate for a KP assembly seat, Haroon Bilour, was killed along with 12 others in a suicide bombing attack in Peshawar about a fortnight before the polling day, the administration's anxieties increased. Soon afterwards a large gathering in Mastung

(Balochistan) came under a bomb attack and a prominent and well-connected candidate for a seat in the provincial assembly, Siraj Raisani, was killed along with 127 other victims. This proved to be the worst terrorist attack during the 2018 elections. On the eve of the election another KP assembly candidate, Ikramullah Gandapur, was killed in D. I. Khan and for this Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) owned responsibility. The authorities were relieved that the number of terrorist attacks during election 2018 was much below the 2013 figure of 148 incidents.

11 July 2018: The suicide attack on an Awami National Party (ANP) corner meeting in Peshawar, which left at least 20 people dead, among them senior ANP leader Haroon Bilour, was strongly condemned by HRCP as a “horrific development in the run-up to the elections”. The Commission demanded that the state should unequivocally condemn the use of wanton violence by non-state actors to disrupt the election process and ensure that adequate protections is given to political candidates during their campaigns.”

エ ●記事 [「ANP, PTI lose highest number of MPs to terrorism」](#) The News (2016 年 4 月 24 日)

PESHAWAR: Khyber Pakhtun khwa has not only lost the highest number of policemen and civilians during the last decade of violence but it also sacrificed several lawmakers and politicians.

Those slain mostly belong to the Awami National Party (ANP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) .

Many senior political leaders of the province survived several attacks on their lives, including suicide bombings and ambushes. Their relatives, friends, guards and others, however, were killed in the attacks.

The ANP and PTI, being the major partners in their respective coalition governments, have suffered the most. The number of attacks on ANP leaders and the killing of its workers are unprecedented.

...

オ ●記事 [「Awami National Party - Pashtun party seeks national role」](#) RFI (2013 年 4 月 29 日)

The ANP is a left-wing, secular, Pashtun-nationalist party – awami meaning “people” – born of a fusion between the pro-Soviet National Awami Party and other smaller groups.

Leaders: Asfandiyar Wali Khan, Bushra Gohar, Afrasiab Khattak

Founder: Abdul Wali Khan

Founded: 1986

In power: North-West Frontier Province/Khyber Pakthunkhwa 2008-2013, junior partner federal government: 2008-2013

...

The ANP also has support in Balochistan and Sindh, including the commercial capital, Karachi, due to the substantial Pashtun populations in those provinces.

Although the ANP advocates dialogue with “moderate” tribal leaders in the tribal agencies, which are largely Pashtun, over 100 of its members have been killed by the Taliban since 2008 and it is a principal target of the Islamist attacks that aim to disrupt the 2013 election campaign.

② 女性／女性教育機関

※ 前記 4 参照

③ ワクチン接種の従事者

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

The TTP and other Islamist militant groups carried out violent attacks on healthcare workers involved in providing grassroots services and polio immunization.

A spate of attacks in April resulted in the government temporarily suspending the polio immunization campaign throughout the country. On April 23 and April 24, police officers protecting polio workers were gunned down in Khyber Pakhtukhwa. On April 30, two unidentified assailants killed a female polio worker in Chaman, Balochistan. The vaccination campaign resumed after the government launched an awareness campaign and asked social media platforms to remove anti-vaccine content.

④ 宗教マイノリティ

ア ●USCIRF [「USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国） パキスタン」](#) (2019 年 4 月)

...During the year, extremist groups and societal actors continued to discriminate against and attack religious minorities, including Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Ahmadis, and Shi’a Muslims. ...For example, the entry of extremist religious parties into the political arena during the election period led to increased threats and hate speech against religious minorities. Also, abusive enforcement of the country’s strict blasphemy laws continued to result in the suppression of rights for non-Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, and Ahmadis. ...

※ 前記 11 「宗教の自由」 参照

(5) 効果的な国家保護を受ける可能性

① 全般的な状況

ア ●米国国務省「[テロリズムに関する国別報告 2017 年 - パキスタン](#)」(2018 年 9 月 18 日)

The Pakistani government and military continued high-profile efforts to disrupt terrorist attacks and eliminate anti-state militants. Progress, however, remained slow on the government's efforts to implement UN sanctions related to designated entities and enforce anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) controls.

The Pakistani government pledged support to political reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban but did not restrict the Afghan Taliban and HQN from operating in Pakistan-based safe havens and threatening U.S. and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. The government failed to significantly limit LeT and JeM from openly raising money, recruiting, and training in Pakistan – although Pakistan's Elections Commission refused to allow a LeT-affiliated group register as a political party.

イ ●米国国務省「[人権状況報告 2018 年 パキスタン](#)」(2019 年 3 月 23 日)

On January 13, police in Karachi (Sindh) shot and killed a Pashtun man, Naqeebullah Mehsud, in what Karachi police authorities initially claimed was a counterterror operation. According to Mehsud's family, he had been detained 10 days earlier. Pakistan's National Commission for Human Rights--an independent government body charged with investigating alleged human rights abuses--concluded police staged a fake raid in order to carry out Mehsud's extrajudicial killing. Furthermore, the report linked then-Senior Superintendent of Police for Karachi's Malir District, Rao Anwar, to the deaths of at least 444 individuals in similar staged police encounters. The Supreme Court ordered Sindh's Police Inspector General to conduct an immediate inquiry into the killing and Anwar's role. Authorities removed Anwar from his position. He fled and was eventually arrested. He was subsequently released on bail, and his trial was ongoing as of December 3.

ウ ●英国内務省「[国別政策及び情報ノート パキスタン：治安・人道状況（過激派の恐怖を含む）、2.0 版](#)」(2019 年 1 月)

2.4.13 The government and security forces retain control of almost all areas of Pakistan, including all major towns and cities. Most casualties are the result of clashes between insurgent groups and the armed forces, rather than indiscriminate, open warfare. The levels of casualties are low compared to the size of local and country-wide population (estimated at over 200 million) . In general, the nature and levels of violence and overall security environment are not such that Article 15c applies. In general, an ordinary civilian is unlikely

to be at risk of harm – solely by being present in areas affected by militant violence – that would breach Article 15 (c) .

エ ●英国内務省「[Country Policy and Information Note, Pakistan: Background information, including actors of protection, and internal relocation](#)」(2017年6月)

2.2.3 Pakistan has a legal framework offering protection and a functioning criminal justice system although its effectiveness varies. The efficacy of the police varies greatly by district, ranging from reasonably good to ineffective. Pakistan’s police system suffers severe deficiencies in a number of areas, including equipment, technology, personnel, training, and intelligence capability. They are considered one of the most corrupt institutions in Pakistan. There have also been reports that the police have often failed to protect members of religious minorities, women and the poor (see also the Country Policy and Information Notes on Pakistan: Land disputes; Hazaras; Ahmadis; Christians and Christian converts; and Women fearing genderbased harm/violence) .

2.2.4 There are reports of police abuse including arbitrary arrest and detention; as well as occurrences of torture, ill-treatment and extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects (see Police and security forces and Human rights abuses by state security forces) .

2.2.5 The army and paramilitary forces, although effective in some areas of Pakistan for combating terrorism and criminal gangs, have been accused of arbitrary and unlawful killings including in fake encounters, as well as torture and enforced disappearances (see Police and security forces and Human rights abuses by state security forces) .

2.2.6 The judiciary is subject to external influences. Whilst the high courts and Supreme Court are generally viewed as effective, lower courts are considered corrupt and inefficient with huge backlogs and lengthy court procedures that often do not comply with fair trial standards. Military courts also lacked transparency and fairness (see Judiciary and the rule of law) .

2.2.7 The reported case of AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31 (IAC) (26 January 2011) , heard on 11 November 2010, found that there is ‘systemic sufficiency of state protection’ in Pakistan.

2.2.8 The country evidence available since AW was heard indicates that in general access to effective state protection remains possible. However each case must be considered on its facts. The onus is on the person to demonstrate that they would not be able to seek and obtain effective state protection

2.2.9 For further guidance on assessing the availability of state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

...

2.3.2 The law provides for freedom of movement within the country, although violence

in some areas restricts this in practice. Pakistan’s size and diversity generally allows for reasonable relocation options depending on the person’s individual circumstances and the security situation in the area of relocation (see Geography and demography, Freedom of movement and the country policy and information note on Pakistan: Security & humanitarian situation) .

2.3.3 Internal location for a woman may be reasonable in some cases depending on their family, social and educational situation (see the Country Policy and Information Note on Pakistan: Women fearing gender-based harm/violence) .

...

3.1.1 In general, a person is likely to be able to access effective protection from the state depending on the nature of the threat and the person’s individual circumstances.

3.1.2 Internal relocation to another area of Pakistan is generally considered reasonable but will depend on the nature and origin of the threat as well as the person’s individual circumstances.

② 宗教マイノリティへの国家保護

ア ●USCIRF [「USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国） パキスタン」](#)（2019 年 4 月）

In 2018, religious freedom conditions in Pakistan generally trended negative despite the Pakistani government taking some positive steps to promote religious freedom and combat religiously motivated violence and hate speech. During the year, extremist groups and societal actors continued to discriminate against and attack religious minorities, including Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Ahmadis, and Shi’a Muslims. The government of Pakistan failed to adequately protect these groups, and it perpetrated systematic, ongoing, egregious religious freedom violations; this occurred despite some optimism about the potential for reform under the new government of Prime Minister Imran Khan....

(6) 国内避難の選択可能性

ア ●オーストラリア外務貿易省 [「DFAT 出身国情報報告 パキスタン」](#)（2017 年 9 月）

INTERNAL RELOCATION

5.31 Article 15 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of movement in Pakistan. Internal migration is widespread and common.

5.32 Large urban centres such as Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore have ethnically and religiously diverse populations, and offer some anonymity for people fleeing violence by non-state actors (see relevant sections) . DFAT assesses that groups facing official discrimination (see relevant sections) will face discrimination in all parts of the country.

イ ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所 (UNHCR) [「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#)
refworld (2017 年 1 月)

In the context of Pakistan, an IFA/IRA will generally not be available in areas which are affected by sustained security and military counter-insurgency operations and retaliatory militant attacks. The availability of an IFA/IRA outside such areas needs to be assessed individually. Areas considered relatively stable may, nevertheless, be inaccessible in instances where access roads to and from such areas are considered insecure.

Given the wide geographic reach of some armed militant groups (as evidenced by high-profile attacks, particularly in urban centres), a viable IFA/IRA will generally not be available to individuals at risk of being targeted by such groups. 444 Furthermore, some non-State agents of persecution, such as local powerbrokers, organized criminal elements, as well as armed militant groups, reportedly have links to or are closely associated with influential actors in the local and central administration, law enforcement and/or judiciary.445 As a result, they often operate with impunity and their reach may extend beyond the area (s) under their immediate control.

...

For Ahmadiis who are found to have a well-founded fear of persecution in their home area for reason of their religion, UNHCR considers that there is no viable IFA/IRA given the widespread and institutionalized forms of discrimination against Ahmadi individuals by the State, as well as the lack of State protection against equally widespread forms of ill-treatment against Ahmadi individuals at the hands of members of society.446

For individuals who fear harm as a result of religious norms of a persecutory nature or harmful traditional practices – such as victims of or individuals at risk of forced marriage, forced conversion or honour crimes – and for whom an internal relocation to another part of the country may be relevant, the endorsement of such norms by large segments of society and powerful conservative elements in the local administration needs to be taken into account.

...

- 7. 兵役、強制徴集 (非国家主体の)
- 8. 司法制度・刑事手続
- 9. 警察・治安部隊 (刑務所等の状況含む)

ア ●英国内務省 [「国別政策及び情報ノート パキスタン:刑務所の状況、第 2.0 版」](#)
(2016 年 6 月)

3.1.1 Prison conditions in Pakistan are extremely poor, but in general they are not so systematically inhuman and life-threatening as to meet the threshold of Article 3. Depending on the particular circumstances of the person concerned, prison conditions may however reach the Article 3 threshold in individual cases. The situation in prisons is reportedly worse for detainees from minority communities, those accused of blasphemy and those on death row. Each case needs to be considered on its facts.

10. 報道の自由

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

Pakistan’s media operated in a climate of fear that impeded coverage of abuses by both government security forces and extremist armed groups. On June 16, Muhammad Bilal Khan, a freelance journalist who ran a popular YouTube channel covering politics, was stabbed to death in Islamabad. In response to such threats and attacks, journalists increasingly practice self-censorship.

Media outlets came under pressure from authorities against criticizing the government. In some cases, regulatory agencies blocked cable operators from broadcasting networks that aired critical programs. GEO TV, a private television channel, was forced off the air or had its audience’s access restricted as punishment for editorials criticizing the government.

On July 9, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) blocked three television news channels—Capital TV, 24 News HD, and Abbtakk News Network—after they broadcast speeches of opposition leaders. The Pakistan Broadcasters Association, a private industry association, claimed that the channels were taken off air without giving them a reason or a hearing. On July 1, PEMRA terminated a live interview with former President Asif Ali Zardari on GEO TV shortly after it began.

On February 9, the Federal Investigating Agency arrested Rizwan-ur-Rehman Razi, a journalist and television host in Lahore, for social media posts that allegedly “defamed state institutions” in violation of Pakistan’s cybercrimes law. Razi was subsequently released. In May, the authorities arrested a journalist, Gohar Wazir, for reporting on protests by minority Pashtuns.

...

11. 宗教の自由

(1) 宗教を理由とした潜在的な難民該当性の類型

ア ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所 (UNHCR) [「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#) refworld (2017 年 1 月)

…This listing is not necessarily exhaustive and is based on information available to

UNHCR at the time of writing....

Individuals who convert from Islam to another religion may be at risk both because they are now members of a religious minority and because they may be perceived as having committed apostasy.177

Finally, while these guidelines do not include a specific risk profile on atheists/agnostics, UNHCR considers that atheists/agnostics may be subject to similar risks as members of religious minorities and may be in need of international protection for reasons similar to members of religious minorities. 178

...

Potential Risk Profiles

1. Ahmadis

...

2. Baha'i

...

3. Christians

...

4. Hindus

...

5. Shi'ites

...

6. Sikhs

...

7. Sufis / Barelvis

...

8. Zikris

...

(2) 宗教の自由に関連する法制度

ア パキスタン刑法 (1860 年 10 月 6 日)

第 15 章 宗教に関連した犯罪

295 条 各層の信仰への侮辱を意図した礼拝所の損傷または冒瀆

礼拝の場所や各層の者により神聖なものとして保持されているものについて、各層の者の信仰をそれにより侮辱する意図をもって、または各層の者がそのような破壊ないし冒瀆を信仰に対する侮辱と見なすであろうと認識しながら破壊する、損傷する、または汚す者は、2 年以下の自由刑ないし罰金、またはその

両方に処される。

295 条 A 信仰又は宗教的信条への侮辱による、各層の宗教的感情への攻撃を意図した故意かつ悪意のある行為

口頭であるか文章であるかに関わらず言葉によって又は可視の表現によって、パキスタン市民各層の宗教的感情を攻撃する故意かつ悪意のある意図をもって、当該の層の信仰又は宗教的信条を侮辱する者は、10 年以下の自由刑ないし罰金、またはその両方に処される。

295 条 B 聖なるコーランの冒涇等

聖なるコーランもしくはその引用を故意に冒涇する、損傷させる、又は汚す者、または軽蔑的でないし違法な目的で使う者は、終身刑に処される。

295 条 C 聖なる預言者の名誉を傷つける言葉の使用

口頭か文章かに関わらず言葉によって若しくは可視の表現によって、または転嫁、暗示若しくは当てこすりにより、直接的若しくは間接的に、聖なる預言者ムハンマド（彼に平安あれ）の神聖な名前を汚す者は、死刑若しくは終身刑に処され、また、罰金を科される。

...

298 条 宗教的感情を傷つけることを故意に意図した言葉の発声等

個人の宗教的感情を傷つけることを故意に意図して、言葉を発声する若しくは当該の者に聞こえる音を立てる又は当該の者の視野において表現行為をする若しくは当該の者の視野にものを置く者は、1 年以下の自由刑若しくは罰金刑、又はその両方に処される。

298 条 A 聖なる人物の名誉を傷つける言葉の使用等

口頭か文書かに関わらず言葉によって若しくは可視の表現によって、又は転嫁、暗示若しくは当てこすりにより、直接的若しくは間接的に、聖なる預言者ムハンマド（彼に平安あれ）の妻たち（Ummul Mumineen [信徒の母]）もしくは家族構成員（Ahle-bait [預言者ムハンマド家の人々]）または正統なカリフたち（Khulafa-e-Rachideen）もしくは聖なる預言者（彼に平安あれ）の仲間たち（Sahaaba [預言者ムハンマドの教友（複数形）]）の神聖な名前を汚す者は、3 年以下の自由刑若しくは罰金刑、又はその両方に処される。

...

イ [米国国務省「宗教の自由に関する国別報告 2016 年 - パキスタン（仮訳）」](#)（2017 年 8 月 15 日）

憲法はイスラム教を国教と定めているが、「法律、社会秩序および道徳に従い、全ての国民は自身の宗教を信仰、実践、および布教する権利を有するものとする」と述べている」。

...

憲法は国に、「少数派の正当な権利および利益を保護する」こと、信仰に関係なく国民の幸福を確保すること、および宗派間の偏見を阻止することを命じている。憲法は、宗教機関の課税においていかなる教団に対する差別も禁じている。

…

市民社会集団は、当局が少数宗派に対する社会的な暴力の事案への介入を怠る場合が多いこと、および警察がかかる攻撃の実行犯の逮捕を怠る懸念を示した。しかし、複数の NGO および報道機関によると、警察による介入が宗教に基づく暴力を阻止する助けになったことが何度かあった。

ウ ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所 (UNHCR) [「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#) refworld (2017 年 1 月)

A. Constitution

Article 20 of the Constitution of Pakistan provides: “Subject to law, public order and morality, (a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion; and (b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.” 37 Amendments made to the Constitution in 2010 provide for seats to be reserved for non-Muslims in the National Assembly and in the Senate.³⁸ Moreover, according to Article 36 of the Constitution, “The State shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and Provincial services.” 39 The Constitution also protects other fundamental rights, such as gender equality, freedom of expression and press, freedom of association and assembly. 40 However, the Constitution also effectively segregates the country’s citizens on the basis of religion into categories of Muslims and non-Muslims, and confers various rights and privileges exclusively on Muslims. 41

…

In a landmark 2014 decision, the Supreme Court held that Article 20 of the Constitution recognizes the individual and communal nature of the right to freedom of religion for every citizen, without distinguishing between Muslims and non-Muslims. 47 The Court emphasized that Article 20 “does not merely confer a private right to profess but confers a right to practice both privately and publically his or her religion”, and also encompasses the “right to propagate his or her religion to others”. 48 It noted that “the right to religious conscience is a right equally granted to all citizens, religious denominations and sects”. 49

B. Penal Code: Blasphemy Laws

…

The introduction of the blasphemy laws in the Penal Code has reportedly fostered an atmosphere of religious intolerance and has contributed to the institutionalization of discrimination against religious minorities. 54 The blasphemy laws have also come under

strong criticism for fuelling extremist violence and targeted attacks against individuals from religious minority groups. 55 Although Pakistan’s blasphemy laws apply to all its citizens, irrespective of religious belief or affiliation, it is reported that such laws disproportionately affect religious minorities.⁵⁶

...

Accusations of blasphemy may carry serious risks for the person accused as well as their families, irrespective of whether the person concerned is subsequently charged with an offence against the blasphemy laws. Individuals accused of blasphemy have reportedly been subject to death threats, assaults, including mob attacks, ⁹³ and assassinations by community members or members of the security forces, either before they are arrested and tried in court, or even after they have been acquitted,⁹⁴ forcing some to go into hiding or to flee in fear of their lives. ⁹⁵ Some persons accused of blasphemy are reportedly tortured or killed while in police custody or detention.⁹⁶ Prison officials have reportedly stated that detainees accused of or convicted of blasphemy are at high risk of attacks by other detainees or even prison staff. In many cases, individuals are reportedly kept in solitary confinement or isolation as a form of protection, sometimes for many years at a time. ⁹⁷

The blasphemy laws are reportedly frequently used by members of society to threaten and harass members of religious minorities, with many allegations made to settle personal scores or carry out personal vendettas, within a climate of impunity.⁹⁸ In addition to the vague framing of charges⁹⁹ and the low threshold for establishing a Section 295C offence,¹⁰⁰ the Penal Code does not require evidence to be presented after allegations of blasphemy are made, and in practice there are reportedly no penalties or punishments implemented against those who make false accusations. ¹⁰¹ Police can reportedly be bribed into registering false charges of blasphemy against members of religious minorities.¹⁰² In an attempt to curb the abusive application of the blasphemy provisions, in 2004 Parliament amended the Code of Criminal Procedure, requiring a senior police officer to investigate blasphemy complaints before registering them with the courts. To date, the requirement has reportedly rarely been implemented. ¹⁰³ In October 2016, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) said that it was “concerned at reports about the large number of blasphemy cases based on false accusation and the absence of investigation and prosecutions”.¹⁰⁴ In May 2015 police reportedly colluded with a religious group, encouraging them to file a First Information Report (FIR) against 68 lawyers, accusing these lawyers of committing blasphemy, allegedly in retaliation for the lawyers’ complaints against the illegal detention of one of their colleagues by the police.¹⁰⁵

(3) シーア派イスラム教徒

① 全般的な状況

ア ●IRBC [「クエリー回答 \[PAK106393.E\] : Pakistan: Situation and treatment of Shia \[Shi'a, Shi'i, Shiite\] Muslims, including Hazaras and Turi, particularly in](#)

Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, and Hyderabad; state response to violence against Shias (2017-January 2020) (2020 年 1 月 15 日)

... Significant numbers of Shi'a live in Peshawar, Kohat, Hangu and Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; in Kurram and Orakzai districts in the former FATA [Federally Administrated Tribal Areas]; in and around Quetta and the Makran coastline in Balochistan; in parts of southern and central Punjab; and throughout Sindh. Although some Shi'a live in enclaves in these cities [Hazaras and Turis], Shi'a and Sunni communities are generally well integrated. (Australia 20 Feb. 2019, para. 3.90-3.91)

...

... Most Pakistani Shi'a are not physically or linguistically distinguishable from Pakistani Sunnis....Some Shi'a may be identifiable by common Shi'a names such as Naqvi, Zaidi and Jafri. Similarly, ethnic and tribal names can reveal a person's ethnicity or tribal affiliation: nearly all Hazaras and Turis are Shi'a, and significant numbers of Bangash are Shi'a.

...

イ ●DFAT 「出身国情報報告 パキスタン」 (2019 年 2 月 20 日)

3.90 Pakistani Shi'a live throughout the country in urban centres, including Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Peshawar, Multan, Jhang and Sargodha. While Shi'a are not a majority in any of Pakistan's four provinces, they are a majority in the autonomous region of Gilgit-Baltistan.

3.91 Significant numbers of Shi'a live in Peshawar, Kohat, Hangu and Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; in Kurram and Orakzai districts in the former FATA; in and around Quetta and the Makran coastline in Balochistan; in parts of southern and central Punjab; and throughout Sindh. Although some Shi'a live in enclaves in these cities (see Hazaras and Turis), Shi'a and Sunni communities are generally well integrated.

...

3.97 Sunni and Shi'a students attend the same public and private education institutions. Students must declare their religious affiliation for entry into both public and private institutions, including universities. Religious bias in public education predominantly affects non-Muslims, but Shi'a groups have raised concerns that the public school syllabus and prescribed textbooks contain depictions of Sunni prayer rituals, and omit prominent historical Shi'a figures.

3.98 Shi'a are well represented in parliament and regularly contest elections for mainstream political parties. DFAT assesses that there are no barriers preventing Shi'a from actively participating in democratic processes in Pakistan due to their sectarian affiliation.

ウ 在イラン日本国大使館「イスラム教シーア派の宗教行事「アーシューラー」について (2018 年 9 月 17 日)

- 1 9 月 19 日 (水) から 20 日 (木) にかけて、イスラム教シーア派の宗教行事「アーシューラー」が行われます。「アーシューラー」は、シーア派イスラム教徒にとって最大の宗教行事のひとつです。この間、欧米諸国やスンニー派アラブ諸国等でも、シーア派イスラム教徒が多数居住する地域では、「アーシューラー」にかかわる宗教行事が行われることがあります。「アーシューラー」は、シーア派イスラム教徒が、預言者ムハンマドの孫ホサインが殺害されたことを悼む宗教行事です。この宗教行事に際して、シーア派イスラム教徒は、自らの身体を叩いたり、泣き声をあげるなどして、ホサインの「殉教」を想起します。
- 2 現在のところ、「アーシューラー」に際して、テロの実行を呼びかける声明などは確認されていません。しかしながら、過去同行事に際して、イラク、パキスタン、バングラデシュなどで複数のテロ事案が発生しているほか、近年、サウジアラビア等の湾岸諸国においても、シーア派関連施設を狙ったテロ事案が増加しています。これらを踏まえ、テロに対する注意を強化する必要があります。

② 政府当局による取扱い

ア ● USCIRF「USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国） パキスタン」 (2019 年 4 月)

The persecution of the Shi'a Muslim community in Pakistan has continued not only at the hands of extremist groups, but in some instances also by the government itself. In May 2018, the BBC exposed the “story of Pakistan’s ‘disappeared Shias,’” which detailed the harassment, arrest, and torture of nearly 140 Shi'a Muslims at the hands of Pakistan’s security agencies. These individuals were often kept in secret detention without trial or any formal charge.

イ ● 英国内務省「国別政策及び情報ノート パキスタン：シーア派イスラム教徒、2.0 版」 (2019 年 1 月)

- 2.4 Risk
- a) State treatment
- 2.4.1 The Shia population is estimated to be between 20 and 50 million (in a total population of just over 200 million) . The state religion is Islam and Shia Muslims are freely permitted to practice their faith. Shias are well represented in government and other public service sectors (see Public representation and Employment) .
- 2.4.2 Whilst there is no reported systematic discrimination against Shia Muslims by the state, there are reports of arbitrary arrests during Muharram (Islamic religious celebration) , related to public order offences (see Discrimination and harassment) .

There are also reports of unlawful detentions and 'enforced disappearances' over the past 2 years, by the Pakistani security services of Shia men suspected of links to Shia militia groups fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria (see Enforced disappearances) .

2.4.3 In general, a Shia Muslim is not likely to face a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm from state actors. If discrimination does occur, it is not likely to be sufficiently serious by its nature and repetition to amount to a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm.

2.4.4 Decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors specific to the person which would place them at real risk. Each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they would be at real risk from the state authorities on return.

ウ 米国国務省「[宗教の自由に関する国別報告 2016 年 - パキスタン \(仮訳\)](#)」(2017 年 8 月 15 日)

(2016 年) 11 月、警察がシーア派の中心的な聖職者である Allama Mirza Yousuf Hussain 氏、およびシーア派で元上院議員の Faisal Raza Abidi 氏を逮捕したことを受け、カラチ (Karachi) で複数の集団が抗議した。…。シーア派の代表者の報告によると、政府は法律の実施活動を口実としてシーア派の活動家を標的にしていた。同州首相はこうした申立てを否定した。

③ 社会における取扱い (冒とく罪による告発を含む)

ア ●IRBC「[クエリー回答 \[PAK106393.E\] : Pakistan: Situation and treatment of Shia \[Shi'a, Shi'i, Shiite\] Muslims, including Hazaras and Turi, particularly in Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, and Hyderabad; state response to violence against Shias \(2017-January 2020\)](#)」(2020 年 1 月 15 日)

MRG also mentions the TTP and SSP or ASWJ as associated with "targeted killings" of Shias, explaining that Shia are targeted by militant groups who have declared that Shias "are worthy of killing," and that there have been "a number of attacks" on Shia pilgrims travelling to and from Iran, noting that the 700 km highway through Balochistan is "vulnerable to militant attacks" (MRG June 2018). According to the US Department of State's International Religious Freedom Report for 2018,

[s]ectarian violent extremist groups continued [in 2018] to target Shia houses of worship, religious gatherings, religious leaders, and other individuals in attacks resulting in at least 41 persons killed during the year. On November 23, a bomb blast near a Shia place of worship in Orakzai District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa killed 33 people, including Sunni and Shia Muslims, as well as three Sikhs, and injured 56. ISIS-K [Islamic State Khorasan Province] claimed responsibility for the attack.

...

イ ●USCIRF「[USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国）](#) [パキスタン](#)」（2019 年 4 月）

…In addition to attacking government and military sites, groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) are known to persecute religious minorities. Along with non-Muslims, these groups often target Shi'a and Sufi Muslims, which has sown deepseated sectarian tensions in the country. According to reports from the South Asia Terrorism Portal, nearly 2,700 Shi'a Muslims have been killed and 4,800 injured in 471 attacks since 2001. For example, in 2018, extremists targeted a Shi'a Muslim seminary with a terrorist attack, leaving nearly 30 people dead and 50 injured.

Groups like the Islamic State, LeJ, and the TTP have particularly targeted Hazara Shi'a Muslims. The National Commission for Human Rights in Pakistan found that nearly 509 Hazaras have been killed in terrorist-related incidents since 2012. …

ウ ●英国内務省「[国別政策及び情報ノート](#) [パキスタン：シーア派イスラム教徒、2.0 版](#)」（2019 年 1 月）

b) Societal treatment

2.4.6 Shia Muslims are regarded as apostates or heretics by some extremist Sunni groups and individuals. As a result, some face hostility and security threats from extremist groups, including the Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-eJhangvi (LeJ) and LeJ's al-Alami faction (for more general information on militant groups, see the Country Policy and Information Note on Pakistan: Security and humanitarian situation) .

2.4.7 The majority of targeted attacks, which usually take the form of bomb attacks at Shia dominated events and venues, occurred in the tribal regions (Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Quetta, Balochistan. Reported numbers of those killed by armed groups in 2017 varied enormously, ranging from 68 to 166. This is in the context of a Shia population of between 20 and 50 million (see Societal treatment and attitudes) .

2.4.8 Targeted attacks by armed groups continue and Shia traditionally represent a higher proportion of casualties from sectarian violence. However, overall sectarian violence against Shias has declined since 2013 (see Sectarian violence) .

2.4.9 In general, a Shia Muslim is not likely to face a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm from non-state actors, though the risk may vary depending on location. Although there continued to be targeted attacks in Shia dominated areas, these are infrequent and do not generally amount to substantial grounds for considering there is a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm. However, decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person which might increase the likelihood of them

facing a real risk of persecution or serious harm. Each case must be considered on its facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they face a particular risk.

6.2.3 The USCIRF report noted in its annual report, covering 2017 events:
 ...in the aftermath of a January 2017 twin terrorist attack at a busy market in Parachinar and Quetta that left more than 80 people dead, the Pakistani Taliban claimed credit for the attack and explained it was meant to “teach a lesson to Shi’as”.’53
 ...

6.2.5 The Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace – ECP), an academic peace research institution located at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Autonomous University of Barcelona), noted in its report ‘Alert 18!’, covering 2017 events:
 ‘The Taliban insurgency was [...] responsible for several attacks, some of them conducted by the Taliban Jamaat-ul-Ahrar faction. Parachinar, the predominantly Shia capital of Kurram Agency, was hit particularly hard by the violence and suffered several attacks. One took place near a Shia mosque in March, claiming 23 lives and wounded 73. In collaboration with the Taliban faction led by Shahryar Mahsud, the Sunni armed group Lashkar-e-Jhan[g]vi carried out another attack on a market in Parachinar that killed 22 people in January. Around 90 people were injured by the explosion, which took place in a mainly Shia area. One of the most serious attacks of the year took place in Parachinar in June, when 72 people were killed and more than 200 were wounded. Lashkari-Jhangvi’s [LeJ’s] al-Alami faction claimed responsibility.’56

6.2.6 The MRGI report of June 2018 stated:
 ‘The targeting of Shi’a professionals by militant groups have continued to the present day, and in recent years these attacks have been especially bloody. Bombings carried out by militants and terrorist organizations have targeted social gatherings and crowded Shi’a areas with near impunity. Shrines have also been attacked on a regular basis, including an October 2017 attack in Baluchistan that killed at least 20 worshippers. There have been no meaningful crackdowns or investigations into the perpetrators of this violence, and police have generally been unable to stop attacks when they occurred.

エ ●DFAT 「[出身国情報報告 パキスタン](#)」(2019年2月20日)

3.93 Shi’a in Pakistan are most prominent during Shi’a religious events and pilgrimages to Iraq and Iran. Shi’a commemorate the Day of Ashura with re-enactments of the martyrdom and processions, during which Shi’a men and women dressed in black parade through the streets slapping their chests and chanting. Selfharm, such as flagellation performed during Ashura processions, can leave permanent marks. Shi’a and Sunni mosques are clearly distinguishable.

...

3.101 Travel in parts of Pakistan is dangerous for all travellers, regardless of sectarian, religious or ethnic affiliations. Shi'a are most vulnerable during large gatherings, such as Ashura processions. Heightened state protection measures during these events partly mitigate the threats associated with this greater exposure....

3.99 Sectarian violence in Pakistan has historically targeted individuals, places of worship, shrines and religious schools, however Shi'a traditionally represented a higher proportion of the casualties (see Security Situation) . Shi'a continue to face a threat from anti-Shi'a militant groups, including LeJ, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) , also known as Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal-Jamaat (ASWJ) , LeJ al-Alami, and other factions of the TTP. The LeJ's objective is to establish an Islamist Sunni state in Pakistan and seeks to have Shi'a declared 'nonbelievers' or apostates, and to eliminate other religious groups such as Jews, Christians and Hindus.

3.100 The LeJ (see Armed Groups) has claimed several attacks on Shi'a in recent years, particularly Hazaras in Quetta (see Hazaras) and other Shi'a groups in the former FATA and Karachi. In an open letter released in June 2011, LeJ leaders declared their intention to 'abolish the impure sect' of 'Shi'a and Hazara Shi'a.' According to the SATP, 114 Shi'as were killed and 308 injured across 10 attacks in 2017. The SATP reports a further five attacks between 1 January and 17 June 2018 killed seven and injured four people. LeJ and LeJ al-Alami, in conjunction with the ISIL, claimed responsibility for many of the attacks.

Anti-Shi'a violence

3.105 Karachi has historically experienced high levels of violence due to rival ethnic, sectarian, political, business and criminal interests. The NAP (see Security Operations) and the highly visible presence of the paramilitary Rangers, have led to a significant decrease in violence, including sectarian violence. Sunnis and Shi'a live throughout the city, although concentrations of Shi'a, particularly Harazas (see Hazaras) can be found in Abbas Town, Hussain Hazara Goth, Mughal Hazara Goth, Rizvia, Ancholi, DHA Gizri, Pak Colony and Manghopir. According to the SATP, at least two sectarian attacks targeted Shi'a in Sindh province in 2017, resulting in at least 90 deaths, while one attack causing one death occurred between 1 January and 6 May 2018. DFAT assesses that a low level of sectarian-motivated violence in Karachi exists within the context of a moderate level of overall violence. The sustainability of recent security force efforts to reduce violence in Karachi is not yet clear.

3.106 In Punjab, sectarian tensions and violence are more prevalent in the south, and in parts of Gujranwala, Sialkot and Rawalpindi. Conservative madrassas and militant groups are more prominent in southern Punjab, and Sunni and Shi'a communities are more

segregated. Shi'a live throughout Punjab, including in Lahore. Shi'a and Sunni communities in cities are much more integrated. According to the SATP, three incidents of sectarian violence in Punjab in 2017 killed three people and injured one, and no incidents of sectarian violence occurred between 1 January and 6 May 2018. The largest sectarian attack in Punjab in 2016 targeted Christians (see Christians) . While violence can occur in any part of Punjab, DFAT assesses that Shi'a in Lahore and Islamabad face a low risk of sectarian violence.

3.107 Balochistan has historically suffered from ethno-sectarian tensions and politically motivated violence, including violence from an active separatist movement. There is a large Hazara Shi'a population in Quetta, the provincial capital, which has historically been a target for sectarian violence (see Hazaras) . Militants also target Shi'a travelling through Balochistan to the Iranian border (see Shi'a) . The number of casualties from sectarian violence in Balochistan has fallen since the introduction of the NAP and Operation Zarb-e-Azb (see Security Operations) . According to the SATP, six incidents of sectarian violence in Balochistan in 2017 killed 38 people and injured 37, and four incidents of sectarian violence between 1 January and 6 May 2018 killed six people and injured two. DFAT assesses that Balochistan has a low level of sectarian violence, within the context of a moderate level of overall violence. Shi'a do not face a higher risk of violence because of their sectarian affiliation, with the exception of the visually distinct and geographically segregated Hazara Shi'a who face higher risk (see Hazaras) .

3.108 The population of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is mostly Pashtun and predominantly Sunni. Most Shi'a live in Hangu, Kohat, Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan. Most Shi'a in Peshawar are long-term residents of the Old City, while many Shi'a in Hangu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan are Turi or Bangash Shi'a from Kurram and Orakzai agencies. Similar to other parts of Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has seen a significant reduction in militant violence in recent years. According to the SATP, one incident of sectarian violence in 2017 killed three people, and no incidents of sectarian violence occurred between 1 January and 6 May 2018. Overall, DFAT assesses that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has a low level of sectarian violence, within the context of a moderate level of militant and criminal violence across the province.

3.109 Most Shi'a in districts in the former FATA live in Kurram and Orakzai agencies. Shi'a comprise around 40 per cent of the population of Kurram Agency; Upper Kurram Agency is estimated to be around 80 per cent Shi'a, while central and lower Kurram Agency is majority Sunni. Most Shi'a in Kurram Agency are from the Turi tribe, particularly in Parachinar (see Turis) . The Bangash tribe is around 40 per cent Shi'a, and lives mainly in Orakzai Agency as well as parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa such as Kohat, Hangu and Peshawar.

3.110 Despite a relative decline in violent incidents, violence across the former FATA is still widespread and sectarian attacks can be lethal. According to the SATP, two incidents of sectarian violence in the former FATA in 2017 killed 92 people and injured 300, while no

incidents of sectarian violence occurred between 1 January and 6 May 2018. In 2017, militants carried out several attacks in the Shi'a-majority city of Parachinar.

On 21 January 2017, a bomb exploded in a crowded market, killing 25 people and injuring dozens more. Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) and the TTP claimed responsibility, saying they were responding to the death of LeJ leader Asif Chotu and support by Shi'a for Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. According to Pakistani news outlets, this was the fourth time militants had targeted the same area of Parachinar in recent years.

On 31 March 2017, a suicide attack on a Shi'a imambargah killed at least 24 people and injured 100. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar claimed responsibility.

On 24 June 2017, two bombs detonated in a market busy with people preparing for Eid celebrations, killing 72 people and injuring more than 200. LeJ Al-Alami claimed responsibility for the attack.

3.111 DFAT assesses that Shi'a in the former FATA face a low risk of sectarian violence, within the context of a moderate level of militant and criminal violence across the region. While attacks against civilians can occur in any part of the former FATA, DFAT assesses that the risk of sectarian violence for civilians in Kurram Agency, particularly in Parachinar, is higher than in other parts of the former FATA.

3.112 Approximately two million people live in Gilgit-Baltistan, a sparsely populated autonomous region in the north. The population comprises Shi'a (approximately 39 per cent), Ismaili Shi'a (18 per cent), Sunnis (27 per cent), and Nurbakshis, who adhere to a Sufi tradition combining aspects of Shi'a and Sunni theology (16 per cent). The mountainous terrain, sparse (and majority Shi'a) population, and the fact that communities tend to live in isolation from each other mean that Gilgit-Baltistan has fewer violent incidents than other regions in Pakistan. DFAT is not aware of any sectarian attacks taking place in Gilgit-Baltistan between 1 January 2017 and 6 May 2018. However, Gilgit-Baltistan's economy is less advanced and it can be hard for people of any faith, especially youth, to secure employment.

オ [米国国務省「宗教の自由に関する国別報告 2016 年 - パキスタン \(仮訳\)」](#) (2017 年 8 月 15 日)

テロ集団も主にシーア派のハザラ (Hazara) コミュニティを標的にし続けた。(2016 年) 12 月 8 日、クエッタ (Quetta) で戦闘員とされる容疑者がハザラ (Hazara) 族の男性 1 人を銃殺した。(2016 年) 8 月 1 日、クエッタ (Quetta) で武装集団がハザラ (Hazara) 族でシーア派の男性 2 人を殺害し、その襲撃について JuA が犯行声明を出した。

2016 年を通じて、身元不明の襲撃者はシーア派、ハザラ (Hazara) 族、およびアフマディー教徒を、イスラム教のイスラム暦のムハッラム月間における複数の攻

撃など、宗教的動機付けがあるものと確信される攻撃の標的にして殺害した。
 (2016 年) 11 月 11 日、3 人のシーア派の学生がバイクに乗った身元不明の武装集団に銃撃された。その学生のうちの 1 人は負傷が原因で死亡した。
 (2016 年) 10 月 7 日、カラチ (Karachi) で発生した 2 件の別々の事件で武装集団がシーア派の男性 4 人を銃撃し、1 人が死亡した。(2016 年) 5 月 7 日、シーア派の市民社会の中心的活动家 Syed Khurram Zaki 氏は、カラチ (Karachi) において明らかに標的にされた殺人で銃殺された。(2016 年) 5 月 5 日、KP のデラ・イスマイル・カーン (Dera Ismail Khan) において、シーア派の 4 人が 2 件の別々の事件で殺害され、その地域で抗議を引き起こした。
 (2016 年) 4 月 8 日、カラチ (Karachi) にあるシーア派のモスクの外で身元不明の武装集団が男性 3 人を殺害した。

カ 米国国務省「[人権状況に関する国別報告 2016 年 - パキスタン \(仮訳\)](#)」(2017 年 3 月 3 日)

2016 年 4 月 6 日に、KP のデラ・イスマイル・カーン (Dera Ismail Khan) で、弁護士 2 人と教師 2 人が、正体不明の武装集団に殺害された。いずれもシーア派教徒であった。
 …。2016 年 10 月 4 日に、クエッタで、正体不詳の武力集団がバスに乗り込み、ハズラ人シーア派教徒女性 5 人に発砲し、4 人が死亡した。…

キ ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所 (UNHCR)「[Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan](#)」refworld (2017 年 1 月)

Shi'ites are reported to be the largest Muslim minority group in Pakistan: they comprise between approximately 15 to 25 per cent of Pakistan's population and include a number of different ethnic groups.³⁶⁵ There are reportedly an estimated 650,000 to 900,000 Hazara Shi'ites in Pakistan, of whom approximately 500,000 are based in Quetta in Balochistan.³⁶⁶ While Shi'ite individuals are not subject to many of the provisions of the formal legal discriminatory framework which affects the non-Muslim religious groups, such as Ahmadis, they are reportedly the main target of sectarian attacks.³⁶⁷ The number of blasphemy allegations made against Shi'ites has also reportedly "increased exponentially" during the period from 2012 to 2015 (see also Section III.B, Blasphemy Laws) .³⁶⁸ Extremist Sunni militant groups³⁶⁹ reportedly view the Shi'ites as "heretics", "infidels" and "apostates" who should be punished with death.³⁷⁰ Shi'ites are reported to be subject to violent sectarian attacks by such militant groups, which are reportedly able to act with impunity.
 371 Hazara Shi'ites are reported to be disproportionately vulnerable due to their visibility; this vulnerability is reflected in the percentage of Hazaras among Shi'ite victims of sectarian violence and attacks.³⁷² As a consequence, Hazara Shi'ites in particular report living in

constant fear;373 threats and risk of attacks reportedly impose severe restrictions on their freedom of movement and consequently their access to livelihoods and education.³⁷⁴

ク ●HRW [「パキスタンのハザラ人コミュニティが攻撃を受けている」](#) (2018 年 4 月 30 日)

This was the fourth attack this April on the Hazara, a Shia Muslim minority. Past perpetrators have been members of armed militant groups that have waged a bloody onslaught against the Hazara for more than a decade, while Pakistan's government has failed both to protect the community or hold those responsible to account.

At least 509 members of the Hazara community have been killed and 627 injured in militant attacks in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province, over the last five years, according to a March report by Pakistan's National Commission on Human Rights. Hazara leaders assert that the number killed was actually much higher.

...

They have been hounded into virtual ghettoization in Quetta's two Hazara neighborhoods by authorities on the pretext of security. Hazara residents say the unrelenting attacks and security measures have cut them off from the city, forcing them to sell businesses and pull children out of schools.

ケ 共同通信「世界年鑑 2018」(2019 年)

17 年 2 月 16 日、南部シンド州セフワンのイスラム教の聖廟で自爆テロによる爆発があり、少なくとも 72 人が死亡。IS が少数派のイスラム教シーア派を狙ったと犯行声明を出した。...

コ ●記事 [「Pakistan vegetable market bomb kills 20 and injures 40」](#) BBC (2017 年 1 月 20 日)

At least 20 people have been killed and 40 wounded after a bomb exploded at a vegetable market in northwest Pakistan.

The blast happened in the city of Parachinar, a mainly Shia Muslim area on the Afghan border.

...

A faction of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) said it was behind the blast, adding its goal was "to avenge the killing of our associates".

④ シーア派 - スンニ派間の結婚

ア ●DFAT [「出身国情報報告 パキスタン」](#) (2019 年 2 月 20 日)

3.95 No legal barriers prevent marriage between Shi'a and Sunnis in Pakistan. While marriages do occur, Sunni-Shi'a marriages are becoming less common in an environment of increasing religiosity. One partner (typically the bride) usually undergoes religious conversion. DFAT is not aware of forced conversions between sects.

イ DFAT [「出身国情報報告 パキスタン \(仮訳\)」](#) (2017 年 9 月 1 日)

3.37 パキスタンには、シーア派とスンニ派の宗派間の結婚を禁止する正式な法律はない。そのような結婚はパキスタンの全土で行なわれているが（ラホールなどの大都市で行われるのが最も多い）、信頼できる筋は、国中で宗教性が高まりを見せている中で、スンニ派－シーア派の結婚はあまり一般的ではなくなっている、と DFAT に語った。宗派間の結婚が行なわれるときは、片方のパートナー（通常は花嫁）が改宗するのが一般的である。DFAT は、宗派間の強制的な改宗については認識していない。

ウ ●IRBC [「クエリー回答 \[PAK106222.E\] : Treatment of persons in mixed Sunni-Shia marriages; ability to relocate to other parts of the country; state protection available \(2017-December 2018\)」](#) (2018 年 12 月 31 日)

1. Treatment of Persons in Mixed Sunni-Shia Marriages

...

The Reader stated that "toleration for mixed marriages [is] somewhat more common amongst the super-elite" (Reader 12 Dec. 2018). The Teaching Fellow similarly stated that mixed Sunni-Shi'a marriages "are usually successful only in the uppermost echelons of society," adding that among "some members of upper class-groups educated at certain English-medium institutions ... acceptability might be much higher" (Teaching Fellow 10 Dec. 2018).

According to the Reader, there is "less acceptance amongst urban/rural non-elites as well as middle-class families, with some being overtly hostile" (Reader 12 Dec. 2018). According to the Teaching Fellow, "generally speaking, the acceptance level will be much lower in rural and tribal areas" (Teaching Fellow 10 Dec. 2018). The HRC representative stated that "[s]uch marriages are more acceptable in [the] educated class[,] which is generally more tolerant and inclusive," adding that, in Pakistan, "[p]eople are more educated in cities than [in] rural areas, [and] hence generally more tolerant" (HRC 14 Dec. 2018). The Teaching Fellow added that "Pahstun ethnic groups, rural landowning families [and] the more religiously inclined ... will also be quite aggressive towards such marriages" (Teaching Fellow 12 Dec. 2018).

The HRC representative stated that acceptance of mixed marriages will vary "from

family to family" and "depends on the culture and value system of a particular family," adding that certain families will not accept such marriages (HRCF 14 Dec. 2018). The Reader explained that "some families would be strongly opposed to mixed marriages," because of the practicalities associated with specific family issues (e.g., divorce, child custody, inheritance, etc.), where subtle Sunni-Shi'i differences can emerge (e.g., in interpretations of Islamic law), or in local contexts where Sunni-Shi'i cleavages have been sharply politicised (thus posing risks for the larger families associated with a mixed couple). (Reader 12 Dec. 2018)

...

2. Ability to Relocate to Other Parts of the Country

According to the HRCF representative, "[i]f there are cases of mistreatment in any particular region, people relocate to the bigger cities where people are usually not much bothered about such issues" (HRCF 14 Dec. 2018). In contrast, the Teaching Fellow stated that "in most situations," the ability for a mixed Sunni-Shi'a couple to relocate to another part of the country "will be very difficult owing to a number of economic, social and legal reasons," and that it will also be just as or more difficult to find a more accepting social situation (Teaching Fellow 10 Dec. 2018).

According to the Reader, a couple would generally need to conceal their "mixed" status to make their relocation desirable (Reader 12 Dec. 2018). The Reader added that "[i]f this status is revealed, social circles may become constrained, offering less protection if the mixed couple were targeted" (Reader 12 Dec. 2018). The Reader further stated that there is no reason to believe that mixed-marriage risks are confined to places with high levels of sectarian polarisation/politicisation ... because although some places are especially polarised along Sunni-Shi'i sectarian lines, there is no place where local norms are such that mixed couples are positively valued as such. (Reader 12 Dec. 2018)

3. State Protection

According to the HRCF representative, "[t]here are no special departments or agencies to deal with the problems of people in mixed marriages in Pakistan" (HRCF 14 Dec. 2018). The HRCF representative added that "[i]f there is a security issue or any other problem, people in mixed marriages can always contact the police or other law enforcement agencies" (HRCF 14 Dec. 2018). However, the Reader stated that "state authorities are generally reluctant to get involved in 'family matters' like marriage choices, particularly where, in a strict sense, the marriage is not actually illegal so the authorities are being called upon to protect the couple against extra-legal family norms" (Reader 12 Dec. 2018). Similarly, the Teaching Fellow stated that "it will be almost impossible" for authorities to intervene if cases of mistreatment are not considered crimes (Teaching Fellow 10 Dec. 2018).

...

⑤ シーア派イスラム教徒への国家保護

ア ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所 (UNHCR) [「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#) refworld (2017 年 1 月)

a) **Situation of Shi'ite Individuals in Pakistan**

The government has been criticized for failing to protect Shi'ite Muslims from attacks, and for allowing militant organizations to operate with impunity by failing to investigate and punish those responsible for violent attacks against Shi'ites in Pakistan. 375...

(4) キリスト教徒

① 全般的な状況

ア ●英国内務省 [「国別政策情報ノート パキスタン：キリスト教徒及びキリスト教への改宗・3 訂版」](#) (2018 年 9 月)

1.2.2 Church networks in Pakistan include:

- Roman Catholics: All Christians in communion with the Church of Rome.
- Protestants: Christians in churches originating in or in communion with the Western world's 16th-century Protestant Reformation. Includes Anglicans, Lutherans and Baptists (any of whom may be Charismatic) and denominational Pentecostals, but not Independent traditions such as Independent Baptists nor independent Charismatics.
- Independents: Believers who do not identify with the major Christian traditions (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Protestant) .
- Unaffiliated Christians: Persons professing publicly to be Christians but who are not affiliated to churches. Doubly-affiliated Christians: Persons affiliated to or claimed by 2 denominations at once.
- Evangelicals: Churches, denominations, and individuals who identify themselves as evangelicals by membership in denominations linked to evangelical alliances (e.g., World Evangelical Alliance) or by selfidentification in polls.
- Renewalists: Church members involved in the Pentecostal/Charismatic/Indep

イ ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所 (UNHCR) [「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#) refworld (2017 年 1 月)

There are reported to be between 2.05 million and 2.09 million Christians in Pakistan,

with between 82.5 and 90 per cent of Christians living in Punjab province.²⁶³

a) Situation of Christian Individuals in Pakistan

State authorities, including the police, have been criticized for having failed to intervene to protect Christian individuals from violent attacks and for failing to adequately investigate incidents of discrimination or violence, ²⁶⁴ although in some cases the police are reported to have intervened and protected Christians from attacks by members of the community.²⁶⁵ ...

...

In 2015, four Christians were reportedly charged with blasphemy.²⁷⁷ In 2014 there were reportedly five blasphemy cases against Christians, and at least three Christians were sentenced to death following a conviction for blasphemy.²⁷⁸ On 16 October 2014, the Lahore High Court upheld the death sentence of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman convicted of blasphemy in 2010. In July 2015, the Supreme Court suspended her execution pending the outcome of her appeal.²⁷⁹ (See also Section III.B, Blasphemy Laws.)

ウ ●英国内務省「[国別政策情報ノート パキスタン：キリスト教徒及びキリスト教への改宗・3 訂版](#)」(2018 年 9 月)

2.4.2 In AK & SK the Upper Tribunal held that: ‘Evangelism by its very nature involves some obligation to proselytise. Someone who seeks to broadcast their faith to strangers so as to encourage them to convert, may find themselves facing a charge of blasphemy. In that way, evangelical Christians face a greater risk than those Christians who are not publicly active. It will be for the judicial fact-finder to assess on a case by case basis whether, notwithstanding attendance at an evangelical church, it is important to the individual to behave in evangelical ways that may lead to a real risk of persecution’ (paragraph 242) .

2.4.3 In AK & SK the Upper Tribunal held that ‘Unlike the position of Ahmadis, Christians in general are permitted to practise their faith, can attend church, participate in religious activities and have their own schools and hospitals’ (paragraph 241) .

2.4.4 There are no laws that discriminate against Christians in Pakistan, although comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation is lacking. Christians have their own personal laws regarding marriage and divorce; however, there are reports that some local administrations denied marriage registrations. Christian festivals are officially recognised (see Legal context) .

2.4.5 In AK & SK the Upper Tribunal held that ‘Along with Christians, Sunnis, Shi’as, Ahmadis and Hindus may all be potentially charged with blasphemy. Those citizens who are more marginalised and occupy low standing social positions, may be less able to deal with the consequences of such proceedings’ (paragraph 243) (see Blasphemy allegations) .

2.4.6 There have been reports of unlawful arrests and detention of Christians, and mistreatment of detainees whilst in police custody. There are reports of Christians being charged under the blasphemy laws and sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Courts have been reported to use the blasphemy laws discriminatorily against religious minorities. Blasphemy laws are disproportionately used against religious minorities, including Christians. The blasphemy laws apply to, and have been used against, all religious groups, including Muslims (see State treatment and attitudes – Police and judiciary and Blasphemy allegations) .

2.4.7 Evangelising Christians may find themselves particularly affected by the blasphemy laws, which carry severe penalties, and may be able to demonstrate that use of the blasphemy laws against them while practicing their religion could amount to persecution (see Blasphemy laws) .

2.4.8 In comparison to the population of Christians in Pakistan against the number of reported incidents, in general, the level of state discrimination faced by Christians does not amount to a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm. Although there have been reported incidents of police harassment of some Christians, these are not sufficiently serious by their nature and repetition as to amount to persecution and/or serious harm and, in comparison to the population of Christians, the number of incidents is very low, indicating there is no real risk. However, decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors specific to the person which would place them at real risk. Each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they would be at real risk from the state authorities on return.

※ [同書 1.0 版法務省仮訳](#)

② 政府当局による取扱い

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

In May, Asia Bibi, a Christian woman who had spent eight years on death row for blasphemy, was released and allowed to rejoin her family in Canada. The Pakistan Supreme Court had acquitted Asia in October 2018, but she had remained in custody due to nationwide protests by religious groups.

イ ●USCIRF [「USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国） パキスタン」](#) (2019 年 4 月)

…Frequently, the arrests and charges occurred in an atmosphere of societal harassment or violence. For example, in February 2018, two teenage Christians were arrested in Lahore after one of them posted an allegedly “sacrilegious photo” to a Facebook group. During the interrogation with police, one of the arrested teenagers jumped from a window in order to evade torture by the interrogators. Subsequently, religious extremist groups carried out

violent protests in the teenagers' predominantly Christian neighborhood, threatening to burn down the entire area and its inhabitants. Nearly 800 Christians living in the area fled for fear of attacks, and the families of the accused have fled the area for the same reason....

③ 社会における取扱い（冒とく罪による告発を含む）

ア ●USCIRF [「USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国） パキスタン」](#)（2019 年 4 月）

Many individuals accused of blasphemy never made it to the courtroom as vigilante violence has caused the murder of 62 people since 1990, with very few prosecutions for mob violence or lynching. For example, in August 2018, various courts cleared nearly 113 suspects of wrongdoing for their 2014 involvement in a mob that burned alive a Christian couple who were falsely accused of blasphemy...

イ ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所（UNHCR）[「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#) refworld（2017 年 1 月）

b) Treatment of Christian Individuals by Non-State Actors

Attacks and incidents of mob violence targeting Christians reportedly continue to occur throughout the country; analysts attribute the violence in part to the growing influence of Sunni extremist ideology.²⁸⁰ Militant groups have conducted attacks in particular during church services or religious processions.²⁸¹...

...

Criminal provisions, particularly the blasphemy laws, are reportedly used by militant organizations and members of some Muslim communities to intimidate and harass Christians, and also reportedly to exact revenge or to settle personal or business disputes.²⁹²...

...

ウ ●英国内務省 [「国別政策情報ノート パキスタン：キリスト教徒及びキリスト教への改宗・3 訂版」](#)（2018 年 9 月）

2.4.11 Both evangelical and non-evangelical Christians face discrimination and violence because of their faith. Discrimination against Christians exists in many aspects of employment and education. Christians from the lower classes may experience higher levels of discrimination than those from higher socio-economic backgrounds. Christians experience discrimination in employment and are generally expected to work in menial jobs. However, some members of the Christian community in Faisalabad have become more socially and economically empowered and have integrated with the local Muslim

community (see Discrimination in education and employment and Discrimination and harassment) .

2.4.12 There are reports of harassment, threats and violence, including targeted attacks by militant groups – sometimes resulting in death – against Christians (see Societal treatment and attitudes – Discrimination and harassment, Blasphemy allegations and Communal and militant violence, and Discrimination in education and employment) .

2.4.13 In AK & SK the Upper Tribunal held that: ‘The risk of becoming a victim of a blasphemy allegation will depend upon a number of factors and must be assessed on a case by case basis. Relevant factors will include the place of residence, whether it is an urban or rural area, and the individual’s level of education, financial and employment status and level of public religious activity such as preaching. These factors are not exhaustive’ (paragraph 244) .

‘Non-state agents who use blasphemy laws against Christians, are often motivated by spite, personal or business disputes, arguments over land and property. Certain political events may also trigger such accusations. A blasphemy allegation, without more will not generally be enough to make out a claim for international protection under the Refugee Convention. It has to be actively followed either by the authorities in the form of charges being brought or by those making the complaint. If it is, or will be, actively pursued, then an applicant may be able to establish a real risk of harm in the home area and an insufficiency of state protection’ (paragraph 245) .

2.4.14 Religious minorities are disproportionately affected by the misuse of the blasphemy laws, which are frequently used for personal or political gain. Whether or not a blasphemy charge is found to be true, the accused, their family and the whole community may be at risk of vigilante violence (see Blasphemy allegations and Communal and militant violence) .

...

2.4.18 In general, there is not a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm of Christians in Pakistan by non-state actors. Although there have outbreaks of communal violence, particularly in relation to blasphemy accusations, these are not sufficiently serious by their nature and repetition as to amount to persecution or serious harm. However, decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the specific person which might make the treatment serious by its nature and repetition. Each case must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they would be at real risk from the state authorities on return.

エ ●記事 [「Pakistani Christians Killed In Drive-By Shooting」](#) RFE/RL (2018 年 4 月 16 日)

Pakistani officials say two Christians have been killed in a drive-by shooting outside a

church in the country's southwest.

The Islamic State (IS) extremist group claimed responsibility for the attack on April 15 outside a church in the city of Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan Province.

...

In December, two suicide bombers blew themselves up at a Quetta church, which was packed with worshippers, killing nine people and wounding over a dozen.

オ ●記事「[Two attacks on Pakistani Christians after Easter. Four Catholics killed](#)」
Vatican News (2018 年 4 月 4 日)

Four members of a Catholic family were killed in a militant attack in the southwestern province of Balochistan on Easter Monday, and in another incident the following day, a group attacked worshippers in a Christian church in Punjab province, injuring many.

...

The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement carried by its Aamaq news agency.

カ ●記事「[Deadly attack on Methodist church in Pakistan](#)」BBC (2017 年 12 月 18 日)

Militants stormed the church, which was packed with worshippers at the time, in the city of Quetta, some 65km (40 miles) from the Afghan border.

The Islamic State group has said it carried out the attack.

キ ●記事「[Pakistan capital bans Valentine's Day](#)」BBC (2017 年 2 月 13 日)

The Islamabad High Court's order prohibits all Valentine's Day festivities in government offices and public spaces with immediate effect.

It also directs the media not to promote or cover Valentine's events.

The orders were a response to a private petition which argued that Valentine's Day was contrary to Islamic teaching.

ク 記事「[パキスタンの 2 都市でテロ攻撃、11 人死亡](#)」CNN (2016 年 9 月 2 日)

パキスタン北部で 2 日、隣接する 2 つの都市を狙ったテロ攻撃が発生し、少なくとも 11 人が死亡した。

...

同日の早朝には隣接するペシャワールで、キリスト教徒の居住地域を標的にした

テロ攻撃が起きた。

④ キリスト教徒への国家保護

ア ●USCIRF [「USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国） パキスタン」](#)（2019 年 4 月）

Pakistan’s best-known case of blasphemy is that of Asia Bibi, a Christian woman whom the Supreme Court acquitted of blasphemy charges in October 2018 after a lower court sentenced her to death in 2010. The Supreme Court’s landmark decision criticized the lower court judges and prosecutors for pursuing falsely accused blasphemy cases that did not meet the requirements of Pakistan’s evidentiary rules. While the Supreme Court highlighted institutional biases faced by minorities accused of blasphemy, the decision justified and defended Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. Further, despite being acquitted by the Supreme Court, Asia Bibi lost nearly a decade of her life in prison due to a false accusation of blasphemy, a fate shared by many individuals accused of blasphemy who similarly languish in jail during the delayed justice process. Further, religious extremist leaders and preachers virulently attacked the Supreme Court’s decision and threatened that their followers would murder Asia Bibi if she were released. Accordingly, the government of Pakistan kept Asia Bibi and her family’s location confidential after her November release from prison. In January 2019, after the reporting period, the Supreme Court upheld her acquittal, clearing a path for her to leave the country

イ ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所（UNHCR）[「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#) refworld（2017 年 1 月）

State authorities, including the police, have been criticized for having failed to intervene to protect Christian individuals from violent attacks and for failing to adequately investigate incidents of discrimination or violence, 264 although in some cases the police are reported to have intervened and protected Christians from attacks by members of the community.265 ...

(5) アハマディア

① 政府当局による取扱い

ア パキスタン憲法（1973 年（2004 年 7 月 31 日改定））

第 5 章 - 解釈
 定義
 260 条

- ...
- (3) 憲法および全ての制定法ないし法律文書上、題目又は文脈における矛盾がない限り、
- (a) 「ムスリム」とは、全知全能の神の単一性及び唯一性、最後の預言者である預言者ムハンマド（彼に平安あれ）の絶対不変性及び無条件の最終性を信じ、かつ、いかなる言葉の意味若しくはいかなる表現においてであれ、ムハンマド（彼に平安あれ）後の、預言者であると主張した若しくは主張するいかなる者も信じていない、またはその者が預言者若しくは宗教改革者であると認めない者を意味する。
- (b) 「非ムスリム」とは、ムスリムではない者を意味し、キリスト教徒、ヒンドゥー教徒、シーク教徒、仏教徒若しくはパルシー教徒コミュニティに属する者、（「アハマディ」と自称しようが何と呼ぼうと）カディアン派集団若しくはラホール派集団の者、またはバハイ人、および指定カーストのいずれかに属する者を含む。

イ パキスタン刑法（1860 年 10 月 6 日）

- 298 条 B 特定の聖なる人物や場所に限定されている形容辞、表現や肩書き等の誤用
- (1) （「アハマディ」と自称しようが何と呼ぼうと）カディアン派集団及びラホール派集団の者で、口頭か文書かに関わらず言葉によって若しくは可視の表現によって、
- (a) カリフ若しくは聖なる預言者ムハンマド（彼に平安あれ）の仲間たち以外の者について、「Ameer-ul-Mumineen [信徒の指導者]」、「Khalifatul-Mumineen [信徒の後継者]」、「Sahaabi [預言者ムハンマドの教友（単数形）]」若しくは「Razi Allah Anho [彼／彼女にアラーのご満悦あれ]」と言及する若しくは呼ぶ者、
- (b) 聖なる預言者ムハンマド（彼に平安あれ）の妻以外の者を、「Ummul-Mumineen」として言及する若しくは呼ぶ者、
- (c) 聖なる預言者ムハンマド（彼に平安あれ）の家族構成員「Ahle-bait」以外の者を、「Ahle-bait」として言及する若しくは呼ぶ者、並びに、
- (d) 自身の礼拝の場所を「Masjid」と言及する、名付ける若しくは呼ぶ者は、3 年以下の自由刑に処され、罰金も科される。
- (2) （「アハマディ」と自称しようが何と呼ぼうと）カディアン派集団及びラホール派集団の者で、口頭か文書かに関わらず言葉によって若しくは可視の表現によって、礼拝の呼びかけの様態若しくは形態を「アザーン」と呼ぶ、又はムスリムが使うようにアザーンを唱える者は、3 年以下の自由刑に処され、罰金も科せられる。
- 298 条 C カディン・グループ等の者が、自身をムスリムと呼ぶこと、又は自身の

信仰を説教若しくは布教すること

（「アハマディ」と自称しようが何と呼ぼうと）カディアン派集団及びラホール派集団の者で、直接的又は間接的に、自らムスリムのふりをする、又は自身の信仰をイスラムと呼ぶ若しくは言及する者、あるいは他の者に自らの信仰を認めさせる者は、口頭か文書かに関わらず言葉によって若しくは可視の表現によるかに関わらず、ムスリムの宗教的な感情を憤慨させる者は、3年以下の自由刑に処され、罰金も科せられる。

ウ ●国連難民高等弁務官事務所 (UNHCR) [「Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan」](#) refworld (2017年1月)

C. Penal Code: Anti-Ahmadi Laws

As noted above (see Section III.A) , since 1974 Ahmadis have been categorized as non-Muslim by the Constitution, even though they consider themselves to be Muslim.¹⁰⁶ In 1984, then President Zia ulHaq further institutionalized anti-Ahmadi sentiment in Pakistan through amendments to the Penal Code which introduced Sections 298B and 298C into the Penal Code through Ordinance No. XX.¹⁰⁷ Commonly referred to as the “anti-Ahmadi laws”, these amendments render certain Ahmadi religious practices illegal and have been widely criticized for violating the Ahmadis’ fundamental right to freedom of religion and other rights. ¹⁰⁸

Potential Risk Profiles

1. Ahmadis

The Ahmadiyya Jama’at (or Ahmadi movement) was established in 1889 in India as a reformist movement within Islam. Estimates for the size of the Ahmadi population in Pakistan vary from 126,000 to several million.¹⁸⁴ The headquarters of the Ahmadi community in Pakistan are in Rabwah, Punjab province, where Ahmadis are reported to constitute over 97 per cent of the population.¹⁸⁵

...

a) Legislative Framework Concerning Ahmadi Individuals

...

Through these anti-Ahmadi laws, the State has imposed severe restrictions on the non-derogable right to freedom of religion of Ahmadi individuals in Pakistan.¹⁹⁷ The anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws are reportedly often used by State authorities as well as by members of society to target and harass followers of, and converts to, the Ahmadi faith.¹⁹⁸ The vague wording of Section 295C has reportedly particularly affected Ahmadi individuals, as in some cases, judges have reportedly interpreted the expression of Ahmadi

religious beliefs by Ahmadis as a form of blasphemy.¹⁹⁹ In 2015, according to Ahmadi groups, authorities charged 11 Ahmadis with offences in religion-related cases during the year, of whom six were taken into custody. ²⁰⁰ According to reports, members of the Ahmadi community are often accused of religious offences on false grounds or to settle personal or business disputes.²⁰¹

b) Situation of Ahmadi Individuals in Pakistan

Ahmadi individuals face discrimination as a result of State-sanctioned measures which impose limitations on the civil and political rights of Ahmadi individuals. Pakistani passports reportedly include information about the bearer’s religious affiliation.²⁰² Muslims who apply for a passport are required to make a declaration to the effect that they denounce the Ahmadiyya movement’s founder as a false prophet and his followers as non-Muslims, and must declare that they believe the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet.²⁰³ This declaration effectively means that Ahmadis must either deny their faith or forego the possibility of obtaining a passport. …

…

エ ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

The provisions of Pakistan’s penal code, which perpetuate discrimination against the Ahmadis, a religious minority, remain unchanged. In August, the district administration in Lahore sealed an Ahmadiyya prayer center after the local clerics objected to Ahmadis being allowed to pray openly.

オ ●USCIRF [「USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国） パキスタン」](#) (2019 年 4 月)

Anti-Ahmadiyya Laws and Attacks

Ahmadis are subject to severe legal restrictions and suffer from officially sanctioned discrimination. In addition to the constitution’s second amendment that declares Ahmadis to be “non-Muslims,” Penal Code section 298 criminalizes Ahmadis referring to themselves as Muslims; preaching, propagating, or disseminating materials on their faith; or referring to their houses of worship as mosques. They also are prohibited from voting as Muslims and were denied registration under joint electoral lists in 2018, relegating them to separate electoral lists that command less political power.

② 社会における取扱い

ア ●USCIRF [「USCIRF 年次報告 2019 年：第一階層国（特定注視国の指定が勧告される国） パキスタン」](#) (2019 年 4 月)

Ahmadis frequently face societal discrimination, arrest, harassment, and physical attacks,

sometimes resulting in murder. The Ahmadiyya community suffered two serious attacks on their mosques in 2018. In May, a mob of nearly 600 people destroyed a 100-year-old historical Ahmadiyya mosque in Punjab Province. The mob included a local leader with ties to the leading political party in Pakistan, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The mosque and adjacent historically preserved home were once inhabited by the Ahmadiyya Muslim community's founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad....

(6) ヒンドゥー教徒

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

In April, a tailor in Taxila, Punjab, was arrested after local traders and religious leaders accused him of blasphemy. In May, riots erupted in Mirpurkhas, Sindh, after a Hindu veterinary doctor was accused of blasphemy for allegedly providing medicines wrapped in paper printed with Islamic verses.

(7) イスラム教スンニ派からの改宗

ア ●DFAT [「出身国情報報告 パキスタン」](#) (2019 年 2 月 20 日)

3.81 ...Religious conversion from Islam (apostasy), while not illegal, is often seen as blasphemous and can result in prosecution under blasphemy laws, or familial or communal violence. Article 295A prohibits insulting any religion, not just Islam, and carries a sentence of up to ten years' imprisonment, which may also be accompanied by a fine.

12. 国籍、民族および人種

(1) ハザラ人

ア ●HRW [「ワールドレポート 2020 - パキスタン」](#) (2020 年 1 月 14 日)

On April 12, 20 people were killed, and 48 injured in an improvised explosive device attack in a market in Quetta, Balochistan, targeting the Hazara community. On July 21, nine people including six policemen were killed in two attacks in Dera Ismail Khan district, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The TTP claimed responsibility for all the attacks.

13. 出入国および移動の自由

14. その他